

# THE ISSUE OF LEBANON

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**Elements for an analytical approach**



**Lebanese Forces Command**  
**Foreign Relations Department**

April 1982

للتنويع والأبحاث

Documentation & Research

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" The Lebanese Issue: Elements for an analytical survey",  
is a set of studies on various subjects that aim to point out,  
as clearly as possible, the fundamental problems this country  
has to face after seven years of war.

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LEBANON SINCE 13/4/1975

The situation into which Lebanon has been plunged since April 13, 1975 was discussed, in general terms, by Ambassador Nagib Dahdah in the report he presented on behalf of the Democratic Christian Union at the meeting of the Democratic European Union in Lisbon on June 24, 1980.

The following is a translation of that text, still relevant as ever, followed by a brief run-down of the following events:

History

The country of Lebanon has risen up out of the territories which in ancient times, belonged to the Phoenicians. The Phoenicians, being separated from the inland areas by two chains of mountains, turned, naturally enough, towards the Mediterranean, that is to say towards the West with which they exchanged both goods and ideas. Similarly, in modern times, the Lebanese have always been attracted by the sea and by commerce. Thus the same circumstances have produced the same results.

From the VI Century onwards, human and sociological elements came into play above and beyond the inalterable geographical facts mentioned above. The Lebanese mountains gradually came to represent a place of refuge. The Maronite Church settled there, driven from Asia Minor by persecutions. Other Christian sects as well as Islamic splinter groups like the Shiites and the Druzes, soon followed. After carving their homes out of the rocks, transforming the arid soil into arable terraces and holding out against invasions, these mountain-dwellers came to imprint on Lebanon its character as a separate entity autonomous at first, and later independent.




In the wake of the Crusades came the first attempts at autonomy, in the form of a coalition between Christians and non-Christians, created in the XVI Century, under the leadership of Emirs, the first of whom were Muslim and Druzes, while their successors became Christians. This coalition lasted until 1842. Volney, a French writer of the XVIII Century, visited the region and described this régime in these meaningful terms: " A well-measured blend of aristocracy, monarchy and democracy. Unlike their Turkish neighbours, here, all enjoy their property, their lives and a measure of freedom in secure surroundings."

The second period of autonomy was forced upon the Ottoman Empire by the great European Powers who held four conferences to this effect: August 3, 1860, February 19 and March 15, 1861 in Paris, and June 9, 1861 in Constantinople following the disturbances provoked by the Turks in Lebanon from 1842 to 1860 which finally led to the massacre of the Christians.

Thus, the 1861 régime grew out of the solutions that the European faction brought to the vast "Middle East Problem", which was precisely that of the Christians living on Muslim soil. This régime was made up of a government of Christians and a voted Assembly, while also forbidding Turkish troops from penetrating into mountain areas. During this régime, Lebanon was the only nation in the Arab World and the Near East to apply the principles of a representative democracy.

In 1915 this autonomy was again interrupted by the Turks who occupied Lebanon, starved its population and sent loads of patriots to the gallows.

During the French Mandate, extra territories were granted and Lebanon was given the status of a State in 1920. The country became a republic in 1926, with a Constitution that is still in



force to this day. It was granted independence in 1943 and joined the UN as a foundation member in 1945. From 1943 to 1975, the Western style democracy and the legal system which it enforced functioned without interruption. Elections were held at their appointed terms, freedom of the press and the right to hold public gatherings were respected, courts of justice were independent and the army was altogether in the hands of the civil authorities. Many of these notions were relatively unheard-of in the remainder of the Arab World and thus Lebanon came to be considered undesirable and dangerous by some of its neighbours.

### The Role of Lebanon

Autonomous and independent Lebanon became a land of freedom and equality for Christians. Several Eastern churches moved their patriarchates as well as their social and educational institutions there. Christians from all over the Arab World came to live and work there. Various foreign Catholic and Protestant institutions have flourished there since the XVII Century, alongside similar orders of Lebanese origin, whereas all over the rest of the Arab World and the Near East, Islam has invariably been the state religion, the only one free to grow and set up places of worship or cultural centers while Christians were merely tolerated ('dhimmi'). Very recently, while President Sadat was fighting "all forms of fanaticism", he nonetheless had a constitutional reform voted proclaiming the Qoran "source of Egyptian legislation", in spite of the fact that at least a third if not more of the Egyptian population is Christian. Far from being detrimental to the Islamic faith in Lebanon, the liberties which the Christians enjoyed alongside Muslims led to Lebanon's becoming the starting point for the cultural Renaissance of the XIX Century, which woke the Arab World out of a 600 year long lethargy. The country was thus a meeting point for the two faiths. People far and wide recognised and praised Lebanon's role as a crossroad between the two religions and a state where Christians and Muslims intermingled.

Popes often quoted Lebanon as a shining example, especially during the reform of Vatican II. Lebanese from both camps, Muslim and Christian, were proud of this and eager to say so.

This intermingling, together with Lebanon's contact with the West and its liberal democracy, made possible the prosperity and the economic boom which, after independence, made Lebanon an enviable nation of peace and well-being as well as an active productive member of the United Nations and the League of Arab Nations. Lecturers, students, businessmen, tourists, theatre companies and musicians flocked to Beirut, "intellectual beacon of the Eastern Mediterranean", to quote an expression of Maurice Barrès; which dates back to 1914, the eve of the First World War.

### The Crisis

So you might now ask: "How has this precious gold been changed to vulgar lead", with all the internal divisions rampant throughout the country; Christians feel constantly threatened and, in the capital alone, the downtown area is in ruins and a great many churches - amongst which are the five cathedrals (Maronite, Latin, Greek-Orthodox, Catholic and Syrian Catholic) have been profaned and looted. A third of the Lebanese population have fled their homes, 4/5 of the nation's territory are occupied and the Lebanese government is incapable of carrying out the slightest transaction without an OK from Damascus ?...


The reason, is that in 1975, as in 1842 and 1915, the forces of fanaticism, again grew tired of witnessing, in the very heart of the East, a Lebanon which differed from its neighbours in its freedom, equality and, this time, its prosperity.

For five years and two months, we have been living through the most destructive and implacable of attempts aimed, to quote the famous words of a left-wing leader, at "wiping out a third of the Maronites , exiling another third, and supressing the

rest". Even if the perpetrators, the instigators and the local and Arab accomplices of this plot are known, it nonetheless remains a fact that the whole thing was made possible by everyone else's silence.

Today, 600,000 Palestinians, of which 40,000 are armed fedayeen, are to be found on Lebanese soil, free of any bond to the Lebanese State and even replacing its authority in the South as well as in West Beirut itself. Syria, which, by the way, has been the 'deus ex machina' in all that has happened in Lebanon during these terrible years, occupies the greater part of the country, protects the organizations it was originally supposed to disband, and is even granting them positions it originally occupied in the center of Beirut, on strategic peaks in the mountains and on the road to the South. From among the other Arab countries, some have given financial support to the PLO and its branches in order to keep them at bay, leaving them with Lebanon. Others, like Libya, have financed them, given them arms, ammunition and detachments of troops in order to carry on the war in Lebanon. Islamic countries outside the Arab World have encouraged their own volunteers to go and fight in Lebanon.

Without wanting to offend Islam in Lebanon, which has, of late, been growing away from the Palestinian Organisations and showing a desire to return to the Lebanon of the past, it is nevertheless undeniable that, at the outset, some of its more short-sighted leaders had thought that the time had come to convert all of Lebanon to Islam. They brought pressure to bear on successive governments to impede the imposition of restrictions on the carrying of arms by the Fedayeen, and in 1975, and 1976, to prevent the mobilisation of the Lebanese Army, thus succeeding in rendering it ineffectual.



### Lebanon and the World

In the face of such hostility, brought about by its liberal regime, its Christian profile and its Westernised outlook, and threatened by occupation and expropriation, the Lebanese people thought themselves justified in hoping for help and support from the West.

In the place of this help and support, they found America's hope that the Christians, presumably incapable of defending themselves, would give up their place to the Palestinians in order to solve, at the least expense, the problem of Israel. Then as soon as they resisted, the Lebanese people found themselves ostracised. In fact, faced with the local complicity and impassiveness towards the attacks against Lebanon, the West made out that it didn't believe this aggression and persisted in calling it an "internal" conflict, so as not to be obliged to take action.

On March 30, 1976, Mr. Kurt Waldheim was bold enough to bring to the attention of the Security Council the potential threat that the troubles in Lebanon held to international peace. In reply, he received two communiqués from Lebanon: one of whole hearted approval from the Christian President of the Republic, and one of protest from the Muslim Prime Minister. Which one do you think Mr Waldheim answered ? The protest, to excuse himself saying that he was convinced that it was an "internal issue", whereas he completely ignored the President of the Republic who, according to Lebanese legislation, is the leader of the State as well as of the Executive, and who, according to the Constitution, nominates and revokes ministers, one of whom is the Prime Minister. And, the ultimate irony was that this is the same President who had agreed with Mr. Waldheim.

Meanwhile, daily life in West Beirut was becoming so unbearable under Palestinian occupation, that some Embassies packed up and left Lebanon. However, despite a circular put out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 22, 1976 and in



spite of the insistence of the Papal Nuncio, Head of the Diplomatic Corps, none of them accepted to transfer, albeit temporarily, to East Beirut where they would have been safe and in close proximity to the Ministry itself as well as to the Head of State! The reason given for this refusal was that 'it was undesirable to favour the partition'. How and why would this partition be favoured by the natural presence of an embassy near the authorities to which it is assigned ?


Besides there's no end to the scores of tales spun by hostile propaganda and passing off the Christians either as partitionists - while in fact they have long been the only ones concerned by the dangers threatening non-Christian areas, in the South for example - or else as reactionaries - while in fact they are actually fighting for the cause of democracy.

Many of you might also remember the words of a certain Foreign Affairs Minister, who, in the thick of the bombardments of Beirut, accused the victims of those bombardments of being their cause, thus inciting the continuation of a genocide ! The strong reactions to this shameful attitude of a Minister in his own country gave the Lebanese people their first glimmerings of hope, even if there was no apparent follow-up to them.

#### Dangers and a Solution

From the beginning of this report, we have kept in mind the serious dangers which the present situation, after so long, still represents for Lebanon. These are as follows:

1. Breaking up of Lebanon, to the advantage of its neighbours.
2. Annexation to Syria.
3. Transformation of a part of the country into a new Palestine.



4. A cessation of the state of equilibrium which, from time immemorial, has allowed the Lebanese Christian community to live in freedom and equality alongside other religious groups.

These threats are too numerous to be ignored, and none of them will be removed until Lebanon has regained full independence from the foreign forces occupying the country, depriving the state of its freedom of decision, and keeping the Lebanese from meeting among themselves.


The solution is contained in this final and definitive remark, All non-Lebanese armed presence must be removed from Lebanon .

It is now a matter of persuading parliaments, governments and public opinions of the reality of this view. Simply by making known the truth, you will contribute towards maintaining a faithful member within the United Nations; one which has the right to enjoy international security, while at the same time supporting a steadfast and shining example to civilization and Christian values. (end of the report presented on June 24 , 1980)

#### 1980 - 1982

The continuing lack of any solution to this crisis has considerably increased the dangers enumerated in the above mentioned report.

In short, at the end of 1980, the Syrian hold on the Bekaa was strengthened, with the area being officially declared a "Syrian security zone" by Damascus, the elimination of supposedly anti - Syrian elements in the Shiite town of Baalbeck, and the first bombings of Zahlé, the major Christian stronghold of the region.



On April 2, 1981, Syrian troops began indiscriminate bombing of East Beirut from all their positions in West Beirut and the surrounding mountains, causing 400 deaths, considerable new damage and an indescribable panic, within a period of two days. On the same day, they began an equally indiscriminate bombing of the town of Zahlé, accompanied by a blockade and siege which evoked widespread indignation throughout the entire world. A halt was not put to this siege until three months later after numerous meetings involving Europe, America and the Arab World and after the payment of substantial sums to Syria by Saudi Arabia following an incident in which two Syrian helicopters were shot down by Israeli fighters over the Bekaa.

Following the April-June attacks, the Council of the Arab League decided, on May 22, upon the formation of a vigilance committee composed of the Foreign Affairs Ministers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria, as well as the Secretary General of the League with a view to finding a solution to the Lebanese problem. This committee, whose first two sittings coincided with the presence in the region of the American envoy, Mr. Philip Habib (June & July) virtually declined to meet again by cancelling two sessions scheduled for January 18 and March 1st 1982. The meeting would have got nowhere as the Syrian delegate, for various reasons, was opposed to examining the proposals of the President of the Republic of Lebanon, then also President of the committee to take into consideration a document submitted by his government suggesting the gradual replacement of the ADF (composed exclusively of Syrian troops) by the Lebanese Army, Meanwhile, Syria and the PLO were renewing a campaign of propaganda against the Lebanese Army, in their continuing efforts to prevent the Lebanese State from having its own regular forces on the areas concerned.


Thus the crisis continues, exacerbated by the passing of time as well as by the proliferation of Lebanon's various foreign

occupiers, and by their annoyance at seeing the Lebanese Resistance liberate a part, albeit greatly reduced, of the Lebanese territory from their hold. Throughout 1981, attacks on Diplomatic personnel were frequent. The Jordanian chargé d'affaires was kidnapped, the French ambassador and the advisory Minister of the Algerian Embassy were assassinated. The Ambassador of Iraq along with all the members of his staff were killed in the wreckage of their embassy, completely destroyed by explosives. This series of attacks seems to indicate a deliberate desire to deprive Lebanon of its diplomatic relations, these being an attribute of its sovereignty, as much as they reflect the plots of Syrian politicians.

#### The Urgent Need for a Solution

The solution put forward in the report of June 24, 1980 are still as valid as ever, and are becoming even more pressing with the approach of the elections of the new Head of State, which are to take place from July 23, for a term of six years. It remains to be seen whether the Syrian troops will withdraw in order to allow the elections to be carried out freely; or if on the contrary, and as all indications would lead us to believe, the attempt to impose a rule which would make Lebanon's independence impossible for ever.

With this goal in mind, the Lebanese Resistance is acting, alongside the military defensive measures, in a political capacity. On November 22 1981, its leader, Mr. Bachir Gemayel, proposed that negotiations be carried out between the Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians as well as amongst the Lebanese themselves on the basis of a general recognition of Lebanon's right to independence and to a peaceful existence within internationally recognized borders.



Quote...

"Today , with the appearance of several international and Arab projects for a solution to Lebanon's problems, we think it is timely to propose our Lebanese point of view for the solution of the Lebanese crisis.

This is a conception based on the following points:

#### A - Fundamental Principles

1. The basis of any solution of the Lebanese crisis lies in the recovery by Lebanon of its sovereignty over all its territory, and in the recovery by the Lebanese State of its full powers in a general and permanent manner.
2. The Syrian Forces that are in Lebanon must return home and there must be a strong Lebanese force that is capable within the framework of national sovereignty, to preserve Lebanese territory as a source of tranquility for Syria.
3. The PLO, with all its ramifications and its branching institutions, must submit to the requirements of full Lebanese sovereignty; there must be a transformation of Lebanese-Palestinian relations from hostility to confidence, in a manner that will reflect the transitory character of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese must agree that any conflict among them will not be settled by force but by political negotiations, to assure the formula of Lebanese Entente. This formula, because of Lebanese pluralism, is to remain subject to continuous renewals and reassessments, on condition that any formula is based on principles that guarantee the Lebanese entity. These principles are:

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- a- The Unity of Lebanese territory
- b- Liberty, security and justice for all Lebanese within a democratic regime that will guarantee basic freedoms for the citizen.
- c- The continued integration of Lebanon into its surroundings and the adhesion of the Lebanese State to the Arab League, with the related rights and duties

#### B- The Practical Frame

1. The Lebanese identity of the South must be preserved through a State initiative in order to ensure all social - pedagogical services and to implement all suspended or jeopardized development projects. This should be prior to the recovery by the Lebanese State of its full sovereignty over the South under all its aspects.
2. The Arab follow-up committee, after addition to it of the Arab parties who express such wish, will have to become an "Operational Committee" that will have the task of implementing before January the 15th, 1982, the following measures in the Lebanese Capital:
  - a. The final cease-fire
  - b. The withdrawal of the Syrian troops and of the Palestinian Liberation Army.
  - c. Control of the Palestinian presence.
  - d. Creation of a security force formed, in its command and its composition, of the Lebanese active forces, who would cooperate with the official security forces in security duties within the capital. As soon as the case of the capital is solved, the afore-mentioned committee will pass progressively to dealing with the situation in the other regions of Lebanon, with May 15th 1982 as a deadline.

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3. The President of the Lebanese Republic will take the initiative of forming, under the chairmanship of the Lebanese Prime Minister, a National Delegation entrusted (in collaboration with the Arab Follow-up Committee) with the task of undertaking the necessary contacts, especially with the Syrian government and the PLO, in order to negotiate with them the means of establishing normal and stable relations that will guarantee the recovery by the Lebanese State of its full sovereignty.

We are not proposing this complete initiative for it to be spontaneously admitted by those who support us or spontaneously rejected by our opponents. This is an open political initiative that can be submitted to discussion. Through it we aim at transferring the conflict between the antagonistic parties in Lebanon from the military level to the political level, in order to find a practical position that will get us out of the crisis...."

Unquote





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## THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE

The Lebanese Resistance is the response of the Lebanese people to the Syrian-Palestinian aggression.

It is organized around the Lebanese Front within the framework of the Lebanese Forces.

### A. The Lebanese Front

#### I. Constitution

It was created in 1976 by national leaders representing different political tendencies who felt the need for establishing a united front in the face of aggressions against Lebanon.

#### II. Objective

The Lebanese Front is not a Party. All the parties of which it is composed preserve their existence and their political identity.

The Lebanese Front is a Directory Council for Christian Leaderships and in that capacity it defines the broad lines of the general policy that are applied and guarded by the Lebanese Forces.

#### III. Composition

The Lebanese Front is composed of:

- Camille Chamoun, President of the Front, ex-President of the Lebanese Republic, President of the National Liberal Party.
- Pierre Gemayel, President of the Kataeb Social Democratic Party.
- Father Boulos Naaman, Head of the Permanent Congress of the Lebanese Monastic Orders.

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- Charles Malek, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, ex-President of the U.N. General Assembly, Thinker and Philosopher.
- Fouad Ephrem Boustany, ex-President of the Lebanese University , historian and writer, author of an encyclopaedia in Arabic.
- Edouard Honein, deputy, ex-member of the National Bloc Party.
- Bachir Gemayel, Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Lebanese Resistance.

## B. The Forces of the Lebanese Resistance

### I. Creation

In August 1976, the Lebanese Front created the united leadership of the Lebanese Forces. Bachir Gemayel was elected President of the Council of Leadership.

These united forces included fighters from:

- The Social Democratic Kataeb Party
- The National Liberal Party (PNL)
- The Tanzim
- The Guardians of the Cedars
- and other fighters not affiliated in any political party.

### II. Actual Organization

On November 26, 1980, after the approval of all parties, the Council of Leadership of the Lebanese Resistance Forces, presided by Bachir Gemayel, was structured and its functions defined clearly.

The Council of Leadership became the executive organ of the Lebanese Front. It united under its control:

- a) The armed forces of the Lebanese Resistance led by general headquarters. Their very strict organization helped them to defend the liberated regions and to maintain order and security for all.
- b) The administrative organs of the Lebanese Resistance:
  - \* A Social-Economic Council
  - \* Cultural Committees
  - \* Information Committees (press, radio, T.V.)
  - \* A Social service Committee
  - \* A Department for Foreign Relations which provides contacts with the foreign countries through offices of representation that are already established.





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## THE ILLEGALITY OF SYRIAN ARMED PRESENCE IN LEBANON

This publication is a brief study whose aim is to demonstrate the non-legality of the juridical status of the "Arab Deterrent Force" in Lebanon.

Though incomplete, this report can be taken as containing the fundamental facts needed for a legal declaration of the illegality of the Syrian armed presence in Lebanon.

### INTRODUCTION

#### Chapter One: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "ARAB DETERRENT FORCE" AGREEMENTS AND ABUSES

1. The "Token Security Force"
2. The Riyadh and Cairo Agreements
3. Abuses of the Agreements
4. Analysis

#### Chapter Two: VIOLATIONS OF THE "ADF"'s MISSION

1. Violations of the Organization
  - A. The composition of troops
  - B. The leadership of troops
2. Violations of the mission
  - A. Distortion of the goals
  - B. Violation of the nature



No one can deny that the Syrian army in Lebanon is the direct cause of the cruel and destructive conflict which this country has undergone since April 2, 1981. Naturally, the Syrian army is not the only destabilizing and explosive factor concerned. However, the large number of troops and the sophisticated nature of the Syrian arms which are installed on Lebanese soil, as well as the participation of these installations in combats against groups of Lebanese citizens would lead any observer to ask the following question: What is the status of this army, which while calling itself "Arab Deterrent Force" is bombarding the Christian sectors of the capital and the major Christian towns of the country with unheard-of violence, and carrying out large scale assaults on civilian populations and Lebanese forces ?

In actual fact, this army entered Lebanon in 1975 under the cloak of the Palestinian military organization called "Saika" which owes allegiance to the Syrian Baathist party.

During the summer of 1976, contingents of the regular Syrian army took up positions in the Bekaa and around the town of Zahlé, without the Lebanese government having requested this intervention from the authorities in Damascus. A conflict between Syria and the PLO-MN coalition was considered by Damascus as a step towards "re-integrating" this coalition. This point of view came to light clearly in the historical speech given by President Assad on 20/7/1976: "The Syrian army entered Lebanon in order to protect the Palestinian resistance and the Arabic nature of Lebanon". This statement sums up the strategic and unquestionable motivations of the Syrian army's presence on Lebanese soil...

#### A JURIDICIAL LIE

The "Arab Deterrent Force" is a juridicial lie concocted by the Arab League in order to "legalize" the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon. Yet this "peace force", as it was originally called, has never brought peace to the country.

May 11, 1977, Syrian troops of the ADF launched an offensive against the village of Bella in the county of Bsharré. Syrian infantry and scores of armoured tanks fought against a Christian militia group from the mountains.

#### THE ATTACK ON THE FAYADIEH BARRACKS


The Lebanese army's turn came in February 1978, when one of its major barracks at Fayadieh was attacked and shelled by a Syrian contingent from the "ADF". From July 1, 1978, the same forces undertook a series of attacks and bombings against all the Christian areas in the central part of the country. The Syrian onslaught which overtook the Christian population of Lebanon during the summer of 1978, and especially during the first five days of October of the same year was only brought to a halt by the unanimous vote of the Security Council for Resolution 436 which called for a cease-fire in Lebanon.

However, at the end of June 1979, the Syrians attacked positions held by the regular Lebanese army in the Akoura heights. On February 8, 1980, several battalions of Syrian infantry and special troops backed up by artillery and tanks marched upon the Christian village of Knat in the North. A violent battle followed between the aggressors and the inhabitants of the village who were supported by troops of the Lebanese resistance. The village was totally destroyed !

As well as these numerous campaigns, the Syrian army has maintained a state of extreme tension along all the demarcation lines in the capital.

#### A NEW AND DANGEROUS PERIOD

On Thursday April 2, 1981, in the most unexpected fashion possible, Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon plunged the country into a new and extremely dangerous era which was bound to be decisive. On the morning of this day, Syrian artillery unleashed



the most violent "Blitzkrieg" Lebanon has ever known, on the Christian sectors of Beirut. The Syrian Army vented its fury on the capital and on the Christian town of Zahlé in the Bekaa, causing widespread destruction and death.

Since that day, April 2, 1981, Syrian aggression has spread and more than one free Christian area has undergone repeated attacks which are clearly aimed at occupying all the regions currently controlled by Lebanese Forces...

Syrian leaders and commanders have stated that the Syrian army has a precise three-fold mission in Lebanon:

- To fight Israel.
- To support the Palestinians.
- To establish the "Arab" national identity of Lebanon.

However, this mission is merely the first step towards the realization of a further long-term goal, a broader goal: the occupation of Lebanon and its annexation to Syria.

#### THE LEGAL SITUATION

In order to show the true political state of the Syrian army in Lebanon, we must first of all examine its legal state. For, after all, since October 1976, the Syrian army has made its presence in Lebanon "legal" through the juridicial 'lie' that is the "Arab Deterrent Force". Yet the basis of this juridicial 'lie' has been confirmed by the Lebanese State together with the Arab League of which Lebanon is a foundation member.

In fact, as long as we recognize albeit theoretically, the existence of the Lebanese state, and as long as we respect the principles of international law, we should establish our nation's claims within the context of the juridicial and political structure which we have accepted. In our case, this means the Lebanese State, the agreements passed by this state, the Charter of the United Nations and the general precepts of international law.

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Under no circumstances should this be taken as implying an acceptance of the current state of affairs resulting from the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon. On the contrary, to prove the illegality of this state of affairs is the first step towards fighting it.

Within the framework of the national political resistance to the occupation and aggression suffered by the Lebanese Nation and by its Christian population, we propose a combat based on the use of the Law. In other words, we believe that it is our responsibility to bring to light the points which constitute legal proof of the illegality of the Syrian army's presence in Lebanon.

Let us not forget that the Syrian army is protected, not only by its military strength, which, to say the least, is impressive, but above all by its legal "cloak". This same cover up makes Syria politically 'clean' , prevents the 'rational' West from intervening in a situation which is legally 'embarassing' , and prevents the UN from taking action in an acceptable context !

To establish the illegality of Syria's armed presence in Lebanon would be the logical reply to counterbalance the "conspiracy " against the country and its Christian population, which the aggressor has tried to pass off as being 'logical'.



CHAPTER ONE  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE  
AGREEMENTS AND ABUSES

The presence of the regular Syrian army in Lebanon, unanimously recognized by observers and by the Syrian leaders themselves, preceded the establishment of the "Arab Deterrent Force" by several months. The army did not join this force until October 1976, that is 7 months after the "official" entry in March of the same year. (1)

This simple detail of chronological order reveals the subjective aspect of the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon. This presence is more the result of a supra-judicial political plan set up by the Baathist leadership in Damascus rather than the affirmative reply of the Syrian government to the Arab League's call for a move to bring peace to Lebanon. The entry of regular Syrian army contingents into Lebanese territory and their participation in military operations has had the following juridical consequences:

1. As of March 1976, the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon is illegal.
2. The participation of these troops in combats irrespective of their aims, is a violation of Lebanon's internal affairs.
3. This same participation in combats renders these troops and the army to which they belong, "belligerent" parties.

Thus, from a juridical point of view, from March 1976, the Syrian army in Lebanon is qualified as regular forces illegally penetrated onto Lebanese soil, and as belligerent parties in the Lebanese conflict.

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1- Famous political speech considered by most observers and by the Lebanese political factions as the political basis for the Syrian initiative in Lebanon.

In view of this statement of law and fact, let us now examine the sequence of following events along with the juridical action that was consequently taken.

#### THE "TOKEN ARAB SECURITY FORCE "

First initiative, on June 9, 1976 the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers from the Arab League , at an extraordinary meetin in Cairo, voted a resolution , among whose several points was the mention of the creation of an "Arab Force".

The establishment of this force and the mission to which it was assigned by the Arab resolution of June 9, 1976, are self-evident: Put a stop to the fighting and preventing the participants in the conflict from carrying out operations of aggression against the opposing factions territories. According to the very text of the resolution, the term used is "Token security force" as opposed to a massive force, as came to be the case later. The token force's objectives are to "maintain security and stability in Lebanon and to replace the Syrian forces." The force's mission was to be terminated upon the request of the elcted president". Actually, the June 9, 1976 resolution was directed against Syria which was planning to overtake Lebanon alone and establish its hold de facto. Besides, in an amendment dated June 11, 1976, the Council of the Arab League points out that the force is to act "within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty".

The "Token Force " which did not cover the regular Syrian forces operating in Lebanon illegally, failed to accomplish its mission. The parties involved in the conflict did not cease combat.



### THE RIYADH AND CAIRO AGREEMENTS

Following the failure of the "token security force", six members of the Arab League met in Riyadh on October 17 : Lebanon , Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the PLO. It was this conference which led to the agreement deciding upon the establishment of a "Deterrent Force" to replace the "Token Force".

The agreement, which was published on October 18, 1976, stipulates:

1. The definitive cessation of combats on the whole of the Lebanese territory as of October 21, and a strict observance of cease-fire agreements by all parties concerned.
2. The strengthening of Arab Security Forces in Lebanon in order to transform them into a Deterrent Force to be answerable to the personal orders of the President of the Republic. This force will be expanded to 30,000 men whose mission will be:
  - a) the implementation of the cease-fire, the halting of combats, the separation of all belligerent parties and the repression of any party violating the cease-fire.
  - b) To carry out the application of the 1969 Cairo agreement and its appendices.
  - c) To maintain internal security.
  - d) To supervise the return of fighters to the positions they held before April 13, 1975 and the removal of military installations in keeping with the schedule appended to the agreement.


- e) To ensure the confiscation of all heavy artillery  
(recorded)
- f) To assist the Lebanese authorities in resuming charge  
of public services and national institutions, to re -  
build and safeguard civilian and military institutions.

These two articles, relating to the establishment of an "Arab Deterrent Force" are built around one basic and precise idea: To re-establish peace and normal life in Lebanon. Four states actually offered to supply contingents of troops to the "ADF": Syria, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. However, Syria who already had 20,000 men stationed on Lebanese territory, insisted on the inclusion of all these units in the "ADF", in order to "legalize" them. In fact, the "ADF" seemed in terms of military numbers, to be nothing other than a leading Syrian majority to which were added a couple of thousand soldiers from a handful of Arab States !

This agreement was ratified in Cairo on October 24 and 25 by the Council of the Arab League. On the same occasion, several documents were signed including those relating to the subsiding and to the renewal procedures of this force's mandate.

#### THE ABUSES OF THE AGREEMENTS

Regular Syrian troops entered Lebanon illegally as of March 1976. Their status during the whole of the period stretching from May 31 to June 9, 1976 was obviously illegal. With the passing of the June 9 resolution, the Arab League did not "cover" "all " the Syrian troops present on Lebanese soil, but only a tiny fraction of the regular Syrian contingents which belonged to the "Token Security Force" together with other Arab countries' troops.



Hence the presence of at least 95% of the regular Syrian troops remained illegal after the Arab League resolution of June 9 1976, which did not make any reference to the matter.

This position of the Syrian army before the summits of Riyadh and Cairo justifies us in terming it an example of "occupying troops".

The presence of the Syrian regular army in Lebanon prior to the formation of the "ADF" involved the four following abuses:

- 1) Illegal entry into Lebanon
- 2) Illegal stationing of troops on Lebanese territory
- 3) The expression of political designs confirming the illegal nature of the entry and continued presence of this army in Lebanon.
- 4) Participation in combats on Lebanese soil without previously referring to the Lebanese authorities and without receiving a green light from them.

What measures stipulated in the October agreements could have possibly transformed an illegal and illicit military occupation into a legal and legitimate support of the Lebanese authorities ?

In actual fact, the inclusion of Syrian troops in the "ADF" appears as a contradiction of the spirit of the Arab solution and of the legal principles concerning forces of intervention and peace-keeping forces, as well as of the Lebanese nation's desire.

1) According to article 2 of the Riyadh agreement, the "ADF" is a reinforcement of Arab security forces in Lebanon in order to transform them into an operational dissuasion force..."

However, the token security force, created by the June 9, 1976 resolution of the Arab League, had set out to "replace the

forces currently stationed on Lebanese soil", that is, the Militias, the Palestinians and...the Syrian army. How was the latter to be replaced by a token force if it was to supply the "reinforcements" of the very same token force ?

2) On the other hand, it is universally recognized that the force of intervention or separation of opponents in any conflict should, in principle, be a neutral force.

3) Finally, would we not be justified in asking of the "ADF" as a whole, let alone the Syrian army, where lie the national wishes of the Lebanese people and to what extent this nation had given its consent to the formation of an "Arab" force, not to mention to Syria's participation in this force ?

#### ANALYSIS AND SELF-ANALYSIS

Without referring to the implementation of the "ADF"'s mission, we can demonstrate the illegality of form in the participation of Syrian troops in this Force. From its very "source" the so-called legalization of the Syrian regular army's presence in Lebanon is riddled with flaws. Yet the Lebanese government's acceptance of the agreements of June 9, 1976 would appear to be a "legitimization" of the Syrian armed presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese authorities' ratification of the Riyadh and Cairo agreements could be interpreted as an official Lebanese "blanc-seing" with respect to the Syrian army in Lebanon.

It remains to be seen to what extent a government formed by a parliament which re-elected itself after a war, can take decisions which, in their far-reaching importance, should involve the participation of the various components of the state; a state which is pluralist in its very nature, especially when these same decisions are violations of international law and of the wishes of the Lebanese nation ?

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Nevertheless, even if we do not state our views on this delicate question, we will at least note that the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon, whether its establishment is, in itself, fundamentally illegal or not, at least presents an irrefutably ambiguous juridicial justification.

This ambiguity whose legal validity could have been affirmed by a just application of the "ADF" 's mission of peace, has in fact ended up being totally dispelled by the non-application of this mission, indeed even by its "counter-application" ...





CHAPTER TWO  
THE FDA'S MISSION  
VIOLATIONS

The "Arab Deterrent Force" was unable to carry out its mission of bringing peace and security to Lebanon, and failed to implement the objectives put forward by the Riyadh and Cairo agreements of October 1976.

THE "ADF", actually Syrian armed forces, became "illegal" because of its violation of the Arab League's mandate, since 1976, that is since its establishment in Lebanon. The violations involved, material as well as political, can be divided into two broad categories, which we shall now examine:

1. Violation of the "ADF" 's organization.
2. Violation of the "ADF" 's mission.

VIOLATION OF THE ADF'S ORGANIZATION

The organization of the "ADF" , as stipulated in the Riyadh documents, mentioned two main points:

- A. The composition of military troops.
- B. The leadership of these troops.

In both these elements of its organization, we can , simply by enumerating certain major facts, note the 'discrepancies' between the stipulations of the official texts and the facts as they stand.

THE COMPOSITION OF MILITARY TROOPS

Article number two of the Riyadh convention stipulates that the "ADF" be increased to 30,000 men. However, neither the Riyadh nor the Cairo texts specified the nationalities which were to compose the force or the total number of each nation's contribution.

Consequently, the "ADF" was composed of a majority of Syrian troops and a minority of Arab troops from Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, The Arab Emirates and the Sudan.

This increase of the presence of the Syrian army, which was not stipulated in the articles of the conventions, and which contradicted their goals and aspirations, constitutes the first violation of the "ADF" ' s mission.

Furthermore, Syria , by including units from the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) in its contingents stationed in Lebanon, clearly contradicts the Riyadh agreement which, in article two, stipulated the "separation of all belligerents", and therefore, the separation of the Palestinians from the other factions. Article 5 of the same agreement specifies that the PLO "shall cease to interfere in Lebanese internal affairs".

Finally, the most serious violation of the very principles of the Arab force's organization, violation of the "philosophy" which underlies the dispatch of Arab security troops to Lebanon, is without any doubt, the withdrawal of the Arab contingents which were sent to Lebanon following the Riyadh agreements, and the continued presence of Syrian forces alone.

More precisely, both the June 9 resolution of the Arab League and the Riyadh agreement explicitly state:

- That the initiative should be taken by the Arab states collectively.
- That the troops should be sent by several Arab countries.

Now, the withdrawal, in 1978 , of all Saudi Arabian, Yemeni, Sudanese and Emirate troops, while only Syrian forces remained is an open contradiction of the articles and spirit of the Riyadh and Cairo agreements. In this context, the illegality of the Syrian armed presence in Lebanon is evident insofar as the "ADF"'s troops all come from the one Arab State. So, the initiative

involved is that of a single state and is thus a violation of the collective and pluralistic foundations of the Arab initiative.

#### B. LEADERSHIP OF THE TROOPS

Equally specified in Article 2 of the Riyadh convention, is the stipulation that the deterrent force be placed "under the personal leadership " of the President of the Lebanese Republic.

According to tradition, " personal" leadership is characterized by two main features:

- Orders are to be given directly by the person in question; that is to say, with no intermediary.
- The contents of these orders are to be judged and decided upon by the person in question alone.

The person decides when they are to be issued and carried out, and is personally responsible for weighing up the motives and the seriousness of the circumstances under which the orders are given.

And yet, if we examine the facts, we will discover nothing even remotely resembling these features relating to "the personal leadership of the President of the Republic".

In fact:

1. A large number of orders issued to Syrian contingents did not come directly from the person of President Sarkis at all, but from the military command of the Syrian Army which comes under the state authority of Damascus, not Beirut.

2. President Sarkis has never confirmed the content of any order involving an attack upon a region of Lebanon or the destruction of any village or residential area.

3. President Sarkis has not prepared a timetable for the military operations of the "ADF" apart from the schedule set forward by its own statutes in October 1976 - a schedule which, by the way, was never put into effect by the force concerned.

4. It is the right and duty of the President of the Republic to initiate any action of the "ADF" and to declare any such action legal or illegal. To what extent do the communiqués of the "ADF"'s command (made public since 1976 , and more specifically since the Bella operation in 1977) stem from this leadership ?

5. Only the President and Commander of the "ADF" is in a position to weigh up the gravity of the situation and decide upon the organization of any operation, apart from the restricted range of routine control and security operations. Then who weighed up the gravity of the situations before the bombings of 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 ?

In actual fact, the personal and direct orders of the President of the Republic would seem to be a juridicial fiction which has never been put into practice by the Syrian army. The obvious proof is the Syrians' repeated refusals (20 times) to carry out the direct and personal orders of President Sarkis by scrupulously observing the cease-fires !

## II. VIOLATION OF THE MISSION

The troops of the Syrian regular army which illegally entered Lebanon in 1976, and whose legal status was "dubiously" set down at the Riyadh and Cairo summits in October of the same year, have violated the provisions of these agreements and broken the only "law" which justified the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

The violation of the "ADF" 's mission through its composition was extended to include a limitless series of contractions between the Syrian moves on the one hand, and the resolutions of Riyadh and Cairo and on the other.

Hence, we shall examine how the "ADF" ' s mission has been distorted and violated.

#### A - Distortion of the "ADF" 's Mission

Article 1 of the Riyadh agreement provides for "the definitive cessation of combats on the whole of the Lebanese territory". Article 2 adds that the "ADF" , which is to be a reinforcement of the token force, is to take action with a view to:

1) "Establishing a cease-fire, halting fighting, separating the parties involved in the conflicts, and putting down any parties which fail to uphold the cease-fire".

2) "Enforcing the application of the 1969 Cairo agreement and its supplements". (2)

3) "Maintaining security".

"Ensuring the return of combatants to the positions they held before April 13, 1975, and the dismantling of military installations..."

"Supervising the confiscation (and listing) of heavy arms".

"Assisting the Lebanese authorities in reassuming control of public services and national institutions, assisting in their reconstruction and in the protection of civil and military complexes.

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2- Agreement reached on November 3, 1969 between the Lebanese Government and the PLO in order to regulate and organize the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon as well as their various activities.

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These two articles, which sum up the official goals of the Riyadh agreement, are sufficiently clear and need no interpretation. The Arab commitment exclusively covered Lebanon's unity and security. It made no mention of political matters, nor of the problems of Lebanon's national identity and external politics - both matters which exclusively involve Lebanese sovereignty.

However, Syria, by ignoring the October 1976 agreements, distorted the goal, and thus violated even the mandate of the "ADF". It should suffice to give just a few examples of Syrian political stand-points which contradict the Riyadh agreements.

1) In 1976, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam, had already openly declared that:

"Lebanon was a part of Syria . We will counter any attempt at separation and reclaim Lebanon along with its mountains , coastal areas and its four counties." (3)

This dangerous statement , even though it precedes the October 1976 agreements, reveals Syria's intention to control and annex Lebanon.

2) In February 1978, two years after the Riaydh agreement, President Hafez Assad declared to Lebanese journalists that "there will be no pluralism in Lebanon". (4)

Since that date, the Syrian authorities, in contradiction with the Riyadh agreements, have been expressing their opposition to a separate type of political and constitutional structure which the Lebanese could freely choose. Moreover, Damascus has been

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3- Statement made in Kuwait and published in "An Nahar" 8/1/76

4- Quoted from the newspaper "As-Safir"


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forcing a national identity and a specific commitment onto the Lebanese and the Christians, taking this political stand-point as inherent in the mission of the "ADF".

3) On January 8, 1981 Mr. Khaddam made the following statement at a public meeting in Damascus : " There will be no discussion or compromise concerning the unity of Lebanon. No confessional pluralism, no confederation, no federation, but a single Arab Lebanon, a part of this nation."

- a) Mr Khaddam has no right to oppose any political system whatsoever. Such a system should be the expression of the will of the Lebanese people alone.
- b) To deny Lebanon its "confessional pluralism" is an attack upon the Lebanese constitution (articles 9 and 95) and upon the spirit of the National Pact which forms the political and constitutional foundation of the Lebanese Republic. It is also an attempt to transform the human, cultural and religious structure of Lebanon with a view to eliminating at least one of the Lebanese social groups, for to deny "confessional pluralism" implies the imposition of a confessional "homogeneity" by eliminating the groups which now constitute its pluralism.
- c) In what way can the Syrian government, which according to the Riyadh agreement, "participates" in the "ADF" force any specific identity, Arab or not, upon Lebanon without the consent of its people ?

4) On Wednesday, January 21, 1981 Mr. Khaddam stated that "Syrian armed presence in Lebanon is directed against Israel"! This new theme explains Syria's intentions which are actually strategic and have nothing to do with the October 1976 agreements.



5) What is more , the newspaper "Tehrane" expressing the views of the establishment in Syria, stated that: "The sovereignty of Lebanon is relative in comparison with the Arab Nation" (6), This "relativity" which the Syrians attribute to the Lebanese sovereignty which the "ADF" is supposed to be protecting, uncovers the whole "political philosophy" which underlies Syria's "participation" in the Arab initiative,


6) The illegal nature of the attitude shown by Syrian political authorities is also present in the military authorities who confirm and uphold the views of the former, In late January 1981, following an incident involving Israeli jet fighters in Lebanese air space, General Tlass, Syrian Minister for Defence and second in command of the armed forces, declared: "As far as I am concerned, the battle with the Israelis in Lebanese skies is a final and definitive decision. We consider that the Arab land is one and that the Arab sky is one " (!)

Tlass went on to say: "Syrian forces entered Lebanon following a historic decision and a patriotic awareness... When we entered Lebanon, we asked no-one's opinion but acted according to our national conscience. We will not leave Lebanon until it has an Arab face, an Arab arm and an Arab tongue..." (7)

(6) "Tehrane" - January 21, 1981.

(7) Interview with Mustapha Tlass in the weekly newspaper "Al Kifah Al-Arabi" - Monday, February 2, 1981

7) After April 2, 1981, the date of the beginning of the current Syrian offensive against the Christian population of Lebanon, Syrian authorities confirmed the continued stationing of troops for reasons other than those set out for the "ADF" on several occasions.





Mr Ahmed Iskandar Ahmed, Syrian Minister for Information, declared that: "Syrian forces will remain in Lebanon until the legal authorities request their withdrawal, irrespective of whether or not the "ADF"'s mandate is renewed at the next session of the Arab League in June ..." (8)

How can the Syrian government keep its troops in Lebanon when the Lebanese state itself, for lack of Arab will, cannot keep the Syrian forces in the name of the Arabs ?

Is there still any doubt about the legality of the goal aimed at by the Syrian armed forces ?

(8) Statement made on April 13, 1981;

#### B. VIOLATION OF ITS NATURE

According to the resolution taken on June 9, 1976, to establish the "Arab Security Force" which was transformed into a "Deterrent Force" by the October agreements, the nature of the mission to bring about an "Arab Peace" in Lebanon was defined in the following two key ideas:

- 1- Separate combatting factions.
- 2- Assist the legal authorities in extending the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over the whole of the national territory.

It is clear from the words used in the numerous texts mentioned above, and especially in article 2 of the resolutions from the Riyadh summit, that the "ADF" 's mission in Lebanon is of a military nature. This brings us the following conclusions:

- The "ADF" is not composed of observers. It is authorized to act and carry out military campaigns if the legal political authorities in Lebanon request it to do so.
- The "ADF" is placed in the service of the legal Lebanese government to act within the framework of a precise mission which has been specified by an agreement reached at the League of Arab States.

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The nature of this mission is defined in the following terms:

This mission is to be military in nature, neutral , general, continuous, of dissuasion, in compliance with Lebanese legality and the internal security of Lebanon.

Let us take this definition and judge to what extent Syrian military action has conformed to the nature of the "ADF" 's mission.

### I - "MILITARY NATURE"

The "ADF" is not a political movement. Its role is to carry out a mission whose nature is strictly military. It must therefore refrain from participating in any activities which are "political" in nature. Now, in contradiction to this fundamental restriction, Syrian troops have been carrying out, from their arrival and up to the present, intense political activity , particularly in the realm of propaganda. Overstepping the province of their mission, the Syrians have transformed their contingents in Lebanon into Baathist information groups.

### 2 - NEUTRALITY

The "ADF" is supposed to be "neutral", that is, acting in a neutral capacity towards the parties involved in the conflict. It should not adopt an attitude of favouritism or partiality, nor take the side of any one faction against another, be it through political or military measures.

Yet, this principle of neutrality has not been respected at all by the Syrian contingents of the "ADF". The first question we are led to ask is: Since the "ADF" , in all its communiqués, admits to carrying out operations against "Lebanese Forces", why, then, does it not work towards disarming the militia of the "National Movement " and "pacifying" West Beirut with its scores of armed party offices ? Don't the Syrian forces consider themselves "legally" bound to extend the sovereignty of the Lebanese State over these areas instead of simply over the areas controlled by the "Lebanese Forces" ? Furthermore, what right do the Syrian Forces of the "ADF" have to carry out military operations alongside forces of the "National Movement" and the Palestinians against

Christian areas ? Surely the most striking example is the attack undertaken by the Syrians and the "NM" against the Sannine heights. What is the "ADF" 's official stand with regards to the "NM" ?

### 3- A GENERAL NATURE

According to the resolutions of the Riyadh summit, and expressly stated in the October 24 delcaration which provided for the respect of ~~the~~ agreements concluded between the PLO and the Lebanese Government, the "ADF" was supposed to disarm the Palestinians outside the camps. Ignoring this basic stipulation, the Syrian troops gave full freedom of military action to the Palestinian forces, giving the PLO ample leeway to use its forces wherever the Palestinian command found it necessary.

### 4 - PERMANENT

The mission of dissuasion was of a permanent nature, that is to say, to be maintained as long as the Lebanese government and the Arab League accepted the renewal of the "ADF" 's mandate. So, logically, the Arab force should continue to fulfil its obligations whatever their nature. The question which naturally comes to mind is: Why did the Syrians, within the framework of their so -called security operations against Christian regions, cease the onslaught at a given moment, and then resume the same operations at a later date without any precise motive ? If the "ADF" claimed that it wished to eliminate the "rebellious" Christian militia, why did it stop in October 1978, and then resume the military operations at later dates, only to suddenly unleash a full offensive on April 2, 1981 ?

### 5 - DISSUASION

As is mentioned in the statutes of the Arab force, its mission is of "dissuasive" nature rather than a "destructive" one. On this point once again, the Syrians have violated the agreement and the principles of law.

a) Firstly, international law, applicable to all international conferences and stated in the Charter of the Rights of Man.

b) Ignoring international law, the October 1976 summits and even the simple sense of humanity, have bombed civilian areas with devastating violence.

#### 6 - WITHIN THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY

It's only natural, logical, even obvious that the "ADF" should respect Lebanese law.

And yet, refusing to comply with even the mere minimum of this law, Syrian troops have arrested, abducted, imprisoned and executed a large number of Lebanese citizens without the slightest form of a trial or any other manner of legal procedure.

#### 7 - A FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY

The "ADF" 's mission is to bring security by putting a stop to the war between Lebanese and Palestinian factions, that is between internal national parties or parties residing on Lebanese territory following an agreement.

In strictly legal terms, the "ADF" 's mission is not a defensive nature. No treaty of mutual defence was signed at Riyadh or Cairo in October 1976. Syrian troops have no right to sponsor the introduction into Lebanon of "defensive" armaments, that is, arms which are directed against an "outside enemy", unless in compliance with a special agreement involving Lebanon.

The case of the "Sam" anti-aircraft missiles which Syria brought into Lebanon from April 29, 1981, following the destruction by Israel, of two Syrian military helicopters, constitutes a clear example of the "ADF" 's violation of the mandate.

Mr. Khaddam, Syrian minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that: "The decision to introduce the missiles into Lebanon was a Syrian decision, and their removal will only be effected following

a Syrian decision".

"Even the Lebanese authorities cannot oblige us to remove the missiles, arms which are inseparable from those of the dissuasion force ".

On May 20 1981, the daily newspaper "Baath" stated that:  
"The Missiles have established a strategic balance with the enemy" (Israel)

All these declarations, as well as the sequence of events since May 1981, clearly show that the Syrian forces are violating the October 1981 resolutions insofar as the goal and content of the original mandate are concerned.

#### OVERALL CONCLUSIONS


The survey of the various aspects of the "Arab Deterrent Force" (which is exclusively Syrian) from the point of view of its establishment as well as the execution of its mission, lead to one clear conclusion: the illegality of Syrian armed presence in Lebanon.

However, after establishing the foundation of this illegality, one question springs to mind: Who can actually carry out the declaration of this illegality ?

- The Lebanese Government
- The Arab League ?
- The UN ?
- The Lebanese people ?
- The Christian community in Lebanon ?

In fact, since all these parties are both involved and responsible , they can all either collectively or individually declare this illegality.

However, with the Syrian declarations in mind, we wonder if the path of legal procedure can lead to the victory of law and justice.





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Documentation & Research

## INTRODUCTION

The name "Lebanon" nowadays refers to a country situated on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean between the 33rd and the 35th degree of latitude. Bound to the North and to the East by the Syrian Arab Republic and to the South by the State of Israel, it is shaped as a rectangle and its surface area is 4.000 sq.miles. The country's geographical structure is quite simple and comprises four consecutive elements running parallel to the sea: a very narrow coast line where the capital, Beirut, is situated; the Mount Lebanon range; the Biqaa Valley east of it; and behind the Biqaa Valley the Anti-Lebanon range.

The population of Lebanon is approximately 3 million, but it is estimated that as many Lebanese now live abroad. Lebanon has an emigration tradition to the New World which goes back to the end of the 19th century. Yet in counterpart for this emigration Lebanon has had to welcome considerable numbers of people from neighbouring countries, and some 900.000 Arabs, among whom are 610.000 Palestinians, now live in the country on a permanent basis.



Lebanon occupies a strategic position on the Eastern Mediterranean coast, an area which has witnessed four successive wars in a short period of time, and the general political instability of the region has had serious repercussions on the country's internal political situation. Undoubtedly, regional and international factors have played an important part in igniting the three grave political crises which shook - and are still shaking - the young republic. It would, however, be a serious misjudgment to overemphasize extrinsic causes without due regard for those outside powers to interfere in the country's internal affairs. The existence of fundamental cultural and socio-political differences between the various elements of Lebanese society provide access to foreign powers for direct involvement in Lebanese politics. Furthermore, from the late 1960s' onwards, the uninterrupted flow of armed Palestinians into the country, coupled with the PLO's active participation in Lebanese politics in support of certain communities, severely upset the existing fragile equilibrium. As a result of which, in the early 1970s' the Lebanese State was unable to perform its task of preserving the balance of power between the communities and co-opting traditional and radical forces into the Lebanese political system. The State's unsuccessful attempts at containing the PLO in 1969 and in 1973 were a harsh reminder of the system's inability to carry out its basic functions. The movement towards total collapse was gaining momentum.

This short study seeks to cast light upon those socio-political factors which, throughout history, always contributed to undermine civil peace in Lebanon and until now resulted in the creation of a fragile political entity. This project sets the present study apart from traditional Lebanese historiography which has always endeavoured to re-write history in vindication of the 1943 compromise-State. History finally caught up with this compromise-State and with its subservient historiography. It caught up with them in 1975 in the way we too pain-

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
fully know. Lebanon's frenzy and its suicidal drive call for a frank and lucid re-assessment of Lebanese history as a basis for a sound and peaceful future. The following pages are a modest contribution to this exciting and indispensable venture.

### LEBANON AND PHOENICIA

One readily associates Lebanon with yesterday's Phoenicians, with the invention of the alphabet, with Carthage and with maritime trade. The production of French Orientalist scholarship since the end of the last century, and the preeminence of Beirut and the coast line in the economy of contemporary Lebanon, have contributed to establish and to reinforce the association between the two.

The word Phoenician itself is a generic name which refers to the Canaanians, the Amurrites and the Arameans who settled on Phoenician coast in 3400 B.C. These people founded a series of city-states (Sidon, Tyre, Beirut, Byblos, Tripoli) ruled by independent princes and struggling with one another for political and economic supremacy on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Ironically, it was only through foreign domination that the area came to acquire a certain degree of cohesion and unity under the name Phoenicia. From the second millennium BC onwards, the Phoenician city-states were ruled successively by the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Neo-Babylonians, the Persians, the Greco-Hellens and the Romans.

Yet these successive waves of invasion which reached the Phoenician shores and subdued the Phoenician cities had little - if anything - to do with Lebanon as such. For the name Lebanon does not refer to the coast line, nor to the Syrian interior.



Rather, it refers to a mountain range running parallel to the Mediterranean, and dominating the Phoenician cities of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Byblos. The name itself is Aramaic and means white: An obvious reference to the eternal snows adorning the high peaks of the mountain range. This is the Lebanon of the Bible: Solomon's, Isaiah's and Jeremiah's Lebanon. It is Aram, the country of the Arameans, the highlanders.


#### THE EVANGELIZATION OF LEBANON

In the second century AD, small groups of missionaries left the Christian communities founded by St. Peter in the Phoenician cities a hundred years earlier and ventured in the mountains of Lebanon, seeking to evangelize its pagan Aramean population. Yet Lebanon had to await the 5th century AD for a systematic campaign of evangelization. At that time, a Christian monk by the name of Abraham reached Lebanon coming from the monastery of St. Maron in Northern Syria. Abraham was a Maronite Christian, a disciple and follower of St. Maron - a holy man who lived at the end of the 4th century in the region of Antioch where he founded a community of hermits and ascetes.

Abraham settled in the Lebanese mountains above the city of Batrun, and there he founded a monastery and a lively Christian community. The region became known as Munaytira, from the Greek word monasterion. From Munaytira, the new Christians moved North to the region of Bsharri (in the mountains above Tripoli) and South to the region of Dayr-al-Qamar (North East of Sidon). Soon the whole Aramean population of Lebanon had converted to Christianity.

#### LEBANON : LAND OF REFUGE

In the 6th century AD, in the Byzantine Empire, there were numerous heterodoxies in conflict with the official creed as well as with one another, as one Council followed the other in quick succession, each hastily abrogating the decisions of its predecessor.



The small Maronite community living on the banks of the Orontes river under Byzantine rule was caught in the violent controversy raging between the Monophysists, the Nestorians and the Monothelists; and in 517 AD 350 Maronites were massacred in prelude for a period of systematic persecution. A century later, and shortly before the rise of Islam, the Maronites fleeing the persecution of their fellow Christians had begun their exodus South, seeking the refuge of the Lebanese mountains. There, they were welcomed by their highlander brothers of the Maronite Christian communities founded two centuries earlier by Abraham. Thus did the historical function of Lebanon as land of refuge for the oppressed begin. The newcomers erected monasteries throughout the mountains, and rural communities gathered round them in the same way as, in Medieval Europe, villages and hamlets sprang in the proximity of monasteries and castles. The political organisations of Lebanon was taking shape.

### THE RISE OF ISLAM

In the first quarter of the 7th century, a new religion appeared in the Arabian Peninsula, Islam. Soon, this new creed was able to unite the fragmentary Arab tribes, and together the Arabs and Islam came out of Arabia seeking to conquer the world and bring the whole of mankind to Allah.

In 636 AD, the Muslims defeated the Byzantine army on the Yarmuk River near Jerusalem and overran the imperial provinces of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt. The Byzantine withdrew to Asia Minor, leaving the whole Christian East up to the Taurus mountains in the hands of the Muslims.

The coastal cities and those of the interior fell after a stiff resistance, which resulted to massive migration of the population of these areas to the mountains. Further, the

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conquerors were swift to bring Muslim tribes to the area in order to neutralize Christian predominance and check potential rebellions.


As had happened with previous invasions, the mountains of Lebanon remained untouched, and the Muslim armies pursued their victorious march to the West and to the North, shying away from the rugged terrain of the Maronites' homeland. At the same time, the mountain people were being joined by those Maronites who had until then lived on the banks of the Orontes river, as well as by some Christians inhabiting the lowlands and who now refused to pay tribute and allegiance to the new Muslim lords. And it is in the mountain that Christians resistance to the invaders was born.

At a time when the cities and plains of the Christian East were falling prey to the Muslim onslaught, the mountains became the repository of Christian resistance to Islam. In Lebanon, in Armenia, in Assyria, the Christians dug their heels in and awaited the revival of Christendom.

#### THE MARDAITES

The Mardaites were a warlike people inhabiting the coastal mountains of Asia Minor and Amanus mountains, where they served the Byzantine Emperor.

In the year 676 AD Constantine IV Pogonat sent an army of some 25,000 Mardaites from Asia Minor to Lebanon to help fight the Muslims. In Lebanon, the Mardaites joined forces with the Maronites, and together they succeeded in setting up an autonomous political entity over the whole mountain system running from the Gulf of Alexandretta North to



Jerusalem South\*. The capital of this entity was Baskinta which lies at the foot of Mount Sannine, in the heart of Lebanon. For a decade, this Christian entity managed to preserve its independence vis-à-vis Islam as well as vis-à-vis the Byzantine. (The Christians of Lebanon spoke Syriac, hence distinguishing themselves from the Greeks as well as from the Arabs).

Then, in 685 AD, the Byzantine and the Muslims reached an agreement, and Justinian II recalled the Mardaite. When the latter's war-lords refused to leave Lebanon, Justinian summoned them to a meeting in the Biqaa Valley, East of the mountain, and treacherously had them slain. As a result of which, in 687 AD, 12,000 Mardaite warriors left Lebanon for Asia Minor, while the others stayed back and merged with the predominantly Maronite population of the country.

#### A CHRISTIAN ENTITY IN LEBANON

Following the Byzantine betrayal, the Christians were unable to hold their ground and withdrew North from Palestine to Mount Lebanon. Around the same time, the Muslims launched an offensive against the Mardaite living in Mount Amanus, in North West Syria, forcing them to abandon their villages and settle in the Muslim plain.

At the beginning of the 8th century, then, Lebanon remained the only independent Christian entity South of the Taurus mountains and West of the River Tigris, and the sole refuge for the Maronite community to preserve its physical, religious and socio-economic status. This small Christian entity extended from the Shuf (East of Sidon) to the Akkar (East of Tripoli).

\*According to ancient historical sources



### ISLAM REACHES LEBANON


From the middle of the 8th century onwards the Abbasid Caliphs began sending Orthodox Sunni Muslim tribes to Lebanon to quell resistance there. As a result of this Muslim military and demographic pressure, the Christian entity shrank further to the North, leaving the whole Gharb and Shuf areas (East and South-East of Beirut) to the newcomers. The Dog River, 8 miles North of Beirut, became the border between the Christian entity and what had now become a Muslim Lebanon.

In the 10th century, the "great divide" between Sunni Islam and Shii Islam led various heterodox sects (Druzes, Alawites) to seek refuge in Lebanon. As a result of this heterodox influx, the Orthodox Sunni character of Muslim Lebanon faded away, and the Southern part of the mountain became a land of predilection for those rejecting the central authority.

Around the same time, Maronites and other Christians who were being persecuted in Northern Syria fled to Lebanon, and the Maronite Patriarchate established its see in the mountain thus underlining the historical function of Lebanon as a refuge for the oppressed.

### THE CRUSADES

When the Crusaders reached the East in the 11th century, the Christian entity in Lebanon was under increasing pressure as Islam was being reinforced by the nomadic Turks of Central Asia. As soon as the first Crusade reached Syria, the Maronite warriors came down from their mountains and joined the Frankish armies which had already welcomed Greek and Armenian contingents on their way from Constantinople to the Holy Land. The relationship between the Crusaders and the




Lebanese Christians was further enhanced by the fortifications erected by the Crusaders and which, together with the monasteries, became an integral part of Lebanon's defence system. Throughout the era of the Crusades, the Christians of Lebanon remained the faithful allies of the Western Christians. The Maronites especially were renowned for their military valour and for their archery skills. Cooperation between the Crusaders and the Christians of Lebanon went beyond the field of military activities to social, economic and cultural intercourse.

#### TWILIGHT OF CHRISTIAN INDEPENDENCE

At the end of the 13th century Islam's battering rams finally breached the last Frankish ramparts on the Syrian coast, and the last Crusaders fled to Cyprus. The Muslims now turned their attention to Lebanon whose population had been cooperating with the Westerners since the 11th century.

In the 13th century, Lebanon had an overwhelming Christian population with a heretical Muslim minority. The Christians were mainly concentrated in the North (Bsharri) which was a Maronite stronghold. South of Maronite country was the Kisrawan which harboured Christians, Shii Muslims and Alawite Muslims. In the Southern Gharb and Shuf areas, the population was predominantly Druze, with a small Christian minority.

In 1297, the Mamluk Muslim armies entered the Kisrawan and subdued the Christians and heretics living there. The invaders then marched North and overran the district of Bsharri, while thousands of Maronites fled the country, across the sea, to Cyprus. For the first time in history, the whole of Mount



Lebanon had bowed to Islam. The Christians had proved too divided to resist, and their traditional military structure based upon regional war-lords was unable to withstand the assaults of the Muslim war machine. The century-old Christian entity in Lebanon had lost its political autonomy, but preserved its social and religious institutions.

#### DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS IN RULED LEBANON

In 1305, the Mamluks launched another military expedition against the Kisrawan. It resulted in a general exodus of the population which saw its villages razed to the ground and its fields destroyed. The 1305 military expedition was to have lasting effects upon the demographic structure of the mountain.

First of all, it put a halt to the Alawites' drift South. Thereafter, they were to remain confined to the mountains North-West of Syria which became known as the Alawite Mountains. Secondly, it pushed the Shiis from the Kisrawan East and North-East to the Biqaa Valley and the Hermel. Thirdly, it stopped the Northern movement of the Druzes and confined them to the Gharb and Shuf districts, South East of Beirut. Furthermore, for the first time the Druze started leaving Lebanon heading for the Hawran in South-West Syria, a region which became known as the Druze Mountain.

The Alawites' move to North-West Syria, the Shiis' exodus to the Biqaa, and the Druzes' move to South-West Syria created a vacuum in the Kisrawan. This vacuum was gradually to be filled by the Maronites who resumed their drift South.

#### LEBANON AFTER THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE

In 1453, the Muslim Turks conquered Constantinople and put an end to the Eastern Christian Emire, heir to Greece and to




Rome. In 1571 Cyprus fell, and the whole Eastern Mediterranean became a mare islamica. Soon the Turks were besieging Vienna, as most of Eastern Europe and parts of Central Europe fell under the domination of Islam.

For the Christians of Lebanon, the fall of Byzantium and the Turkish thrust deep into Europe meant a radical reappraisal of their strategy for survival. An increased feeling of isolation led the Christians of Lebanon, with the Maronites at their head, to look for local allies. Naturally enough, their choice fell on the Druzes, by far the largest and most mountain-like community after the Maronites. In the second half of the 16th century an alliance was, therefore, formed between the Maronites and the most prominent Druze family, the Maan, led by Fakraddin.

#### THE HISTORICAL ALLIANCE

The Maronites were in a position to contribute substantially to the plans of Fakraddin, a Druze prince educated by a Maronite. First, since the 15th century, their numbers had been increasing tremendously, and they were able to give Fakraddin a people around which an autonomous power could be built. Secondly, the Maronite community was extremely well structured and organised, both religiously and at the level of civil administration and legislation; and it could therefore afford Fakraddin the nucleus of a State apparatus. Thirdly, the Maronites could offer Fakraddin the intellectuals and civil servants needed to link up with European courts. In exchange, Fakraddin helped the Maronites to resist the Sunni Muslims and the Shii Muslims who were exerting pressure on them from the Biqaa and from the coastal towns; and he encouraged the Maronites' movement South to the Gharb and



Shuf districts. Finally, the Maronites were supplying Fakraddin with the demographic and institutional structures indispensable for the establishment of an autonomous power.

Having consolidated his power-basis in the mountains, Fakraddin then spread his influence East to the Biqaa Valley and West to the coast line, setting up an autonomous principality conducting its own diplomacy and contracting trade agreements with European powers.

An autonomous Lebanon with Christian political preponderance and demographic predominance was a monstrosity in the eyes of the Turkish Muslims; and they were no longer prepared to accommodate the ambitious and bold Fakraddin, nor his highly structured Maronite power-basis in the mountain. They, therefore, mounted a major military expedition against the Lebanese prince, and in 1635 Fakraddin was executed in Istanbul.

Following his death, the Shiis rebelled against his successor, and the Biqaa Valley escaped the influence of Mount Lebanon. Concurrently, the Sunnis established their power in the coastal towns, and thousands of Christians fled from persecution to the mountains. There, they were joined by Christians from other parts of the Ottoman Empire also fleeing Muslim persecution (in 1667 for example the Syriac-Catholic Patriarch came to settle in Lebanon).

At a time when the Christians inhabiting the Lebanese and Syrian lowlands were seeking the refuge of the Lebanese peaks, the Druzes, for their part, were leaving Lebanon for the Hawran which became the religious and political center of Druzism. The demographic trend set up in the 14th century was thus confirmed in the 17th century, as the Alawites remained

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confined to their mountains in North-West Syria, and the Shiis pushed East, leaving Mount Lebanon and ruling over the Biqaa Valley, while the Druzes moved further South to the Hawran, now their matrix. Whereas, the various Muslim heterodox communities were showing preference for other lands (Alawite Mountains, Biqaa and Hermel, Hawran), the Christians remained in Mount Lebanon where they were joined by coreligionists from Syria, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

#### THE REINFORCEMENT OF CHRISTIAN POWER IN LEBANON

From the death of Prince Fakraddin Maan and until the first decade of the 18th century, Lebanon was characterised by political instability and internal strife. Then, the Shihab family, heir to the Maan, succeeded in asserting its power over the whole country and quashed the feuding war-lords who now reverted to the secondary position they had occupied under the rule of Fakraddin.

The Maronites had sided with the Shihab and had helped them to subdue the feudal lords. They now benefited from the general reorganization of political society effected by the victors. Consequently, the Maronite community began to attract prominent members of the Muslim ruling aristocracy who converted to Christianity.

With the reinforcement of Maronite power and the spread of their influence in Lebanon, Christian communities suffering from persecution in the cities and plains of Syria now flocked to the mountain. In 1725 the Greek-Catholic Patriarch sought refuge in Lebanon, and five years later the Armenian-Catholic Patriarch followed suit. Both communities began to grow and develop in their new land of predilection.

#### THE RISE OF THE MARONITE CLERGY

Under the rule of the Shihab (some of whom had secretly

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converted to Christianity) the Maronite clergy became the dominant power in the country. The reinforcement of the power of the clergy was helped by the Shihab princes themselves who sought an ally to counter the potential threat of the aristocracy, be it Druze or Maronite.

Under the rule of Bashir II Shihab (1794-1840) the alliance between the Prince and the Maronite clergy at the expense of the aristocracy helped the Maronites to expand over the whole of Mount Lebanon, from Bsharri North to Jazzine South - thus recreating the demographic pattern of medieval times when the Mardaites ruled Lebanon. Gradually, the Maronite community was becoming the human backbone of the Lebanese mountain system, and the Maronite clergy the institutional backbone of the Christian communities.

#### EUROPE INTERVENES

In 1831 the Egyptian armies of Muhammad Ali Pasha invaded Syria, routed the Ottoman armies and concluded an alliance with Prince Bashir II. At first the Christians of Lebanon welcomed the Egyptians as liberators. Soon, however, the autocratic rule of Muhammad Ali and his propensity for acute centralization, coupled with a deterioration of the economic situation in the country, led the people of the mountain, Christians and Druzes, to rebel.

The Druzes rose under the banner of their feudal lords who now sought to overthrow Bashir II and re-establish their power. As for the Christians, they rebelled against the despotism of the Egyptians who sought to disarm the Christian villages, dissolve local militias, and enforce a general conscription. Whereas the Druzes were led by their feudal lords, the Christians uprising was led by the Maronite lower clergy and was directed against the Egyptians, against


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Bashir II, and against the aristocracy.

In May 1840 10.000 warriors rose in the mountain and marched against the Egyptians, as mass was being celebrated in each village and farm where the rebels assembled, and as monks and priests blessed the insurgents' weapons. A month later, however, the Egyptian army ( led by Colonel Sèves, a French officer who had converted to Islam), had succeeded in defeating the Lebanese twice, before Zahleh and before Sidon: the repression began. Then, on July 15 1840, a British fleet anchored at Junieh in the Kisrawan and distributed 30,000 rifles to the insurgents. Soon the Lebanese were again in control of the mountain. And as the Europeans and the Ottoman Turks intervened militarily, the Egyptians withdrew from Syria and Bashir II went into exile. The rebellion had succeeded, and it had provoked the first internationalization of the Lebanese question.

#### THE 1841 MASSACRES

The Ottomans were very eager to foment inter-communal trouble so as to establish direct rule over the mountain by playing the role of arbitrorers. As for the Muslim communities (Druzes, Shiis and Sunnis) they were determined to regain the ground lost to the Christians during the rule of Bashir II. They resented the privileges accorded by Bashir II to the Christians, and were eager to remind the latter that under the law of Islam, Christians could only be second class citizens. On the other hand, the tolerant era of Bashir II, the war waged under the leadership of the lower clergy, and the growing influence of European ideas, had induced the emergence within Christian ranks of a strong democratic movement seeking emancipation both from the Muslim and from the aristocracy.



Conditions were ripe for a communal clash, and it was triggered in the autumn of 1841 when the Druze feudal lords attempted to regain control of the lands which had been confiscated by Prince Bashir II and distributed to Maronite peasants. Soon, the Druzes were attacking Christian villages in the Shuf and Matn districts and massacring their inhabitants, while in the Biqaa Valley the Christian town of Zahleh successfully withstood the Druzes' onslaught. Concurrently, Druze leaders requested the termination of the autonomous status of Lebanon and a return to direct Ottoman rule in order to curtail the power of the Christians and check the growing influence of Europe in the country. The Ottoman army intervened to stop the feud, and on January 15, 1842, the Sublime Porte announced the termination of Lebanese autonomy. The Christians were dismayed. The Maronite Patriarch retreated to the heart of the mountain where Ottoman soldiers never dared to venture. Europe intervened and imposed a solution whereby Lebanon would be divided into two countries, a Northern one ruled by a Christian Prince, and a Southern one ruled by a Druze. The Beirut-Damascus road became the dividing line between the two counties.

Yet it soon appeared that the system was not workable, especially since there was a substantial number of Christians living in the Southern (Druze) county. At the end of 1843, in Dayr-al-Qamar, capital of the Southern county, more than a thousand Maronite dwellings as well as many churches and monasteries were ransacked and destroyed. In the spring of 1845, the Druzes and their Shii allies rose again, killing Christian villagers, priests, monks and



European missionaries, razing churches and monasteries to the ground, and desecrating Christian cemeteries. The Muslim onslaught on the Christians lasted six weeks, at the end of which the Ottomans again intervened to stop the massacres and introduced major political reforms in the country. The main novelty consisted in an elected Council: an institution which was to have lasting consequences on the structure of Christian society. Indeed, the Maronite Church, eager as it was to curtail the power of the aristocracy, encouraged and supported the candidacy to the Council of Christian commoners. As a result, the Maronite feudal lords lost what power they had left after a century of inroads by the lower clergy and the peasantry.

#### THE 1858 REVOLUTION AND THE 1860 MASSACRES


The idea of the French Revolution and of the 1848 European Revolution had made their way into the Christian villages of the mountain. In 1858, a blacksmith by the name of Tanius Shahin rose in arms in the Kisrawan, demanding the immediate emancipation of the peasantry. Soon the whole Christian mountain was in turmoil, as peasants attacked castles and mansions, killing the aristocrats and taking control of the land. Within a few weeks the peasants were in control of the whole Northern county up to the Beirut-Damascus road, as feudal families fled to Beirut. By 1859, the revolutionary movement had overflowed into the Southern (Druze) county where Maronite peasants now demanded emancipation from their feudal lords and sought the alliance of the Druze peasantry. There, however, the Druze peasantry sided with the Druze aristocracy against the Maronite peasants.



In the summer of 1859, the Druzes started attacking the Christians in the Shuf, Gharb and Matn districts. A series of incidents provoked by the Druzes in the Southern county set the communal strife in motion: thus did the social revolution advocated by the Christian democrats become a religious war. The whole country was up in arms, Muslims against Christians, as the Sunnis and the Shiis sided with the Druzes, while the Maronites, the Greek-Orthodox and the Greek-Catholics stood side by side.

Within three days of the start of the Muslim onslaught, sixty Christian villages in the mountain and on the coast line had been burnt and razed to the ground in the obvious aim of preventing their hounded inhabitants ever from returning. Christian villagers of the Biqaa Valley fled to the mountain and to Zahleh which remained the only Christian community East of Mount Lebanon. Soon the town was being besieged by 17.000 Druzes, Shiis, Sunnis and Beduins. Zahleh continued to resist awaiting the arrival of the Christian militia across the mountain. But the latter never came. Instead, the Druzes, disguised as Christians and flying the Banner of the Cross, tricked the defenders and entered the town, looting and slaughtering. When the Ottoman contingent sent to protect the Christians arrived, the soldiers joined in with the assailants and committed the worst atrocities: butchering children, and raping women before killing them.

In the South, the Christians of the Shuf had fled to the coastal town of Sidon to escape their Druze tormentors. But in Sidon, the Sunni Muslims did not prove more clement than the Druzes. In Dayr-al-Qamar 2,200 Christians were mercilessly slaughtered in a single day. In Hasbayya, the Christians led





by a young lass, bravely resisted the Druzes' onslaught. Besieged and cut off from the Christian lines, they finally entrusted their lives , their women and their children to the Ottoman garrison which disarmed them before handing them over to the Druzes, who killed each and every one of them.

The same thing happened in Rashayya, Est of Hasbayya. By June 1860, there were no Christians left South of the Beirut-Damascus road. But in the Northern county, where 40,000 Christians had sought refuge, the revolution was still holding its ground, and when the Muslim army marched on Bikfayya, the capital of the Christian county, the militia defeated it, forcing it to withdraw South.

As the Christians were organising their counter-offensive in the mountain, the Muslims shifted their effort to Syria. In Damascus , thousands of Christians were massacred by the mob, while 8,000 others fled West to Mount Lebanon. The extension of the massacres to Syria compelled Europe to intervene. The main powers decided to send a French expeditionary force to Lebanon to force the Ottomans to re-establish peace and order and to protect the Christians. French troops arrived at Beirut harbour on August 16, 1860. For the time being at least, the ordeal of the Christians was over. Now they could bury their dead, look after the hungry, care for the orphaned children. In Lebanon alone, 360 Christian villages had been destroyed in a conscious attempt at altering the geographical repartition of the population; 250 Christians had been killed in battle; 11,000 others treacherously butchered, and 4,000 had died of hunger; the mountain had 6,000 new widows and 10,000 orphans; 100,000 Christians were homeless. The Druzes on

the other hand, had lost 1,300 men in battle while only 176 of them had been murdered.

Figures speak for themselves. For months after, the massacres bell did nothing but toll. Eastern Christians were dismayed, close to desperation. For twelve centuries now, since the Islamic conquest, Maronites, Armenians, Greek-Orthodox, Greek-Catholics, Jacobites, Nestorians, and others, had been slowly converging on Lebanon: a Lebanon they saw as a haven, the last stretch of freedom in an increasingly Muslim and intolerant East. In the 1840s and 1850s, for example, the Christians of the mountains in Northern Iraq had suffered from the exactions, persecutions, and massacres perpetrated by the Muslims. And European travellers' accounts are full of the tragic history of the Christians of these regions. These Christians had then sought the refuge of the Lebanese mountains. And now they were again being hounded and pushed further West and out of the East.

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF MOUNT LEBANON (1861-1914)


In 1861, the Europeans and the Ottomans made public their proposal for a reorganisation of the Lebanese entity. It called for the establishment of an autonomous entity, ruled by a Christian non-Lebanese Ottoman official, over the whole of Mount Lebanon and excluding Beirut, the Biqaa Valley to the East, the Akkar plain to the North, and the region of Sidon and Tyr to the South.

The autonomous entity's main sea outlets were Junieh, Jbayl and Batrun, and its population 300,000 out of which 268,000 were Christians (89% of the pop.) The European proposal was certainly designed to allay the fears of the

Christians of Lebanon as well as of those of the East in general , since the predominantly Muslim plains of the East, North and South had been left out the newly constituted entity.

Lebanon again appeared to be a haven for Eastern Christians, and this could explain why in 1895 the Gregorian and Catholic Armenians fleeing from the persecutions that had befallen their homeland arrived to Lebanon in great numbers and settled there. Around the same time, Greek-Catholics suffering under the exacting and authoritarian rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II also flocked to Lebanon. As Lebanon again became the center of attraction of Eastern Christendom and the center of European missionary, cultural and commercial activity, the Ottomans stepped up their pressure and resumed their interfering in the mountain, threatening what had become the last Christian homeland in the East. This provoked a swift reaction on the part of the United States of America who sent a fleet to Beirut in 1903, threatening to land should the Ottomans persist in harrassing the Christians and the Europeans. Western guarantees such as this increased the Eastern Christian's confidence in the future of Lebanon as an independent, sovereign, Christian homeland, and in 1909 the mountain welcomed a new influx of Gregorian and Catholic Armenians: Further victims of the Ottomans' Panislamism.

In 1908 Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown by the Young Turks. The new rulers of the Ottoman Empire embarked on a systematic policy of Turkification and centralisation which led them to question the autonomy granted to Lebanon. Concurrently, nationalist ideas were spreading among the



Lebanese, and various committees were formed in the country demanding political reforms and advocating independence for Lebanon.

At the eve of WWI, the overwhelmingly Christian population of Lebanon was intellectually mature and politically responsible; it had established close commercial ties with Europe and needed the Biqaa and Beirut to fulfil its economic potential ; it had been exposed to European ideas regarding nationalism and democracy; and it was eager to shake off Ottoman domination and link up with the West, with modernity, and with the great adventure of mankind. The Young Turks, on the other hand, were determined to quell all nascent nationalist movements in the bud and to reassert direct Turkish rule over the whole of the Empire.

#### WORLD WAR ONE

As soon as the Turks entered the war on the side of the Austro-Germans, they abolished the autonomous status of Lebanon and occupied the country militarily. The Ottoman army's incessant requisitions, the economic blockade of the mountain which the Turks instaurated, and the arrival of the locust, forced the peasants to sell land to speculators and abandon their villages: mountain roads became littered with hungry peasants aiming for the coast, eating roots, cats, dogs, anything. By 1916 80,000 people had died in the mountain. Concurrently the Ottomans were hounding the Lebanese nationalists. On September 24, 1915, eleven Lebanese freedom fighters were hanged in Beirut. In June 1916 the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut was deported: he died a few months later in exile. When the Red Cross reached Lebanon with the



British army, it estimated that 200,000 people had died in Lebanon as a result of repression and starvation.

The arrival of the Allies did not bring peace to the Lebanese. They still had to fight for their right to exist as a nation in the face of Arab demands for the immediate unification of Lebanon with Syria. In September 1917, the Lebanese nationalists reaffirmed their right to full independence from Syria as well as from French tutelage.

Notwithstanding Lebanese wishes, Prince Faysal of Arabia cabled to Beirut on October 2, 1918, asking his supporters to fly the Arab flag over all official buildings, and he sent an Arab officer from Damascus to take possession of Beirut in the name of the "Arab Government of Mecca". In order to prevent clashes between the Arabs and the Lebanese, the British occupied Beirut on October 6 and demanded the withdrawal of Faysal's troops East to Syria.

#### LEBANON IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I

In accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement which stipulated that Mount Lebanon and the Biqaa Valley were a French "zone of influence", the British evacuated Lebanon and the French moved in. In January 1919 the Paris Conference gave France a mandate over both Lebanon and Syria. The Lebanese nationalists protested, arguing that the instauration of the mandate was a step backward in relation to the autonomy Lebanon had always enjoyed. And to counter Arab Syrian demands, the Lebanese nationalists further pointed out that throughout the centuries when Syria had been subjected to foreign domination, the mountain of Lebanon had managed to preserve its autonomy.



The Paris Peace Conference then asked an international commission to make in situ investigations. The Americans sent a team whose findings are known as the King-Crane Report. The Report declared that the people of Lebanon, while welcoming French assistance in building a modern nation-state, wanted a free and independent Lebanon, and it concluded that should the League of Nations consider a mandate over Lebanon necessary, then the Lebanese would prefer the Americans to the French.

Notwithstanding the King-Crane Report, however, and in accordance with Anglo-French bilateral agreements, France was given a League of Nations mandate over Lebanon and over Syria. The Lebanese accepted it because it was an international guarantee against the expansionist schemes of Prince Faysal. On March 7, 1920, Prince Faysal declared himself King of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine: an obvious threat to the Jews of Palestine as well as to the Eastern Christians who were still flocking to Lebanon (in 1920, for example, there was a substantial immigration of Armenians fleeing Muslim persecution and annexation of their country). To counter Faysal's plans, France sided with the Christians and, agreeing to their demands, reintegrated the Biqaa Valley into the Lebanese entity.

Far more important, France's stand in 1920 was an assurance that an economically viable Lebanon would remain a land of refuge open to the victims of fanaticism and obscurantism. Three years earlier, the British had pledged to favour the establishment of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. The declaration, in 1920, of the State of Greater Lebanon by General Gouraud gave hope to the Christians all over the East, as hounded Armenians and Assyrians were still reaching the Lebanese haven.

### THE STATE OF GREATER LEBANON

The creation of Greater Lebanon on the 30th of August 1920, incorporated new territories into the 1861 Government of Mount Lebanon. These territories were predominantly Sunni and Shii. As a result, the country, though now more viable in economic terms, lost its social homogeneity, and the dominant position of the Christians was threatened by the infusion of large numbers of Muslims. The newly incorporated Muslim Sunni community, far better organized than the Shiis, altered the existing power relations between the communities and emerged as the second most powerful community after the Maronites in the new political structure.

The French authorities, in accord with the terms of the mandate, and with the consent and cooperation of the Representative Council of Lebanon (elected in 1925), drafted a constitution on May 24, 1926, thus legalizing the newly created "Greater Lebanon". The Constitution reflected the new political realities of Greater Lebanon, and it further institutionalized the confessional nature of the Lebanese political system.

It would be useful here to elaborate on the bearing of the new constitution on future political developments in the country.

1. The Constitution drafted in 1926 endowed Lebanon with modern political institutions in what was essentially a serious attempt by the French to institutionalize the existing political pluralism in the country. The Constitution accepted the de facto existence of the various communities and made provisions for the protection of their rights. However, the newly incorporated Muslims

and their leaders regarded the modern concept of political pluralism and the creation of democratic institutions as alien to their political outlook and tradition. The Muslim State is basically theocratic in nature. Membership of the political community is reserved only to the Muslims, irrespective of their nationality. In theory, the Muslim Umma ('nation') is composed of all those who profess the doctrine of Islam. The status of the Christians is that of dhimmis: non-Muslim subjects living under Islamic law and enjoying protection in return for paying the poll tax. They have no share in the political power structure of the State. So, for the Muslim, particularly the Sunni leadership, equal legal status for the Christians, and a French-imposed power-sharing formula, were hardly acceptable.

2. The attitude of the Muslim population, and particularly the Sunnis, towards the new Lebanese State remained hostile for a considerable period. The ideology of Lebanese nationalism based on secular principles was totally unacceptable to the religiously - motivated Muslim masses. For the latter, religion has always claimed priority among other symbols of identifications. Union with Muslim Syria and other Muslim Arab countries remained one of the primary objectives of the Muslim leadership. This lack of loyalty towards the Lebanese fatherland hindered the emergence of a viable political community in Lebanon, and it encouraged communal spirit and sectarian loyalties. The concept of an independent Lebanese identity with distinct characteristics based on historical, social and political factors was unacceptable to the Muslim leadership for whom Islam and Arabism were (theoretically as well as practically) inseparable and indivisible. The idea of a secular Lebanon based on pluralism and liberal democratic concepts was regarded as a device conceived by French colonial authorities to isolate Lebanon from Muslim Syria and the Muslim Arab world.



Thus, since the early creation of a modern Lebanese political entity, the loyalty of the Muslim communities, particularly the Sunnis, was always directed toward Damascus and the Muslim Arab countries.

#### INDEPENDENT LEBANON

1943 saw the termination of French mandate and the establishment of an independent Lebanon. This period witnessed the emergence of an important verbal agreement, better known as the National Pact, and regarded as an important constitutional agreement legitimizing the existing political institutions and confessional power sharing. In fact, this verbal agreement was no more than a modus vivendi between two political personalities -- Bishara el-Khuri and Riyad as-Sulh -- who claimed to represent the two most powerful communities in the country, the Maronite and the Sunnis. These two political leaders reached an agreement with regard to power-sharing in the formal governmental structure and to the principles of policy formulation in internal and external fields. This understanding preserved the existing power relationship between the communities and informally legitimized the confessional basis of the Lebanese political system. As a result, the pattern of representation of the communities according to their proportional numerical strength in the State apparatus -- parliament, administration, courts and armed forces -- was firmly established.

For more than three decades the principles of the Pact were not subjected to any alteration or modification. The Lebanese State was unsuccessful in its efforts to integrate the various communities into the Lebanese "nation", which enjoyed a merely nominal existence. The unitary governmental structure and its infrastructures did not produce the wished for results. The problems of national identity and national loyalty remained important obstacles to the creation of a viable political

community in the country. And State institutions continued to play a minor role in the various spheres of national life.

Throughout this period, several serious attempts were made by various groups; especially Christian intellectuals, to secularize the country. However, these attempts met fierce opposition from Muslim circles. The main objective of the Muslim communities remained the alteration of the balance of power in the country in their favour. No efforts were made by the Muslim political leadership to modernize the existing political institutions in the country, or to familiarize its followers with democratic liberal principles. The concept of a pluralist Lebanon which would be the center and meeting point of Western and Middle Eastern civilizations remained alien to the Muslims. The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Muslim intellectuals were engrossed in non-Lebanese socio-political issues, constantly attempting to solve their identity problems by referring to Arab, Muslim, Marxist and lately Palestinian ideals.

The principles of the Pact which were to serve as guidelines for policy formulation were seldom respected by the major political forces in the country. The first principle related to the attitude of the Christian communities, particularly the Maronites, towards the Western world. The former accepted to limit their political ties with the West and to refrain from asking for Western political and military protection. It was a crucial concession if one considers the Christians' long-established cultural, socio-political and economic ties with Europe. The Christian political leadership thoroughly observed the application of this principle in Lebanese politics and only on one occasion (the 1958 civil war), did it ask the United States to intervene to counter

Nasser's serious threat to the very existence of Lebanon.

The second principle of the Pact related to the attitude of the Muslim communities, particularly Sunnis, towards Muslim Syria and the Muslim Arab world. Muslims accepted the existence of the Lebanese political entity, its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, they agreed to refrain from demanding unity with Syria or with Muslim Arab countries. Throughout the post-independence period, however, the policies adopted by the Muslim leadership totally negated the second principle of the Pact.

The third principle of the National Pact dealt with foreign policy formulation. According to this principle, the Lebanese State was to pursue a non-interference policy in regional and international conflicts; it was to support any move or action which may strengthen relations between Arab countries and foster unity within Arab ranks; in inter-Arab conflicts Lebanon was to adopt a strict neutrality, refusing to side with any Arab country against another. Yet throughout the post-independence period, Lebanese Muslim political leadership constantly attempted to drag the Lebanese State in inter-Arab conflicts.


#### THE 1958 CIVIL WAR

In 1958 Lebanon experienced the most serious crisis in its modern history. For more than five months -- May to early October -- the country witnessed continuous civil disorder, including violent skirmishes between loyalists -- mainly Christians -- and rebel -- Muslim -- forces. The civil war shook the very foundations of the Lebanese Republic. The whole country was divided into two opposing camps. On one side stood the President, Camille Shamun, enjoying the support of most Christian

political forces, and on the other the predominantly Muslim opposition.

It is not the purpose of this study to analyze in depth the causes of the 1958 crisis. However, the rise of power of Abdel Nasser, first in Egypt and later in the Arab world can be regarded as the main catalyst which ignited the 1958 civil war. The early 1950s' witnessed a strong wave of Islamo-Arab nationalism which spread throughout the Muslim Arab world. Nasser became the symbol of this newly emerging movement and the idol of the Muslim Arab masses. Using Arab unitarian slogans Nasser's Intelligence Services (the Mukhabarat) interfered in the internal affairs of most Arab countries. Lebanon was not spared. Moreover, the 1958 Union between Egypt and Syria accelerated events in Lebanon, where Nasser found a fertile soil for the realization of his political objectives. Unfortunately, throughout the 1950s' the energy of the Muslim leadership in Lebanon was directed towards altering the existing power relationship in the country rather than promoting the principles of the National Pact. The Muslim leadership did not attempt to propagate ideas of pluralism and liberal democracy among the Muslim communities. The notion of a free, sovereign, independent Lebanon, with certain unique characteristics, remained alien to the overwhelming majority of the Muslim masses. It was, therefore, obvious that the Muslims' loyalty would be directed towards Nasser and Nasserism in the hope that Lebanon's integration into the United Arab Republic will put a definite end to Christian predominance in the country.

Moreover, ever since the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, most of Lebanon's Muslim leaders had been pressing on President Camille Shamun to adopt a pro-Nasserite policy in inter-Arab disputes,




as well as an anti-Western attitude in international diplomacy. All of which in violation of the third principle of the National Pact which clearly stipulates that the Lebanese State should adopt a neutral attitude in inter Arab disputes as well as in international affairs. Staunch Muslim pressure on President Shamun led the latter to adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine in anticipation of Western economic and military aid against increasing Nasserite and Communist threats.

The 1958 civil war ended with a formula of 'no victor, no vanquished' , a formula which meant the maintenance of the status quo. However, the events left the country bitterly divided on certain major issues. The civil war did not bring any solution to such vital problems as national identity, the nature of the political and economic system, Lebanon's role in regional and international politics, etc...

#### THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Ten years later Lebanon experienced a prolonged political crisis which can be regarded as a prelude to the present situation. The 1969 crisis was mainly due to the presence in Lebanon of armed Palestinian groups, and their activities against the State of Israel. This crisis, which lasted from April 23rd until late November erupted as a result of violent clashes which took place in several Lebanese cities between the Lebanese police and demonstrators demanding that an end be put to all restrictions on Palestinian activities in the country. These clashes led to the resignation of the Government of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, following which no Muslim Sunni leader was able to form a government. The country was virtually divided into two camps on the issue of armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. On the one side stood the Lebanese nationalist parties enjoying the support of the Christian communities, and on the



other a combination of political forces -- Arab Muslim nationalists, Syrian nationalists, Marxists etc -- who drew their support from the Muslim communities. The Lebanese nationalists demanded the disarming of the Palestinians and regarded their armed presence as a danger to the State. Their opponents actively campaigned for the right of the Palestinian guerillas to enjoy freedom of action in the country and to carry out armed raids against Israel from the Lebanese border.

The Cairo agreement of 1969 concluded between the representatives of the Lebanese State and the Palestinian Liberation Organization finally ended the 1969 crisis. The crisis had revealed crucial shortcomings in the Lebanese formula:

1. The position of the Lebanese Muslims vis-à-vis the Lebanese Army. The latter was the only effective non-sectarian institution capable of defending the Lebanese political system and preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the country. However, the Muslim leadership paralyzed the Lebanese Army and prevented it from playing its role as the protector of Lebanon and its political institutions.
2. The Lebanese Muslim leadership unconditionally supported the Palestinians to the detriment of the interests of the Lebanon. The Muslim leadership once again reasserted its allegiance to Muslim and Arab causes rather than to Lebanon. This, in turn, revived Christianity mistrust.
3. The Arab countries, irrespective of their political orientation, actively supported the Palestinian position in Lebanon. They unanimously demanded unilateral concessions from the Lebanese State. This arbitrary and

biased attitude widened the gap between the Lebanese Christians and the Muslim Arab world.

4. The Cairo Agreement was a direct violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The presence of foreign armed groups enjoying "legitimate" rights paralyzed the Lebanese government. The Palestinians passed as the protectors of Muslim interests in Lebanon. Through their efficient propaganda machine they advocated the idea in Muslim circles that their armed presence in Lebanon was neutralizing "the Christian controlled" Lebanese Army.

In 1973 the country witnessed heavy armed clashes between Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese Army, as Palestinians hardened their attitude after their expulsion from Jordan. Lebanon had become the last center for free Palestinian activity. And once again the overwhelming majority of Muslims supported the Palestinians against the Lebanese Army and State. The Arab States strongly protested against the use of Lebanese Army units on Lebanese territory against Palestinian irregulars, and they forced the Lebanese State to sign the Melkart Protocol -- yet another direct violation of Lebanese sovereignty and a further indication of the inability of the Lebanese authorities to carry out even the most primary tasks.

#### THE DESINTEGRATION OF LEBANON


In 1975 the long-heralded political disturbances started. The crisis totally justified Christian fears about the real intentions of the Palestinian leadership, as well as Christian historical mistrust of Islam. The Lebanese Army, the main pillar of the Lebanese State, was totally paralyzed because of the hostile attitude of the Muslim leadership to its deployment: an attitude which led to the total collapse of the Lebanese

Army in 1976. The Muslim communities strongly supported the Palestinian guerrilla in Lebanon. They actively joined the PLO and fought against their Lebanese compatriots. The PLO seized this opportunity to control more Lebanese territory. As a result, all Muslim populated areas in Lebanon came under direct or indirect PLO control. The Syrians manipulated events in Lebanon in favor of pursuing their long-cherished-dream -- the creation of Greater Syria. Syria never officially recognized Lebanese independence, and Lebanon's territorial integrity, and never established diplomatic relations with Beirut. Under the pretext of safeguarding Lebanon's unity and protecting the Palestinian guerilla movement, Syria occupied 80% of the Lebanese territory with the blessing of the major Arab countries. Irrespective of their political orientations, no Arab country supported the Christians in Lebanon. The latter fought the battle of survival alone, first against a Palestinian-Lebanese Muslim alliance, then against the Syrians, thus revealing their deep and strong attachment to Lebanon and to the values for which it always stood. The struggle is still going on.

### CONCLUSION

Thirteen centuries ago, Islam overran the Eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire and subdued their Christian populations. Later on, Assyria and Chaldea bowed to Islam. Then, Armenia followed suit. Throughout these centuries Mount Lebanon remained the only Christian haven in the Near East. Ever since the Islamic conquest, Eastern Christians have been flocking to Mount Lebanon. In it, these Christians found a refuge against persecution and a shield against fanaticism. In it, they were able to live freely, and to preserve their identity.

For thirteen centuries the Christians of Lebanon have managed to survive and retain their country -- against all odds. Throughout this perpetual struggle for survival, Leba-





non's Christians have looked to Europe and the West for inspiration and for support. Throughout these long, dark centuries, the Christians of Lebanon have remained the West's most faithful friend and its most undemanding ally.

Today, Lebanon is the last stretch of land where Eastern Christians can live in peace, in security and freedom, in vindication of their forefathers' century-old choice to resist and to live freely rather than submit and lose their identity. Land of freedom, Lebanon is today threatened. The Lebanese Christians have now taken up arms to resist this lethal threat. In so doing, they have given hope to Christians all over the East. This is the true significance of the Lebanese Resistance: symbol of an age-old struggle for life and for freedom.

Today, Lebanon is assailed from all parts. Soon, this Biblical mountain may well be levelled by medieval fanaticism armed with modern war machines. Today, more than ever before, the West must remain true to itself and help the Lebanese Resistance to preserve this island of peace and liberty.



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## THE DEMOGRAPHICAL PROBLEMS

By Naoum Farah

To be able to understand the Lebanese demography problems one has to go back to its History.


Since the 3rd Century A.D. Lebanon's population was mainly Christian. After the beginning of Islam and its spreading, the Christians of the M.E. met with periods of persecutions that forced them to take refuge in Lebanon because of the geographical aspect of the land, which allowed them to survive.

The Christian population had to submit to the Coranic law applied by the Ottoman conqueror until 1869. That law allowed only the Moslems to be full fledged citizens.

The Coranic law created difficulties for the Christians especially in the places where Moslem immigrants started to settle, looking for work. Those hindrances were made mainly in the cities.

These laws having encouraged the Moslem fanaticism, brought in by the masses of immigrants, provoked confrontations with bloodshed between the Christians living here and the brought-in Moslem population who was protected by that Coranic law.

Those cyclical massacres, and the permanent persecution atmosphere, impelled a large part of the Christians younger people to leave Lebanon, settling in countries where they would be more secure. This urge of emigration emptied the Christian regions from their dynamic young elements and covered even more the economic situation.




After the first world war, when Lebanon was placed under French mandate, many Christians came back home. They got integrated again in the Lebanese society from which they had never been really estranged.

This massive return movement of Christian emigrants, gave the Christian part of the population a genuine superiority in all fields: demographic, economic and social. After the creation of the Israeli State, Lebanon was submitted to a great flux of Palestinian refugees whose number reached 150.000 in 1952. After the 1967 Israeli Arab war, the number of the Palestinian refugees was considerably heightened until it reached in 1975 the staggering amount of 500.000 (half a million).

The Moslem groups encouraged the clandestine entrance of these refugees into Lebanon. These refugees, taking advantage of the Coranic Law that runs the personal status of the Lebanese Moslems, and helped by the "Cheriah" religious Courts as well as by the fanaticism and eagerness of these political groups, succeeded in registrating fictitious marriages in the name of many Lebanese who were already married, being allowed to do so by the Islamic law of polygamy. Moreover, the Moslem population omits voluntarily to declare their deads to allow other Arab Moslems to step conveniently, in their shoes and hence, to avoid the laws regulating permanent visas and work permits for foreigners in Lebanon.

These same proceedings made it easier for Arab citizens to acquire the Lebanese nationality illegally and thus, to be able to avoid their own military service or avoid getting the compulsory work permit imposed upon aliens in Lebanon. The Syrians and Egyptians as well as the Palestinians and the Kurds coming from Mid-Eastern countries have been the main winners through these illegal practices.



We reproduce here underneath, the official numbers at hand, relative to the repartition between Moslems and Christians in the Lebanese population since 1932.

Year	Total Population	Christian Population	Moslem Population
1932	859.000	461.000	398.000
1942	1.022.000	557.000	465.000
1948	1.199.000	634.000	565.000
1953	1.409.000	778.000	631.000
1961	2.144.000	1.194.000	950.000
1964	2.362.000	1.294.000	1.068.000

Taking into consideration the registered number of births and deaths, as well as other sources of the information marking out the general movement of a population (naturalisation, loss of nationality, covering up etc...) we get the following results which was deduced roughly on the 1st of January 1977:

Year	Total Population	Christian Population	Moslem Population
1977	3.089.000	1.640.000	1.449.000

This majority of the Christian part of the population will be more striking when:

- The Lebanese living abroad will register their offsprings
- The official Civil Service will be able to control in a stricter way the registration of all the population.
- The Public Security Office will be able to use all the records they can get concerning the alien presence on Lebanese soil and, will be able to compare the number of these records with the number of work permits given by the Ministry of Social Affairs.



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### WHY ZAHLE ?

1. Zahlé is a town of 200,000 Christian inhabitants . It is the Metropolis of the Bekaa, the inland region of Lebanon, which extends from the Hermel in the North to the Litani in the South. This plain which covers 40% of the Lebanese territory is endowed with particularly rich soil and was called by the Romans "The Granary of the Empire".

It is situated between two chains of mountains, and backed by the oriental side of Mount Lebanon. It was considered all through history as the refuge of all the Christians in the Bekaa. Backed by the mountain, the inhabitants of Zahlé often subjected to persecutions were able to resist the permanent pressures applied by the Syrian occupation forces and the Palestinians.

2. The Syrian claims of supremacy over the whole of Lebanon and particularly over the Valley of the Bekaa are already well known. The Syrian authorities do not hide them. They have been constantly repeating, for many years now, that the Bekaa, adjacent to their frontiers, forms an essential element to their security. This means very clearly that the annexation of the Bekaa constitutes a "strategic" Syrian objective.

This attitude is not new. During the twenties the Syrians wanted to integrate all the Bekaa plain into their frontiers. The resistance of the inhabitants of Zahlé - at that time - frustrated their efforts.

Nowadays, the Syrian Government considers that the situation is suitable for the annexation of the Bekaa. The only serious resistance for the Syrian occupation is Zahlé; thus Zahlé must be destroyed. All other claims are nothing but pretexts and illusions. The game is clear . The Syrian victory over Zahlé

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means that Syria annexes 40% of the Lebanese territory.

In defiance to the provision of international law and all human values the Syrian Government launched its troops against Zahlé. This was on the 2nd of April 1981. The Syrian histeric behavior went beyond all limits. Phosphorous bombs were launched not only against Zahlé but also against the civil population in the freed parts of Beirut. The burned corpses still witness to these terrors.

Zahlé was sieged for six months and was cut from Mount Lebanon. Thanks to the resistance of the people of Zahlé and to the systematic support of the Lebanese forces, the Syrian attempt failed.

Today, there is no indication that Syria gave up this objective. Zahlé is still besieged. The Syrians are trying to strangulate it economically in order to weaken its strength.

As indicated by Mr. Bachir Gemayel, Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Forces, since the beginning of the massacres on the 2nd of April 1981, the battle of Zahlé remains the "War of Lebanon".





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### "THE CHURCH FOR OUR WORLD" MOVEMENT

#### Describes its own conception of "The Lebanese Resistance"

The "Church for our World" movement consists of priests, bishops, monks, friars, nuns and laymen.

It had proclaimed 1980 as the year of Hope in Lebanon, in order to revive hope in the souls of the Lebanese people, who had suffered a painful ordeal due to the war - hope in a better future, built on brotherly feelings and 'entente'.

In their awareness that they are confronted by a deteriorating political situation, which threatens the country's future both from within and from without, the movement feels that this is an emergency in which it is bound to raise its voice in unison with that of the spiritual leaders, in their solemn declarations, and in support of the Zahle bishops in their numerous appeals. These appeals are launched with the object of bringing comfort and solace to the Lebanese in their tragic ordeal, as well as being meant to rouse the conscience of the free world, exhorting them to come to the rescue of Lebanon.

#### 1. RESISTANCE OF A PEOPLE

The resistance of the Lebanese People is not that of a group, of a party, or of a militia. It is the resistance of a whole people, struggling to defend its entity and its destiny. There are many other forms of resistance in Lebanon, besides armed resistance.

- a) Armed resistance is carried out by all the Lebanese people, even though the Christians happen to be the backbone of this resistance. This armed resistance is that which is practised by those who carry weapons, not with the object of killing their fellow-creatures, but to defend kith and kin, country and soil, town and village, Fatherland and State.

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- b) As for the forms of resistance which do not bear arms, these are embodied in the prayers raised to Heaven by all the pure, loving hearts, beseeching the Lord for peace and mercy. Such as the poignant voices of the martyrs, Ghassibe Keyrouz, Sister Marie-Sophie Zoghbi, and their two Muslim comrades, Khalil Saydah and Selim Hammoud.

Another form of resistance was that which was incarnated in a return and a sense of fidelity to the history of Lebanon. Just as it was symbolized in a return to the soil and its exploitation. However, the most important form of resistance is that which started by the quest for a new society, labouring to establish its foundations and to organize it into a coherent group.

All these forms of resistance are no less than a vibrant expression of Faith, in their essence. They imply absolute stubbornness, to cite the words of the Prophet Isaiah "If ye do not believe, and stand firm, ye cannot survive.."

## 2. LEBANON , A VICTIM OF POWER-POLITICS

Many Lebanese, both Christian and Moslem, have finally realized that in this tragic battle being waged on their soil, they are aught but victims of evil and alien hands. It is already abundantly clear that Power-politics have tried, at the start, to give this war sectarian undertones.

They have gradually acquired a belated awareness of their common destiny. That is the reason why they appeal to all those who believe in human values to allow them full freedom to get together and forge their 'entente'.

To all of us, there is no longer any doubt that the turmoil, the suffering, the devastation, the disintegration and the

exodus endured by the Lebanese stem from a vile conspiracy, with manifold aims.

These seek to:

- obtain strategic extra-national advantages, with a view to settling one of the Great Powers on the Sannine Heights.
- implement the designs of Israel on South Lebanon, of the Syrians on the Bekaa valley, and find an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.
- ensure the free flow of Arab oil to the Western world.
- Change the free parliamentary system of liberalism in Lebanon, and paralyze the role of the Christians who are adamantly insisting in maintaining it, and on safeguarding the Charter of Human Rights.

All this is rejected by the Lebanese Resistance. All nations are called upon to turn back from this evil path and to disown this vile plot. For its authors are prepared to let an entire people be wiped out - without feeling any pangs of conscience - just to take a short-cut towards the solution of the Middle East crisis.

### 3. LEBANON: A COUNTRY WITH A CAUSE TO FIGHT FOR...

For all the foregoing reasons, we declare that the identity of an Islamic-Christian Lebanon is by far stronger than all the contradictions which are striving to disintegrate it. In its conviction of having a specific vocation in the East, Lebanon has been working, well before the war, towards a consolidation of its internal stability, an elucidation of its peculiar identity, through its unreserved opening to the Western world and the world at large, through its fidelity to relations with the Arab World, and through its energetic defence of the Palestinian cause.

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Lebanon has always been ,and has remained conscious of its singular vocation in this part of the world. There is nothing in common between this vocation, and those values which represent the criteria of our modern world, such as oil, industry, race, ideology and political alliances.

This is one of the reasons why it has appeared strange to the thinkers of our century. Thus; in their failure to understand Lebanon, they simply abandoned it to its fate. Worse still, they tried to wipe it out of existence, thereby destroying its distinctive civilization. The tragedy of Lebanon stands as a cogent call for the condemnation of all Arabs and the great men of this age. Were Lebanon itself, in its usual magnanimity to forgive them for their crime, History and God Himself will not.

#### THE SOLUTION ?

In spite of its tragic ordeal and all that it has endured, the Lebanese people will persevere in hoping. Such hope is a virtue which stems only from the souls of the strong. They will continue to defend their freedom and the freedom of others, being fully aware that suffering untold still lies in store for them. Yet, they know that 'Love is more powerful than Death.

Such love, however, should not be construed as a surrender to the dire situation which we reject, and against which we shall defend ourselves to the bitter end, with all the means in our power, and to the last drop of our blood.

This is why we are now asking all nations which have lavished expressions of support on us to suit the action to the word:

1 - By separating the solution, at the level of security from the Lebanese Cause, the Middle-East crisis and the Palestine problem.

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2- By maintaining Lebanon's present boundaries, which have been recognized by all nations and acknowledged internationally.

3 - By giving up their policy of using Lebanon as a convenient theatre for their petty wars, their vicious plots , and the conflicts between nations.


4- By intervening energetically, in the name of justice and Human Rights, to prevent all the dark forces of aggression, from whatsoever quarter they may come, from destroying the country's security, attacking the Lebanese Army, and further enlarging the scope of destruction of this country.

5 - By helping legality to recover its authority and extend its sovereignty over the whole of the country and its institutions.

#### SPRING 1981

1- Ghassibe Kayrouz was a young Maronite seminarist from Niha, a village in the Bekaa Valley. He was killed whilst going home to celebrate Christmas with its folks, in 1975. He left a will in which he predicted his coming death, and forgave his murderers.

Sister Marie-Sophie Zoghbi, was a nun of the Sacred-Heart's order. She was in charge of the Red-Cross Centre in the Baalbeck area. She was shot, by a cowardly sniper, whilst she was on her way to Zahlé in a Red-Cross Ambulance, with her two Muslim comrades, who insisted on going with her to go and assist the wounded in Zahlé.







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
LEGITIMITY AND LEGALITY OF  
THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE SIX YEARS LATER  
BY NAOUM FARAH  
HEAD OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS DEPARTMENT  
AND OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF THE LEBANESE FORCES

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Syria leaves no doubt as to the exact nature of the irregular action of its troops stationed in Lebanon and operating under cover of the ADF. Moving into Lebanon as an Arab Deterrent Force, the Syrian troops have quickly turned into "Aggression and Destruction Forces", at a time when Damascus kept putting forward the Riyadh and Cairo Summits resolutions, and claimed to act within the frame - work of the strict Lebanese legal authorities.

By triggering their double offensive against Zahlé, the largest Christian city in the Orient, and the liberated areas of Beirut, the Syrians have clearly proved that their action is undertaken against "rebel and dissident factions to the Lebanese legality". This manoeuvre was aimed at camouflaging reality and presenting the defenders of Lebanon as an "in - surrectional movement".

However, the struggle undertaken by the Christian people against the double Syro-Palestinian occupation, within the framework of the Lebanese Forces' Resistance, is a struggle which draws its legitimacy from the right of each people to oppose occupation of its territory by foreign troops. What is more, in the case of Lebanon, the legitimacy of the resistance undertaken by the Lebanese Forces against the invaders is an integral part of the national legality of a pluralist and multi-denominational nation, whose fundamental structure lies on the consensus of its two main communities: the Christian and the Moslem.



Therefore, if the national legitimacy of the Lebanese Resistance includes all forces which resist, in one way or another, to the double occupation, the legitimacy of this struggle, expressed by the whole of the Christian community of the country, is entwined with the legality.

#### THE CHRISTIAN MINISTERS WITH THE RESISTANCE

The first element which confirms this reality is the meeting which included on the 2nd and 4th of April, 1981 the Christian Cabinet Ministers, the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces' Command Council has clearly demonstrated that the offensive triggered by the Syrian army of occupation concerns all the Christians of Lebanon, and not just the armed elements alleged to be "dissidents".

The scope of this event, a real premier, has not been played up enough. It is a qualitative change in the socio-political morphology of the country. In fact, this meeting between the Christian components' government, and representatives of the Lebanese Resistance Forces, consecrated the meeting between the legitimacy of the latter, and the legality of the former.

#### PATRIARCHS v/s ADF

Patriarchs, Bishops and Religious leaders of the Christian communities in Lebanon issued a communiqué on April 11, 1981 following a meeting held in Bkerke, calling for an "international patronage, which under the United Nations' sponsorship would restore peace and stability.

According to the constitution (articles 9 and 95) Lebanese constitutional customs and the National Pact of 1943, Lebanon is fundamentally composed of religious communities which are regrouped into two main entities: Christian and Moslem. The

meeting of the spiritual leaders of the communities, is by itself a predominant element of the Christian presence in Lebanon. It constitutes a representative assembly of an important element of the Christian wing of Lebanese legality.


In its above mentioned communiqué, this assembly declared the following : "Taking into account the fact that the recent dramatic evolution of the situation has confirmed that the decisions taken within the framework of conferences and regional organisations, have failed in securing calm and restoring security to the country" (paragraph 7, second indented line). By this statement, the spiritual leaders of the Christian communities of Lebanon have rejected regional conferences - including the Riyadh and Cairo summits which failed to restore peace in Lebanon, and consequently, the legality of the ADF, that of its Syrian structure, and confirm beyond their illegal character, their inefficiency and nocivity.

On the other hand, the same communiqué indicated that the role of the United Nations is to restore peace and stability in all the Lebanese regions. The UN having been established to defend the legitimate rights of peoples, guarantee the independence of nations, solve conflicts and prevent hostilities" (paragraph 7, 3rd indented line in fine script).

The Patriarchs and Bishops of the Christian communities of Lebanon, have by their appeal to the UN, supplied an undeniable proof of the solidarity of the Lebanese Christians in their struggle against the occupation of their country.

#### A GENERAL WILL POWER

If International Law gives each oppressed and threatened individual the right to defend himself, it acknowledges to communities, peoples and nations the right to resist aggressions and attempted genocide.




The Lebanese Christians are threatened in their very existence, as a whole. The Patriarchs and Bishops, the Lebanese Resistance Forces, Leagues and Christian Associations have all strongly stigmatised actions aimed at reducing their numbers. The legitimacy of the struggle of the Christian people - as a people - to survive and defend its liberty, is recognized by all Universal principles. However, this legitimacy is not restricted to the universal and international aspects. It stems from a national legitimacy peculiar to the Lebanese structure, which reserves the right to each of its two composing factions the right to exist and the right to liberty.

#### A RADICAL BACKDOWN

The Lebanese Republic is essentially multi-denominational, It is a federation of rights between communities, and a historic federation between two peoples.

Any will which succeeds in assembling the totality or near totality of the components of one at least of the two factions is a legitimate will.

Legality in Lebanon is an expression of the legitimacy emanating from the groups constituting the communities, and the active forces. This way, the Christian people, through its Patriarchs and Bishops, its ministers and members of Parliament, its political leaders, its active forces, its leagues and secular Associations is one of the two pillars on which the power rests. The rejection by this people of the presence on its territory of an alien army, expresses clearly and beyond any doubt the illegality of such a presence. Its rejection is that of this legality of which it is one of the constituent and fundamental factions.



The Lebanese Resistance expresses the legality of a legitimate will to enjoy liberty.

Six years after the outbreak of the war in Lebanon, it is high time for the great world capitals, and the international bodies to take into account this root and positive change in both the facts and the conjuncture of Lebanon.

From the time of scattered militias, to that of a militarily unified Resistance, ideologically ripe, politically coherent and homogeneous, at community level, the road has been long, hard and exalting. Today, the forces of the Lebanese Resistance, ambitious for their country, modest for themselves, sure of their right, but open to others, renew their commitment to carry on the struggle so that all the Lebanese without denominational or partisan discrimination can live free and equal in a country limited by its internationally recognized borders, independent, sovereign and democratic.

In a Lebanon liberated of the Syro-Palestinian occupation Liberty supersedes anything else.





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### INTRODUCTION

No, this paper is not a full run-down of the atrocities committed against Lebanese children during the Lebanese War. Such a detailed list of this horror would hardly be possible now since the causes and consequences of this very horror are still present. Besides, this would be unnecessary since our aim is not to denounce and condemn all the horrors, all the crimes of war, of which we have been victims, all of us, young and old, but rather to put an end to the war and to bring about peace.

The solutions we have in mind are none other than the solutions of peace, freedom, respect for the rights of all human beings, irrespective of age or status, and especially the rights of the child which are recognized and upheld everywhere.

In the context of this overall point of view or premise, we consider ourselves justified in claiming that the evidence which we are presenting at this congress is more than sufficient, alas, to demonstrate the following points:

1) Not only has the violence unleashed against the Lebanese people (attacked in their country, in their own homes, their goods and their lives, their freedom of culture and worship, and hunted out it would seem even in their eternal hopes) not only has this violence not spared children from massacres and panic, but it seems to have been directed especially against them. This is confirmed by the figures: There are 20% more victims amongst children than amongst the rest of the population.

2) Above and beyond the figures, above and beyond all the living evidence (especially the accounts of the principals of schools and directors of hospitals) it would suffice to take a look at the buildings themselves in which children were once housed, educated



or cared for, and which are now in ruins or gutted by fire. The mere sight of these ruined hulks, sinister reminders of days of activity and enthusiasm , speaks far more eloquently than any written account.

3) Our children have obviously been sought out and attacked everywhere: in kindergartens, orphanages, elementary schools, secondary schools and universities, where such attacks had the greatest scope of causing havoc, at the busiest periods in the days, in the most densely populated sections of buildings. Bombing was even carried out on hospitals to finish off those who were already wounded.

Finally , to top off this reign of hatred and butchery, there came the endless siege of the town of Zahlé, where famine and disease were added to the effects of the bombing of schools and hospitals.

4) This carnage aimed at children which is one of the monstrous characteristics of so many genocides , has been and continued to be carried out all the more insidiously against the children of Lebanon precisely because of all the qualities they embody: physical and intellectual aptitudes, a thirst for knowledge, ( the percentage of school-goers in Lebanon is the highest in all the Middle East) the desire for cultural pluralism and synthesis and, in short, an openness towards the whole world.

5) How could one fail to feel concern and outrage at this massacre of innocent beings ?

6) And now, here we are working hard to rebuild our ruins, tend our wounded, care for the young, paying particular attention to the physically and mentally handicapped, those who have been struck down in body or mind and who are faced with a lifetime of

suffering ahead. However, we are calling out above all to a world-wide conscience to help us put an end to war and re-establish peace. With the return of peace, we will be able to give Lebanon back its youth and innocence for all time and eternity, thanks to our nation's inexhaustable ressources and its endless capacity for renewal.



## CHILDHOOD AND WAR

Our organization: The Civil Organization for the Protection of Lebanese Children (C.O.P.L.C.) founded during the year of the Child 1979, has currently set itself the objective of remedying the disastrous consequences of the Lebanese war against Children.

Our discussion will be divided into three sections:

- I Lebanese children before the war
- II Lebanese children and the war
- III Conclusion and future hopes.

### I. LEBANESE CHILDREN BEFORE THE WAR

In Lebanon much more than in most other countries, it is difficult to speak about children or youngsters as a whole. Actually in every country different ways of thinking are found at different social levels, in different regions, in rural or in urban surroundings. Even at this basic level, Lebanon offers a wide variety of settings: coastal areas, mountain regions with their particular idiosyncracies, the high Bekaa plateau, or even the differences between Beirut proper with its surrounding suburbs (comprising more than a third of the population of Lebanon), or the other cities like Tripoli. Beyond these fundamental differences, one also encounters the divergent attitudes that spring from religious pluralism: the concept of the family (and hence of the child) is not the same in a Christian and a Muslim household, even if mutual influences between these two settings, ever-increasing up till 1975, had considerably lessened the differences. Since 1975, a regrouping of the population has taken place on one side while, on the other, many of the Christian schools located in the areas controlled by the Syrian and Palestinians now have between 70% and 90% Muslim children whereas the figures were virtually the opposite before the war.

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### 1. Numerous children

The proportion of children and youngsters in the Lebanese population is the first thing to note : 52% of the Lebanese population was under 20 in 1975, while 30% was under 12.

These figures reveal a high birth-rate: 32/1000 in 1964, 29.8/1000 in 1968. (Figures taken from the demographic Year Book of the United Nations, 1969). The decrease shown between 1964 and 1968 can be attributed to the development of urbanisation as well as to the popularisation of the Western-type family model. The latter was adopted especially by the Christians. In rural regions the average number of children per family was a little under 6 for Christians, a little over 6 for Muslims. Yet, this figure was only slightly reduced when the Muslim families settled in towns, whereas it came down to 3.5 children for Christian families. (Let us remember that, by comparison, the industrialised West has birth-rates of between 9 and 16/1000, with about two children per family; the structure of the Lebanese family is thus markedly different even in the cities and the most 'westernised' contexts).

### 2. Solidity of the Family and the Society

Lebanese children live in large families. This obviously has some disadvantages, especially in the realm of housing; We must , however, keep in mind that, in Lebanon, the climate and traditional foods are such as to tax a family's budget much less than in other countries, so that the size of Lebanese families was quite acceptable even for those with lower incomes.

Above all, however, children in Lebanon are weaned in the sort of stability which is provided by family structures capable of accommodating numerous individuals. The anguish of solitude and abandon are obviously rare in such large families, all the more for the fact that, in Lebanon, having many children implies wanting them and loving them. Each child is considered as an expression of life; the joy and honour of the family

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And yet, while being thus surrounded and encouraged by a numerous family (including the extended family ties which have remained strong in Lebanon) the child nevertheless lives in very competitive surroundings. The parents are the first to take this into account and one of their first concerns is to see to their children's education.

### 3. Schooling

There is a high standard of education in Lebanon even though there is no actual law obliging parents to send their children to school. A survey carried out by the central Bureau of Statistics revealed that in 1972, 87.6% of children between 6 and 14 went to school. This percentage was closer to 90% in urban districts and around 86% in rural areas. It should also be retained that the percentage is higher for boys than for girls, while being generally lower in areas further removed from modern development, such as certain parts of the Northern or Southern Bekaa.

Of course, a figure of 12% of non-school goers is hardly to be ignored. Yet it is significant that school-going children - or rather their parents- at least in the elementary schools are all voluntary. What is more, this voluntary attendance is always costly: even in government schools study equipment and books are not free. Then again, more than half of the educational facilities are provided by private establishments, whether they be religious or not. Now, these schools are not subsided by the government, except in the case of those schools called 'free' (only at the elementary level) where parents now pay around 50,-LL a year, while the Government pays about 400,-LL (Today's inflation rates are constantly modifying these figures. In any case the total sum available is barely sufficient to cover expenses). The important point to remember is that education is inevitably an expensive undertaking for any family, and always involves a voluntary choice to be made by them. The fact that education is usually opted for by the family is another indication of the important role played by the child in the Lebanese society.

This financial aspect of public education clarifies one detail which has often been pointed out by sociologists who have examined the problem: the importance given to the diploma and to its profitability : it is not only the official recognition of the efforts undertaken which is sought, but also a recompense for the sacrifices that it necessitated.

This system, which could be termed "ultra - liberal" in - volves other advantages and disadvantages. Because of the competitive environment it fosters, this pluralism has maintained, in Lebanon, an overall standard of education which is noticeably higher than in neighbouring countries. Everyone is looking for the "best school ", the one which can guarantee successful exam results, and establish useful connections for the future. However, the "best school" is not necessarily within the reach of every budget, despite the efforts made to increase scholarships even beyond the elementary levels.

On the other hand, this pluralism has also taken on an ideological colouring : Generally speaking, Christian schools, though they maintain an excellent standard of Arabic, tend to be more geared towards the West, and thus concentrate more on English and French. Now Muslim schools, even though they don't neglect languages , are more oriented towards the Arab-Muslim East. The government institutions try to keep a just balance between the two, but tend to be rather more strongly influenced by surrounding Arab countries and by Muslim elements within Lebanon itself. There is also a movement afoot to establish Lebanese Arabic as a standard cultural language. Lebanese is quite different from literary Arabic which is never spoken except in official discourses.

#### 4. WEAKNESS OF THE STATE


The State appears to be relatively weak when compared to the solidity and efficiency of family structures. This partly explains the existence of a somewhat atrophied civil sense. We must, however,

keep in mind that the State is none other than an institution designed to serve the nation. In fact, despite a very regrettable lack of civil sense, it is obvious that the Lebanese citizen's attachment to his country is very strong, perhaps precisely because it is more family-oriented and emotional, rather than civil and rational. Taking this into consideration, we can also better understand the phenomenon of emigration which, even before the war, was often criticized as showing lack of attachment to the fatherland. Emigration is not just a tradition in Lebanon (amongst Christians as well as Muslims) but rather the most usual reaction of the youngest member of the family who is often led to try out the unknown abroad because of the competitive prospects he faces at home. Now, there is no shortage of 'youngest members of families' in Lebanon, and that with the country's 300 inhabitants per Km<sup>2</sup>, emigration seems to be the natural solution .

The very solidity of these family structures is also often felt as a stifling burden by adolescents, and thus many "revolutionary " ideologies have often known considerable success amongst the younger Lebanese, especially students. However, the social tensions which spring from a very rapid, chaotic and often unbalanced rate of economic growth, have tended , for these very same reasons, to be allayed by the multiple connections and the keen sense of belonging that always go hand in hand with life in a large family. The extended family has often succeeded where the State has failed in matters of basic education and social welfare. The State has doubtless been too weak and ineffectual whereas the structure of the society has remained steadfast.

### Conclusions

Keeping these facts in mind, we can better understand why the sociological statisticians were so surprised by the younger generation in Lebanon at the outset of the war. A leader of the so-



called 'national movement' showed nothing but contempt , at the very beginning of the war, for these supposedly over-pampered children whom he considered too spoilt to make history and forge a future for themselves. This is at least an acknowledgment that the younger generation was not at all 'fascist' or belligerent as they were later accused of being when they turned out to be ready to fight with a courage and tenacity which were all the more surprising considering the fact that military service was unknown in Lebanon. These same bonds, existing throughout the society as well as within the family itself, account for the endurance and stability of the country's economy, even through all the blows that have been dealt to it since the start of the war.

Thus the war acted as a revealing factor for material that was difficult to analyse and had consequently often been neglected. Of course it also unleashed countless problems which we shall now examine in greater detail.

The fact of the matter is that Lebanese children, once called 'the lucky ones' , now live the daily tragedy of the war which is ravaging their country, leaving behind its sad toll of insecurity, damage caused to the population and to the family units, health problems, interruptions in education and, of course, the inevitable psychological disturbances.





### 1. Insecurity


War is an inevitable source of death and misery. We know all too well how many countries have lost the harmonious scenes of daily life in return for visions of horror-filled war and destruction.

And yet, seven years of war in Lebanon have shown that the bombardments have not been aimed primarily at military targets but rather at the civilian population and more precisely our children.

The Lebanese child has been the foremost victim of the relentless destruction that has struck from across our borders. The war's child mortality figures are 20% higher than those for the population as a whole.

This improbable fact has been confirmed by the accounts of violence and death gathered from large numbers of schools and hospitals. On April 2, 1981, in particular, it was on schools, kindergartens and orphanages that the first shells fell. At the "College de Notre Dame de Nazareth" in Ashrafieh, Beirut, it was reported that, from March 17, 1981, teachers and older pupils resorted to having children climb from one floor to the next in a bid to save the lives of children from the 9ème and 10ème classes who were exposed to sniper fire. The Zahret El-Ihsan School, whose classrooms catered to scores of orphans, was systematically destroyed. The "Collège des Saints-Coeurs" at Sioufi, where a thousand children were obliged to take refuge in a single room without water, food or electricity, was not spared either. Many other schools were struck in the same manner.

Thus, a whole generation of children has experienced the shadow of death. Such "surprise" shellings as those of April 1981, could be repeated at any time and in any area.



No individual can consider himself safe in Lebanon.

On April 2, 1981, the Director of Saint Joseph's Hospital in Dora announced: "From a nearby school, the hospital has received eight mutilated children; we are working to sew back the limbs and replace the disfigured heads simply in order to return some manner of a corpse to each of the stricken families". Among the eight victims was a five-years old child who has been born in the bomb shelter of the same hospital in 1976.

Ghada , Rania and Georges, brothers and sisters, had been obliged to flee their demolished home in Ain-Remmaneh with their parents. Yet in Dora, in a room where they had taken refuge, death nevertheless struck them down as they were peacefully asleep. The daily horror of death had again outdone itself. On June 1, 1981, the photo of those little bodies torn to pieces recorded the work of man's savagery for all posterity.

Countless such examples could be quoted. Hospitals have even reported the cruel threat faced by the yet unborn. The Hospital of the "Sacré Coeur" at Hazmieh tells of an unborn baby killed by a piece of shrapnel which struck its mother's stomach. The child's death saved the mother's life.

Will the spokesmen of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child accept these eye-witness accounts as violations of the principles which call for recognition of the fact that the child must under any circumstances, be among the first to receive protection and aid, and which stress the need to protect children from all forms of neglect and cruelty.

## 2. Effect on the Population

Insecurity and fear of war influence the relationship of a married couple, and thus a mother's desire to give birth to a child. A survey carried out in several maternity wards,

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and published in the daily newspaper "Le Réveil" on December 4, 1978, brought to light a decrease in birth-rates; 20% at the American University Hospital, 35% at Saint Georges' Hospital in East Beirut. It should be added that during heavy bombing, this figure reached 50% at Saint Georges' Hospital, this being due to the general exodus of the population. The Rizk Hospital in Ashrafieh gave a figure of 30% in requests for abortions, while this figure had never been higher than 15% before April 13 1975.


How should such figures be interpreted ? In answer to this question mother spoke of the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity. "How could we flee if the bombings begin again? This is no time to be burdened with a new-born child".

"What is the good of having children who will be traumatised by the war, and then seeing them suffer in a war-torn country?"

Other young mothers wondered where they could give birth if the shelling were to be resumed. In fact, at Zahlé in April 1981, reports laid heavy stress on the deplorable state of mothers who were obliged to give birth in the shelters, and therefore with a most unacceptable lack of hygiene, especially for premature births , and with all the ensuing consequences for both mother and child.

The frequency of premature births caused by a state of fear was recorded in a report from the Sacré Coeur Hospital in Hazmieh. It should not be forgotten that premature births promote defects, handicap the child from the start and reduce his chances of successfully reaching a state of good health.

Insofar as money is concerned, the families of premature children are faced with much higher expenses (incubators, longer stays in hospital, etc;)



The 4th point in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which states that special help and protection must be provided for the child through its mother in the form of sufficient pre- and postnatal care, is also tragically seen to have been violated in Lebanon.

### 3. Broken Homes


Children, who used to enjoy many privileges before the war, including the very solidity of the parental relationship, are now often faced with tragic situations forced upon them by untimely circumstances. Though quite rare, there have even been cases of couples separating for religious or economic reasons (reduction of salaries, closing down of some businesses, etc...)

Out of a population of three million, the war has already caused more than seventy thousand deaths; according to statistics given by "Caritas Lebanon", there are about thirty five thousand orphans in Lebanon, of which 14,000 are war orphans.

The plight faced by these children is all the worse because their widowed mothers often have no professional training, and jobs are now difficult to find. Several private organizations have been set up to cater to the various needs of these children. At one of these orphanages "St. Joseph's" in Aajaltoun, which houses 300 children, 80% are war orphans, 5% have lost both parents. The Bureau of Social Development reports that the number of children in its care in 1980 reached 5640. This figure increased five times over the period 1975/1980 compared to 1970/1975, as well as the preceding five years periods.

### 4. Health Problems

Health problems have been worsened by the fact that bombardments have been directed specifically at hospitals. In East Beirut, hospitals have often been hit. Many of these hospitals included maternity wards and pediatric centers. Thus, children suffered all the more from these attacks.




For example, the Lebanese Hospital at Jeitaoui, Beirut, with 150 beds, was almost completely destroyed by shelling in September - October 1978. Rebuilding had just been completed when, on April 8, it was struck by several shells which destroyed the emergency ward and the out-patient clinic.

Such widespread damage to hospitals inevitably brings about a reduction in the efficiency of medical services, transforming everyday operations - (appendix operations, etc) or cases which would normally be easy to cure, into major problem cases.

These health problems were exacerbated during the prolonged shellings, such as those of East Beirut in 1978, and especially Zahlé (April - June 1981) where even the Red Cross premises received shells. Because of power cuts and lack of anaesthetics, the sick and injured were put to sleep with whisky , and operations were performed by candle light.

A report received during the siege of the town of Zahlé and signed by leaders of the various communities, mentioned outbreaks of infectious diseases (tonsillitis, otitis, enteritis) caused by the crowding of school children into shelters lacking space, water and electricity.

Children who are already ill also faced major problems. Professor Assaad Rizk, former Minister of National Education, mentioned , in April 1981, the case of two children (Moussa K., 14 years old and Taleb D., 13 years old) who had been suffering from chronic hemodialysis for a year and who were unable to attend their therapy sessions because of the heavy shelling around the hospital. Certain death thus awaited these children within a short space of time.




Some doctors have even reported the appearance, in children aged between 7 and 11, of serious illnesses caused by the frequency and the shock of explosions; illnesses such as leuchemia, epilepsy, deafness and even mental retardation. (From "El Amal" daily newspaper , January 20, 1982)

The greatest problem to be faced in the future is that of wounded and handicapped children. The statistics of "Caritas", covering the whole of the Lebanese territory, mention 1,450 Lebanese children left handicapped by the war. Such is the case of a seven-year old boy who was wounded in Zahlé, taken to Paris to have his two legs amputated, and who now timidly hides his two pitiful stumps under a French hospital bed sheet. As he grows up he will be dependent on artificial limbs for the rest of his life.

#### 5. Educational Problems

More generally speaking, it is the whole context of education in Lebanon which has been seriously disturbed insofar as this affects even the most solid psychological temperaments. This problem is becoming more and more serious as time passes.

Firstly, from the point of view of schooling, this is now the seventh year in which the school terms have not followed each other normally. In fact, even in years during which there was no serious interruption of classes in the majority of schools, the vacation periods were nevertheless troubled. In other years, vacations were devoted to catching up on time lost during the preceding term or else to hurriedly preparing for exams which one could never be sure of being able to sit for. Thus, since the war, a new range of problems has arisen. The need to keep peace has thrown any ideological matters concerning the reviewing of school programs into the background.




So far, set backs in schooling programs have not been too serious, thanks to the Lebanese people's firm conviction of the importance of school work, the devotion of instructors, and the children's keenness to make up for lost time.

However, many children have paid a high price for keeping up with their studies. The strain has lasted for years with no true vacations, and has been made even more difficult by the state of insecurity due to continued disturbances, forever repeated after theoretical cease-fires. In the long run, this constant strain is bound to cause considerable negative consequences.

#### 6. Psychological Problems

After seven years of war, the harmonious development of the average Lebanese child's personality has been severely disturbed. Even during relatively calm periods, he can be suddenly awakened by explosions at any moment. He waits for his school bus behind sand bags. He studies in a classroom whose windows have been broken by shell-blasts and whose walls are pitted with bullet-holes. He has spent whole nights in bomb shelters during shelling which sometimes lasted up to 10 hours at a time, at a rate of 20 shells a minute. In some cases, he has seen his own house destroyed, or his village bombarded. He has often had to flee to escape death.

According to the statistics of "Caritas-Lebanon", more than 1.000.000 Lebanese have been obliged to flee their homes at least once because of the war. By January 1st, 1982, there were still 250.000 people (8% of the total puplation) living as "displaced persons" in their own country. The same survey showed up more than 58 totaly devastated villages, amongst which is Damour (20.000 inhabitants) and over 100.000 homes which have been partially or completely destroyed throughout the country.



A child who is thus continuously uprooted from his home is obviously left with feelings of insecurity and frustration. And yet, ironically, this state of war has been brought about by the Palestinians, whom Lebanon once welcomed as refugees, and the Syrian Army, which supposedly came to re-establish order. This state of moral confusion explains why some adolescents, even 14 years old, have joined the ranks of fighters. Even though such cases are not numerous, they testify to a serious problem which threatens to become worse if no action is taken. Violence could easily become an integral part of the child's psychic build. "I was born in a shelter, I study in a shelter, I'll get my degree in shelters". These were the somewhat humorous words of a young child. Others take refuge in the fantasies of their imaginations, refusing to believe that a parent or brother has died.

If we were to ask ourselves about the mental state of children during shelling, we could refer to the testimony of various authorities from Zahlé. (The Lebanese Red Cross, clinics at Hoch El-Umara and Wadi El Arayech, 7 school principals) which mention: a serious state of panic, tenseness, cries, desperate craving for security, incoherence, aggressiveness and rebelliousness. In the orphanage mentioned above, where 80% of the children were war orphans, 20% saw their parents die with their own eyes. Long term disturbances sometimes result from such experiences: fear of noise, claustrophobia, repulsion at the sight of meat...

Even in areas relatively spared from fighting, but where numerous refugees had come from more exposed regions, we encounter elements of aggressiveness and insecurity.

Hence, at Byblos, a school principal described the children's attitudes during the shelling of April 1981 in the following terms: "They're constantly asking about the number of victims killed each day. They sense the fear that ravages their elders. They start at



the distant sound of explosions from Beirut or from the mountains when hell breaks loose." And she concluded by saying: "What sort of a future generation is this war breeding ? What feelings of revenge and aggression must be weaned in these young hearts?"

### Dynamism and Vitality in the Face of Tragedy

However, not everything about the plight of children in Lebanon is negative.

Despite all these hardships, most Lebanese families have managed to maintain a warm home atmosphere within the family, that vital refuge for children who are distressed by the experience of tragedy. Untimely loss of life has strengthened family ties more than ever before. This newly found solidarity is thus giving rise to a new kind of strength. Widows are comforted by the support of brothers, cousins and uncles. Orphans, hurt by the loss of their parents' love, are nevertheless not completely abandoned.

The gulf separating some social classes from one another has been lessened. The panic felt during shelling and the pride of having to face a threat together have tended to strengthen the bonds of friendship and create lasting ties between certain families and their children. Songs and prayers chanted together in the shelters during bombings and replacing cries and tears; the cooperation needed to help the wounded; the ever present hospitality in assisting and consoling the refugees; all these examples of such a firm social solidarity can only point towards a brighter future in the rebuilding of Lebanon.

Another positive aspect of these trying times is the composure shown by so many instructors even at the most critical times, as well as the persistent willingness of the many organizations created during the war to provide the necessary assistance to children. Amongst these organizations, we should quote the A.F.E.L.

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"Association du Foyer de l'Enfant Libanais" (Association for Homes for Lebanese Children), which currently cares for more than 275 orphans; as well as our own organization, "A.C.S.A.U.V.E.L." The moral and physical development of the child being one of its primary objectives, ACSAUVEL has been trying to act effectively since 1979. Two projects have already been carried out:

-The first consists in the creation of civilian groups which aim at helping children to become aware of their rights and responsibilities (within the context of the education of the "Child Citizen"), and at discovering as well as sponsoring the more gifted children.

-The second consists in the creation of a "Center for the Re-education and social integration of marginally retarded children". It should be recalled that shocks caused by shellings have increased the number of mentally handicapped children. The survey carried out by "Caritas-Lebanon" in November 1981, shows that out of 18,768 handicapped children between the ages of 0 and 14, 31.9% were mentally retarded.

These facts show that despite the destruction caused by the war, a certain dynamism and vitality have managed to survive in the heart of Lebanese society and its youth. Moreover, the creation of new organizations and the large number of children involved in the various movements which are now active or being formed, prove that Lebanese society has succeeded in confronting the challenge of war. We wish to stress the fact that these movements are not planned by the leaders, but are born and developed spontaneously, from the very beginning, and almost always without government assistance.



These Lebanese children have retained the dynamism needed to create a future. But they will not be able to endure war and uncertainty indefinitely.

We are now asking you for this work towards Peace, this real understanding, this willingness to help. Do not abandon them to the despair of violence and terrorism.

### III. Conclusion

This brief run-down on children has brought to light a strong society, and more especially a firm family structure, which has kept the Lebanese nation alive despite the trials it has had to endure.


To counterbalance this strength, we are faced with a State which has been too weak to prevent the crisis let alone solve it once it broke out.

A solution to the problem of children in Lebanon, and of the country as a whole, would thus involve:

#### 1. Restructuring of the State

A State which could better deal with the inherent pluralism of the Lebanese society. Even back in 1969, the sociologist, Emile J.P. Valin, wrote at the end of a study on "Pluralism in Lebanese Society and Education": "The solution seems to lie in the refusal to destroy the unity within the multiplicity and the multiplicity within the unity (...) Lebanese schools mustn't consider choosing between a compartmentalised and a unitary system. Their role is inexorably contained in the ideas of inclusion, complementarity, convergence."

The reconstruction of such a pluralist state, a cultural crossroads and melting-pot of civilization, is above all the



responsibility of the Lebanese people. However, it is equally important for international public opinion to be aware of the details of the problem, in order to support this task of reconstruction and avoid over-simplified solutions. For organization within a context of pluralism is never easy. Children who have been wounded, traumatised, have lost their parents or homes, can best be helped along the road to regained hope by an acceptance of the existence of Lebanon in all its complexity.

## 2. Peace

Peace is the first prerequisite needed for such a reconstruction. It will at least allow the wounds to be tended. However, one cannot afford to be unrealistic. The scars will be long-lasting. It is therefore, all the more urgent for international solidarity to express itself in more than powerless declarations and bids for time. The gift of peace, especially peace for children, needs more than this if these same children are not to lose all faith in humanity.

## 3. Wariness of simplistic Information

It must also be hoped that such simplistic forms of information as have been current will be abolished. All too often have we seen the war in Lebanon referred to within the unrealistic framework of ideological differences between left and right wing, which, in actual fact, had little or nothing to do with the true situation. Such deformation of the facts has also often ended up denigrating the nation's confused battle for survival.

## 4. Understanding which is put into practice

Lebanon, and even more so Lebanese children, need sympathy and understanding. Only this real comprehension can lead to the useful and sometimes necessary help we need in repairing the material and moral damage caused by the war.

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### EDUCATION IN LEBANON

The state of education in Lebanon suffers from a major crisis in the elementary, secondary, technical and university stage , whether in the private or public sector.


The episodes of the deep-rooted history of education in Lebanon influenced the nature of its evolution from the point of view of potentialities and appropriateness as it did the extent of its authority and power.

This history began with various educational institutions, each functioning towards its aspirations and contrasting goals. The institutions in question ran their business on individual initiatives through extemporized convictions and postulates which, in the long run, gained a strong foothold.

At the start, the Government's presence was not felt, and this ensued in excessive overlapping of infringement upon free learning guaranteed by Article 10 of the Constitution.

When the moment came for the Government to set a foot in the field of official education, its step was timid and reluctant, a fact which widened the gap already existing between the private and public sectors.

The Private Sector: Credit for teaching and cultivating the children of Lebanon is due to such institutions as have been practising this constitutional freedom with abnegation and integrity when other institutions have been exploiting the process of teaching for investment purposes and illicit gains.




The Public Sector: Slow-paced and very timid at the start, this sector perceived that its needs overwhelmed its potentialities. This of course , resulted in improvising public schools and amplifying the volume of the problems and their impact. Consequently, the two standing authorities of education - private and public - concurred but without coordination to try and find a solution to the problems, which, unfortunately, have remained unsolved, swinging between them a generation of perplexed children.

This last situation and this wavering have been at the source of the awkward, disintegrating state of education in the country, whereas the only solution to this dilemma can be undertaken by an organism that embraces and shepherds the various educational institutions, public or private, and secure the freedom of learning as stipulated by the law.

Such an organism must stand on an overall solid ground, set distinct, clear unity of aim and aspirations, adopt a thorough aggressive policy of planning, organize and legislate on sound bases and methods apt to satisfy the requirements and needs of the economic and industrial sectors in the country. Further, this organism has the duty to prepare and cultivate the citizens under the banner of a unique national Libanism.

University Education in Lebanon: Lebanon is undergoing an indigestion process because of an inflation of institutions of higher learning. Some of these institutions operate legally, others illegally. Totalling 17 in number, they are found mainly in Beirut or its suburb except the Theological Institute of St John the Damascene, which is at Balamand (Bellemont), Koura. The reason lying behind this elevated number of institutions is due to the fact that certain universities (the Lebanese and St. Joseph's



universities, for instance) have opened up branches in the districts in recent years.

Hereunder is a brief note on the properties of the most noted universities and colleges recognized in Lebanon:

### 1. The American University of Beirut (A.U.B.)

Founded in 1866, it operates upon a charter granted by New York City State U.S.A. It is administered by a board of trustees. The greater part of its students comes from the Arab world. Its financial sources come from students' fees, scholarship foundations and donations by individuals, institutions and governments in the U.S.A. and the Middle East.

Its campus comprises:

- The Faculty of Arts and Sciences
- The Faculty of Medicine
- The Faculty of Health Sciences
- The Faculty of Engineering and Architecture
- The Faculty of Agriculture and Food Sciences
- Division of Education and Extension Programs

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 4616

### 2. St. Joseph's University of the Jesuit Fathers:

Founded by the Company of Jesus, it was first established at Ghazir, Kesrwan, whence it was subsequently transferred to Beirut in 1875. The title-name of the university, which at the beginning was a theological institute, was ratified by the Vatican.

The University campus comprises:

- The Faculty of Law and of Political, Administrative and Economic Sciences
- The Faculty of General Medicine
- The Faculty of Pharmacology



- The Faculty of Dentistry
- The School of Nursing
- The School of Obstetrics
- Institute of Experimental Studies
- Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
- The Faculty of Engineering
- University Institute of Technology
- The Lebanese School of Social Training
- Higher Institute of Industrial Technology
- Higher Institute of Agriculture and Food Engineering

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 5681

### 3. The Lebanese University

Its beginning was limited to one institution, Normal School of Teachers, founded in 1953, which constituted the nucleus of this State University. The School trained teachers and prepared them to form the body of teachers of all stages and levels in public schools. Lebanese and non-Lebanese can be admitted to take courses. Instruction is given in Arabic, though some subjects are instructed in a foreign language.

The campus of the University comprises:

- The Faculty of Law and Political and Administrative Sciences
- The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
- The Faculty of Sciences
- The Faculty of Pedagogy (Education)
- The Faculty of Business Administration
- The Faculty of Information and Documentation
- Higher Institute of Social Sciences
- The Faculty of Engineering
- The Academy of Fine Arts
- Institute of Applied and Economic Sciences
- The Faculty of Agriculture

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 33927

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#### 4. University of the Holy Spirit, Kaslik:

It was founded in 1950 by the Maronite Religious Order. It is situated at Kaslik, about 17 KM north of Beirut.

Its campus comprises:

- The Faculty of Theology
- The Faculty of Liturgy
- The Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences
- The Institute of Pedagogy
- The Faculty of Law
- The Faculty of Arts (of literature)
- Academy of Musical Sciences and Music Education
- Institute of History
- Institute of Languages
- The Faculty of Commercial Sciences
- Center of Development Research and Peace

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 2107


#### 5. Beirut Arab University (B.A.U.)

Founded by the Islamic Association of Beneficence and Charity in 1954, this University is academically chartered by the Alexandria University, Egypt. Courses began in 1970 only and is officially recognized by the law regulating higher studies in Lebanon.

The campus comprises:

- The Faculty of Arts (literature)
- The Faculty of Law
- The Faculty of Commerce
- The Faculty of Sciences
- The Faculty of Engineering
- The Faculty of Architecture

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 29258



#### 6. Beirut University College (B.U.C.)

It was founded as an American Evangelical Mission School in 1935. It developed and attained the status of a university in 1950. It is chartered by the Board of Trustees of the New York State University.

Its campus comprises:

- Division of Theoretical and Applied Sciences
- Division of Commercial Studies
- Division of Social Studies
- Division of Applied Sciences
- Division of Applied Languages

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 1733

#### 7. Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts (A.L.B.A.)

Founded in 1937, it had the purpose of teaching and propagating music. This was extended to other fields.

Its campus comprises:

- School of Architecture
- School of Decorative Arts
- School of Figurative Arts


The total number of its 1980-81 students was 504

#### 8. Haigazian College

It was founded by the Union of Armenian Evangelical Churches of the Middle East and the Association of Armenian Missionaries in America. Its campus comprises:

- Division of Business Administration and Economic Sciences
- Division of Social and Human Sciences
- Division of Arts (languages and literature)
- Division of Science
- Division of Armenian Studies

The total number of its 1980-81 students was 285



Statistics: The total number of students matriculated at all higher studies institutions in Lebanon for 1980-81 was 79,073 the percentile distribution of this figure being

- at the Lebanese University	42.91%
- at the Beirut Arab University	37.00%
- at the University of St. Joseph	6.18%
- at the American University of Beirut	5.83%
- at the University of the Holy Spirit, Kaslik	3.40%
- at the remaining institutions	4.68%

The percentile distribution of foreign students, who represent 39.23% of total university students is:

- at the Beirut Arab University	84.34%
- at the Lebanese University	7.38%
- at the American University	3.66%
- at other Institutions	4.62%

One of the facets of the knotty problem of higher teaching, of which Lebanon suffers, is the lack of an official educational policy in this field, which would lead to the assumption that the Lebanese individual is not considered as a free human being; possessing civic values emanating from his heritage and rooted in a distinct society, Lebanon, and in a definite human and cultural environment, the Middle East, not to say a comprehensive human frame.

As a matter of fact, we feel the direct need to elucidate the educational policy, particularly that part of it pertaining to higher studies so that the nobleness of the Lebanese individual, the man, can be comprehended within the framework of his higher quality to absorb world civilizations and cultures. Only then will vanish the confinement to one language and the shrinking into only one people and the insulation in one nation and the contentment with one-sided culture.


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Higher teaching in Lebanon must emanate from the preceding principles and on them must it delineate its planning towards the establishment of future scientific faculties and branches that will meet with the satisfactions of oncoming generations that would procreate efficacious minds apt to work, plan and realize.

Man must be the central point of interest in university education to the full extent of spirituality, humanitarism and civilization so that he can work out and activate the new homeland, the new Lebanon, and work for the affinity of new citizenism and take the citizen-student by the hand and help him become aware of his human values, in which he should evolve and grow in comptability with his evident self and his cultural and national appartenance. Only by this way will he avoid becoming stranger to his message and to the specific call of Lebanon to him to be the linking bridge of human and cultural encounters and so preserve the unity of his land and the multiplicity of its children thus promoting the personality of its society.

It is incumbent upon higher education in Lebanon to consider the crucial importance of the situation, which calls forth for an equation and an equilibrium between magnanimity and recoiling as between approach and dissolving. Higher education should develop the student into feeling proud of the manifold variety of his homeland's structure and patrimony, and into receptivity of what is resplendent and useful coming to him from affluents of intellect and civilization flowing into Lebanon.

Higher education should inculcate in the mind of whoever adheres to any one of the existing higher institutions in Lebanon or would-be ones in the future, that he is supposed to have a blind belief in Lebanon's oriental legacy bequeathed to him, and




to love it always striving to develop it, also to have faith in Lebanon, whole Lebanon, to work for it for the welfare of whichever individual living on its soil.

The University in Lebanon has so far performed its duty only perfunctorily. This failure can be considered an underlying factor in the events in the country. The educational policy of the university must be based on prescience and foresight of the great role that it should play in the making of the civic facade of the State, and the imprinting of the national society, in acquiring competent faculty to teach and, finally, in taking into consideration the requisites of society so as to utilize and exploit all capacities.

The University should possess the firm belief that the Lebanese identity of Lebanon is not for bargaining, that loyalty to Lebanon as a free motherland, independent, ultimate, allows no room for association in it or for perversion.

Bringing these principles to the fore, it ensues that the part to be played by the university will consist in the following :

- 1- Sincere respect of the University's independent apolitical structure and its faculty members applying integrality, undaunted in intellect and knowledge by administrative or political restrictions. This will confer upon the university the honour of participating in the service of intellect and the sustainment of universitarian procedures.
- 2- The constitution of a fitful social citizen efficaciously productive, a conscious consumer thus constituting an infrastructure capable of realizing the political objectives and the economic, social and spiritual evolution.



3- To bring to light and propagate the knowledge needed to promote development projects and to improve national resources.


The part of higher education in Lebanon should perpetuate free thinking, unyielding to any political, intellectual or doctrinal pressure whether internal or external.

It is the bounden duty of the university to preserve and honour the part it plays and to be consistent with the dignity of the State with a purpose to attain national ambitions and faithfully to its aim to build up a futuristic civilized society, in which economic and social fundamentals will focus on brotherhood, collaboration, and not on hostility and conflict.

In this way higher education will group in one cluster all of human , national , spiritual and cultural aspects. Academically, it will plan to develop man, any man, relying on spiritual morals and on the legitimacy of the rights of man; it will set up faculties and divisions that shall satisfy the needs of the fatherland; it will graduate universalists and make them ready to respond to their society.

As a result, higher education besides being the continuity and the crowning of the schooling stage, it is the alert mind, the intellectual and moral criterion, the dispenser of administrative requirements, and the operative faculty of the Lebanese society.

13th March 1982



Documentation & Research

## REFORMATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

### 1. The Inexorability of Reform:

The commitment to introduce reforms in the fields of politics, economy and society occasions the development and modernization in the fields of education, for changes in the latter constitute a solid basic means to realize reformation in the former, and that is:

- a. by bringing about a socially-conscious citizen, an actively-yielding producer and a practically-aware consumer;
- b. by forming effective capabilities for the realization of political aspirations and social economic developments;
- c. by bringing to light and propagating knowledge essential for the development of projects and national resources both human and natural.

### 2. The Impulsion of Educational Reform:

- a. Educational reform should set off from pellucid goals, whence the development of national ambitions, of a civilized futuristic society, and of basics of reliable economy and society.
- b. The reform should rest upon fundamentals of general goals that group human, national, professional, spiritual and civic aspects.
- c. All political and administrative organizations should commit themselves to plan educational systems and to develop relevant projects so that reform can come out continuous and whole.

### 3. Pre-University Stage:

- a. A system of education.
- b. Application of the system of education bearing an orderly sequence extendable to reach the adults whereby they can be able to remain in line with progress and do away with bureaucratic illiteracy.
- c. The interconnection between the syllabi and social requirements from the point of view of living and occupations.

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- d. Interconnection between the syllabi and world civilizations introduced through a number of civilized languages (of them one or more foreign languages), as well as the application of modern methods to arm the citizen with possibilities to communicate with the civilized world.
- e. Focalization on national, moral and religious education and application of human civic instructions; debarring teachers, professors and schools from exploiting their chair as pulpits of indoctrinations inconsistent with Lebanese nationalism and with the world's declaration of the rights of man.
- f. Evolution of education functions with a view to developing into man any citizen endowed with talent, power and efficiency; introduction of vocational training at all the levels of teaching.
- g. Culturing technical faculties in the person by reinforcing them through responsiveness to world productivity and to the potentialities of natural environments.

#### Effectiveness of the System of Education

- a. Reinforcement of teaching in public schools by allotting school premises to all regions in Lebanon and by raising the standard of instruction as well by modernizing its methods.
- b. Put an end to financial squandering by way of restraining the rate of leakage, failures and traditional practices in education.
- c. Adopt modern educational technology and avail it of commodious locals throughout Lebanon with the purpose of consecrating qualitative democratic teaching.
- d. Application of obligatory education, freely accessible to all, which would naturally abolish grants to gratuitous schools.

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- e. Define the fields of technical instruction based on the study of the classification of professions and their respective needs.

#### Body of Teachers:

- a. Raise the standard of teacher formation by imposing the Baccalaureate II as the obligatory prerequisite for admission to the Elementary School of Teachers and the Bachelor of Arts (Licence) for admission to the Intermediate and Secondary cycles.
- b. Readjustment of the teachers' living status to render the profession of teaching a pole of attraction of best elements.
- c. Consider the Licence diploma of teaching a national cause, whereby an independent national body takes upon itself to scrutinize the applicant's folder before issuing an authorization to teach. This committee has the jurisdiction to withdraw such authorization should it ascertain that the teacher has failed to comply with his/her professional, moral and national undertaking.
- d. Reinforcement of the control on teachers by way of a body of inspectors of education.
- e. Creation of an advisory body to help the teachers of private and public schools apply the principles of reformed education and modern methods. Such body shall be a division of the Cultural Center of Research and Development.
- f. Render qualifiable all those working in the field of education by adopting continual recycling procedures.
- g. Reactivation of physical drill, scout movements and school hygiene; setting up of cultural centers for youth.



### Private Schools:

- a. Substantiation of the freedom of learning as stipulated by the law.
- b. Definition of the conditions permitting the continuity or the opening up of new private schools.
- c. Imposition of educational inspection in private schools to secure standard and patriotism.

### Participation of Parents:

- a. Adoption of the participation of parents in the administration of schools.
- b. Adoption of the principle of the participation of nationals in the operation of the developement of education.

### 4. University Stage

The application of a planned policy of university education that takes into consideration what is mentioned under the captions "The Inexorability of Educational Reform" and "The Impulsion of Educational Reform" is of the greatest importance; for the university, besides being an extension of the school and the crowning of its work, should be the alert mind, the intellectual, moral criterion and the source for qualified administrative requisites of society and of the land.

### The Role of the University in Lebanon:

- Adaptibility with the national society with a purpose of developing it, of forming worthy nationals and developing individual personality, socially and professionally.
- Granting holders of a given secondary standard free admission to institutions of higher education; submitting admission to technical schools, higher institutions and universities to the norms of general planning within the limits of the nation's needs of the various specializations.

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- The elaboration and diversification of higher studies on the basis of the multiplicity of universities within the line of free education and authentic universitarian responsiveness.
- The adoption of the principle of participation on all levels between students, faculty, the administration and the various political, economic and social sectors in matters concerning administrative affairs but within defined stipulations and as per unequivocal criteria initially envisaging the smooth running of university function.
- The introduction of decentralization in the geographical spheres of the allotment of branches of higher institutes to the districts and the adoption of the principle of campuses according to the requirements and requisites of regions and districts.
- Intensive elaboration of higher studies.
- The adoption of planning and research in the development of the qualitative university studies, and of statistics and elaborate studies to be the basis of coordination between the various university sciences and the needs of society.
- The modernization of programs and syllabi conjunctively with the Lebanese reality, in the meantime being open up to world civilizations and developed cultures.
- The preservation of the principle of traditional examination system conditioned by improvement and evolution.
- The contrivance to bring forth needed culture and knowledge for use in the development of natural and human capital.
- Intensive organization of higher studies.
- The achievement of a legislation regulating the stages of higher studies concerning in a particular case:
  - . The distinction between 3rd cycle higher studies institutions and universities.

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- . The establishment of a general secretariat for higher studies to implement the law, to coordinate between higher institutions and universities, and the supervision of the syllabi and the homologation of diplomas.
  - . The adoption of a diversifying endeavor on university levels to embody all human talents available.
  - . Interrelation of university schemes from the unity of human knowledge as a starting point.
  - . The adoption of the principle of the generalization of university learning to incase all fields of knowledge.
- The reinforcement of the Lebanese University:
- . By revising its administrative laws and regulations, structures, and by the institution of a board of trustees composed of select intellectuals and experts.
  - . Revision of the terms of recruiting professors with a view to securing a highly qualified standard as well as world recognition of the university so that it may have a window open on the potentialities of the other universities in Lebanon making such interrelation free of all artificiality of restriction or reserve.
  - . The reorganization of the living conditions of the faculty body so that professors of quality are attracted.
  - . The revision of its syllabi and teaching methods in harmony with its national role and with modern teaching sciences.
  - . The insistence upon the principle of the multiplicity of civilized languages and the awareness of the dangers of total arabization of the programs.
  - . The edification of proper university premises and campuses apt to absorb the diverse university activities.
  - . The edification and modernization of libraries, laboratories and centers for research, studies and conferences.

- . The institution of centers for higher university scientific research to be concerned particularly with cases related to our local requirements and exigencies.
- . Correspondence and communication with other universities in the world with the purpose of cultural exchange.
- . The creation of an ambiance proper to university standards through the edification of buildings to be put at the disposal of the multiple activities of the students, teacher-student encounters, the aim being the promotion of education and research.





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Documentation & Research

### POPULAR COMMITTEES

#### How did they start:

At the end of the first six months of the Lebanese War when the Lebanese became tired and impatient because of the absence of the Government and its services and when the remnants of this Government began to collapse bringing down the soul, the institutions, the organizations and the Administration of the State, leaving behind a terrible void on the civil and security levels, the Lebanese citizen felt that his own existence was at stake and that he could no more remain an impartial spectator. Such an attitude would constitute a crime against Lebanon.

This feeling was very strong among the citizens of Ashrafieh. Consequently, a small group of young people formed the nucleus for a mobilization that became a real hope for those citizens who wanted to support the battle. Their first step was to visit the leaders of the Kataeb branch in Ashrafieh, where a program was set with clear objectives and plan of action. This step constituted the emergence of what came to be called "The Popular Committee - The Lebanese Kataeb". The community rallied around this Committee as being a true expression of their feelings. This gave the Committee the moral force which helped it to support the armed forces. It was able to provide comfort for the fighter coming back from the front and to carry out social services that were entrusted to the fighters in addition to their military tasks.

One of the main reasons for the success of the Popular Committees in Ashrafieh is that it considered every member of the Community an active member in the Committee itself and a participant in solving the daily problems that resulted from the conditions imposed by the war. It is a human non-political "groupement" of people threatened by a dirty war who want to take part in confronting it by means and ways that can be made

possible through the mobilization of individual abilities and efforts in the community.

The first role was social: in this field it provided social welfare in the form of basic services concerning health, relief, municipal, civil defense and provisions.

The second role was educational: it worked on educating the people politically to strengthen their ties with the leadership. Popular meetings were organized with Sheikh Bashir and other intellectual leaders. The Committee played the role of a mediator between the popular base and the summit. On one hand it conveyed the thoughts and views of the people to the leaders; on the other hand it explained the opinions of the leaders and their instructions. Thus it provided direct, sound, democratic contact between the citizens and the leaders that represent their aspirations and objectives. It was also able to provide the internal "line of defense" as described by Sheikh Bashir Gemayel in one of his meetings with the members of the Central Council of the Committee.

Within almost one year about 112 popular committees were formed in villages covering a population of more than 250,000. The objective was to enlist the cooperation of non-party members in the service of the community and the State. At this stage the General Coordinator played a gigantic role. It established this number of committees that covered 425,000 people spread over the districts of Bsharreh, Koura, Metn, Kesrwan, Zahlé, Baalbek and Beirut. 1250 voluntary workers took part in the administration of these committees against no pay.

#### After the Election of President Sarkis

At the beginning of 1977 Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, President of the Kataeb, expressed the wish that these popular committees


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
halt their activities in the hope that the Government would be able to resume its services to the citizens. As everybody knows the official administration did not regain its full health and once again the citizens found themselves neglected and thier rights ignored, thus it was necessary to reactivate the popular committees beginning early 1980.

Accomplishments: (Ashrafieh Committee, consequently the Central Committee under supervision of the General Coordinator).

- Promoted the idea of using plastic bags for garbage disposal.
- Replaced the Beirut Municipality in providing the basic municipal services.
- Elaborated a new program for garbage collection which saved about 75% of the cost.
- Conducted the necessary daily analyses for the Beirut water system.
- Provided the necessary maintenance for the water, electricity, and telephone systems.
- Established clinics and equipped them with specialists and provided free medical treatment and medicines to the needy. Made blood classification and provided blood for the injured in hospitals. It also provided inoculation for the infants in the area.
- Reactivated the "Qarantina" Hospital
- Innovated the idea of a "Popular Market" under the Kataeb Martyrs Bridge.



- Issued the popular committees magazine.
- Prevented the cutting of trees and issued a law for protecting the Lebanese forests.
- Established parking places for cars.
- Issued a law for inspecting the pharmacies and the sanitary situation in schools.
- Combatted the marketing of harmful medicines.
- Legislated against hunting in certain places.
- Provided and is still providing vocational programs for the youth.
- Issued a legislation for controlling the marketing of pork meat.
- Combatted the "sandal worm", a task in which the Government failed.
- Participated in solving the housing shortages.
- Controlled food coloring and designated the harmful kinds.
- Conducted a scientific study for establishing natural reservations for preserving some unique aspects of the Lebanese landscape .
- Conducted a study and formulated a legislation for preserving the coasts and the fishing resources.



- Conducted a study and formulated a law for reafforestation of areas where the trees were cut or burned.
- Studied and organized the marketing and use of insecticides and pesticides of all kinds.
- Confiscated and destroyed big quantities of spoiled canned food and frozen meats imported from India.
- Helped in providing shelters and in providing means of protection and all sorts of relief works. In this respect it played a major role in Zahlé during the blockade and after.

These were the achievements of the Popular Committees in the field of providing the essential daily needs of the citizens. They are now engaged in more profound and important studies concerning Lebanon's future.

The Central Secretariat



Documentation & Research



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Documentation & Research

The exhibition "Books of Lebanon" held at the beginning of this year in the halls of the UNESCO, Paris, is a substantial testimonial of Lebanon's cultural contribution, both to the Oriental as well as the Western world.

It is also a healthy sign of vitality. In the foreword of the publication which was edited on this occasion, the French Minister of Culture, Mr. Jack Lang, wrote: "It is significant that Lebanon, in the darkest days of its ordeal, has succeeded in upholding its culture, keeping it alive like a flame which is sheltered in the palms of one's hands. It has never ceased to glow, inextinguishable, radiating life and hope.

Today, in Paris, here at this exhibition, a new proof of this conscience and undaunted will is given to us, to the glory of writers and books."

As Mr. Camille Aboussouan, Ambassador of Lebanon to the Unesco recalled: "The first Arab typography in France was due to the Lebanese, Gabriel Sionita, teacher of languages at the "College de France". With him, Orientalism was launched, and has today become one of the most important elements of French universal personality. In another valley of the mountains of Lebanon, at the Convent of Quoshaya, the first printing press of the Arab World went into action, almost simultaneously, in the service of one of mankind's most noble causes, the alliance of two distinct cultures: The Christian and the Islamic, through their respective means of expression, Syriac and Arabic.

"Faithful to its vocation since four thousand years of history, Lebanon was destined to promote and live through the renaissance of a civilization. No cultural field was neglected, no line of thought spared. Thus, the scores of works which proliferated until the year 1900, bear witness to the perennity of

a land of liberty, dialogue and friendship."


(World vocation)

As a country linking East and West, a land of encounter and of exchanges, a cradle of numerous civilizations which shaped its socio-cultural features throughout the ages, Lebanon acquired a form of bilingualism or polyglossism ever since the dawn of its history. Thus, the French language flourished in the 19th century, as a result of century-old links of friendship between the two countries, and of a multi-level cooperation with the West, France in particular.

The use of bilingualism and even trilingualism corresponds with Lebanon's universal vocation, the boundaries of which encompass the world. Open to the West, and maintaining privileged relations with its Arab neighbours, Lebanon is the ideal place for a dialogue between civilizations. It is a geographical crossroads, where Christendom and Islam meet. All the works of Lebanese writers in the Arabic and French languages bear witness to such a mission, by a quest for human and national values, through a confrontation of various cultures. This option and this universalist vocation are engraved in our history and in our consciences, and they both contribute to mould the peculiar features of Lebanese civilization. At the same time, they determine the specificity of our heritage.

The integration of Western-styled humanism and the use of foreign languages has inevitably been contested by some, raising opposition amongst the followers of a Lebanese entity fully integrated into the Arab World.

One fact, however, remains unquestioned, and admitted by all: it is the rebirth of Arab Literature, or "Al-Nahda", achieved at the beginning of this century under the influence of some foreign literary trends.



France has been selected as an abode by a number of French speaking writers, who thus elected to defend the Lebanese cause using its rostrum as an international forum. This was the case of poets, essayists, dramatic authors, and other intellectuals. Having fled Ottoman persecution, they settled in Paris and organized the struggle of liberation. Hence, the appearance of a "committed" form of literature, at that period. Essays and manifests were published to this effect, such as "The Lebanese Question", by Boulos Najm, in 1908. Dramatic plays were enacted on the Paris stages: "The Oath of a Tree", by Michel Sursock, in 1906. "Antar" by Chucri Ghanem, in 1910. It is not surprising that the French language holds a privileged place, in view of the fact that it happens to be a universal language, and the appropriate linguistic tool to serve a cause, by conveying messages to the West to enlist international support.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Lebanon was placed under a French mandate. This situation is another factor which explains the remarkable strides covered by French literature. Around Charles Corm, an illustrious poet of the period between the two world wars, one can find a cluster of other poets who share the ideas of a necessary return to Phoenician origins, and of Lebanon's singular vocation as a main crossroads of civilization. In his work "The Inspired Mountain", Corm composes an ode to the glory of his nation. (1934). Other works include "Patriotic Feelings", "Hommage to France", "Celebration of Lebanese Landscapes", all themes by the various poets of that period, the most celebrated of whom were: Hector Klat, Elie Tyan, Michel Chiha... Their poems delve deep into the country's history, often reflecting factual situation and revealing its essence and its perspectives.

Some of these poems may seem to be outdated today, because they were inspired by particular circumstances of their time.

However, they nevertheless stand as a shining example of the undeniable literary talent of their authors and the admirable ease with which they manipulate verse.


(A New Language)

To this orientation of poetry in the first half of the century, we may oppose the changes which occurred and the evolution realized in this field since Lebanon's accession to independence until our time.

Modern authors nowadays have a tendency to neglect circumstantial poetry, in favour of general themes, with human and universal characteristics. Poetry finds in this new trend a novel and original language, with such authors as George Shehade and Fuad Gabriel Naffah. According to most literary critics, George Shehade is rated amongst the greatest and most authentic poets of our age. He is the author of a compilation of poems and plays. "Poems" (1952) - "Monsieur Bob'le" (1951) - "An Evening of Proverbs" - (1954) - "Story of Vasco" (1956), etc. S. Robin wrote about him: "Torn between the West, which first instilled poetic revelation into his soul, dazzling him with its brilliance, and the mystic East, to which he is fettered by numerous spells, Shehade very ably delved into this same anguishing dilemma to extract the principles of lyrical virtues.

As for Fuad Gabriel Naffah, he is the author of a compilation of poems which is unanimously appreciated for its formal qualities, in harmony with the fickleness of inspiration. "The Description of Man, of the Frame and the Lyre". (1957).

Another remarkable fact which cannot be ignored, is the rather impressing number of women-writers who chose poetry. They are mostly to be found within the ranks of the great





contemporary authors. They have assimilated the contribution of foreign literary trends, while remaining attached to their oriental civilization. Of the latter, they have in their works restored the spirit and the background.

Andrée Chedid, the author of "Texts for a Face" (1949), "Texts for a Poem" (1950), "Texts for the Living", (1952)... Nadia Tueni, whose poetry is vibrant with the tremors of a lively sensitivity, the author of "Age of the Surf", (1966), "Joy and the Miscreants", (1968) , "Poems for a Story" (1972)... And Claire Gebeily, who tried to uncover all the ways of existence through the revelations of the heart and the senses, and who published "Latent Poems" (1968), "An Exile Memorial" (1975), "Discovery" (1981)... And so many other fervent adepts of the art of poetry, to whom they entrust the task of shedding light on their feminine condition, divided between the demands of reality and aspirations which are just as legitimate.

"Modern Lebanon", writes Maurice Sacre, "cannot claim having achieved anything in the field of original creations, unless it be in the realm of Poetry..."

Only poetry in Lebanon has achieved impressing strides and has penetrated the process of original creation, to an extent that it has become the equal, in a great measure, of the great world movements.

Writers and poets of Arabic expression, such as Gebran K. Gebran, Mikhail Naeime, Adonis, Said Akl, Chawki Abuchacra have conferred on Arab literature its patent letters of nobility. The celebrated orientalist, Jacques Bergue, in his foreword to "An Anthology to Contemporary Arabic Literature" (Edition du Seuil) wrote of the great Lebanese poet, Said Akl: "He pictures



himself as a herald of an exemplary Lebanon, who is prepared to propose to Europe a message of tolerance and grace, just like King Cadmus had done before him. This mission would go even further. It would be his duty to intensify Man's humanity, to spread friendship and creativity throughout the Orient, and comprehension and sacrifice throughout the world. It is certainly a complex task, but one in which he will not fail". In several other compilations, this Minstrel of all that is beautiful unfolds his verbal art in the presence of pretty damsels, as attractive as the idea itself and as real as the gushing waters of a mountain stream. His peerless verse recalls that of Petrarch and Maarri...He is an iconoclast on the surface only, and rekindles the flames of Mediterranean affinity in his Arabism."

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## MUSIC IN LEBANON

Lebanon is a country which is open to all horizons. As such, it participates in the international cultural life, not only in the field of literature, but also in the Arts, and mainly Music. The country is well endowed with conservatories, musical institutes, and various other organizations which all help to promote this artistic life.

### I. THE NATIONAL MUSIC CONSERVATORY

Founded about thirty years ago, it dispenses teaching in all instrumental and theoretical disciplines. Over thirty teachers provide tuition to some 600 students in the various fields: Piano, violin, both classical and Oriental, Transverse (German) Flute, Oriental Flute (Nay), Oboe, Bassoon, etc...

### II. THE KASLIK MUSICOLOGY INSTITUTE

Founded in 1970 by Father Louis Hajj, this institute is mainly specialized in conducting research in Oriental music. 260 students frequent this institute.

### III. THE TEKELIAN PREPARATORY MUSIC SCHOOL

Founded in 1974 by the Tuba player Minas Tekelian (now deceased), this school is a private Lebanese institution, acknowledged by the State. It prepares young students to enrol in the higher music courses of the National Conservatory.

### IV. THE MUSIC TEACHERS' SCHOOL

This school prepares music teachers for the country's official schools, over a three-year cycle.

### V- THE MUSICAL YOUTH OF LEBANON

These are quite different to the previously listed institutions: the J.M.L. are an association of volunteers, members

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of the International Federation of Musical Youth. Founded in 1954, the J.M.L. do not particularly aim at teaching music as such, but at imparting a musical education and an awareness of this art in children and youth.

#### VI-TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF A SYMPHONIC ORCHESTRA IN LEBANON

Lebanon however, suffers from a grave shortcoming: it has no symphonic orchestra.

In order to avoid the "Brain Drain" of musicians and youthful talents, the musical circles in Lebanon all agree that it is desirable to form a symphonic orchestra.

The development of music studies indicates that this is a feasible project. It would furthermore greatly contribute to enhance Lebanon's cultural and artistic life.

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Plastic Arts and Painting have enjoyed remarkable progress in Lebanon. Most observers were struck by the diversity of talents in this field: the Basbous brothers have acquired unquestionable mastery in the art of sculpture, and their works lack nothing by comparison with those of the famed European sculptors.

However, it is particularly in the field of painting that the Lebanese artists have shown original creativity. The production ranges from realism (Rashid Wehbe) to a style of allegorical inspiration (Juliana Seraphim, Jean Khalife and Nadia Saikaly). The tormented personality of Paul Guiragossian is reflected in his paintings, which depict the tragical side of life.

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
In this lies the mirror of a civilization. Riachrd Shaheen had the merit of publishing an encyclopaedia relating the marvellous history of "Plastic Arts in Lebanon", which is one of the features of our cultural heritage.

The well-known Paris daily, "Le Monde" in its issues dated November 22, 23, 1981 devoted a special supplement to Lebanon under the eloquent title : "Bent on Survival".

Hereafter, we reproduce the integral text of an article which appeared in this special issue, under the signature of J.P. Peroncel-Hugoz. This deals with Lebanon's intense activity in the field of editing.

**EDITING & PUBLISHING :** Lebanon's beehive activity in Arabic, English and French.

"In the field of editing, Lebanon has been, for the past third of a century to the Arabs what the Netherlands were to France in the XVIIth century. All the thinkers and writers of the Middle-East who wish to publish their opinions without being subjected to censorship, continue, ever since years past, and in spite of the state of war prevailing in Lebanon since 1975, to have their works published in Beirut. Sometimes, it is not due to their fear of censorship, but rather, to poor quality printing which induces Arab authors to apply to Lebanese a fact which induces most Arab authors to seek out the Lebanese printers in order to ensure quality editions. Magdi Wahba, of the celebrated Arab Academy in Cairo, has recently had his Franco-Arabic-English dictionaries on the subjects of Cinema, literature, languages and political terms published by the "Librairie du Liban", in order to make certain that there will be no smudges, errors or misprints in it at every page.



The Lebanese war has therefore not diminished the role of Beirut in the field of printing and editing, rather the contrary. Publishing has become a necessity for a great number of people, a passion, a craving, or a means to make up for political frustrations, to forget the upheavals brought about by the war. In 1980, 2500 works rolled off the presses in Beirut, i.e. more than the total produced by all the other Arab countries put together. For global circulation, only Egypt, with 43 million inhabitants overtook Lebanon, with its mere 3 million.

Furthermore, some remarkable works of translation are also to be found in Lebanon, such as "The Church of the Arabs" by Jean Corbon, (Editions du Cerf, 1977) carried out in 1980 for the "Imprimerie Catholique de Beyrouth" by Monsignor Aghnathios Hazim, who was at that time Archbishop of Lattakia (Syria).

The greater part of these publications are produced in Arabic. However, books in other languages are published in sufficiently large numbers in Lebanon. Of course, English and French form the greater part of these. French accounts for at least 10% of the titles produced by Dar-El-Mashrik, the Jesuits editing firm, French being understood and read by 60% of the Lebanese population.

The Lebanese University has also published over a hundred works of importance in French. Amongst these, we have "The Christian Orient, on the eve of Islam.", by Edmond Rabbath, published in 1980.





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Documentation & Research

## THE LEBANESE ECONOMY

The Lebanese economic literature provides many apologies, of Lebanon's laissez-faire economic system. To a large extent, these are justified by Lebanon's remarkable economic performance during the quarter of a century preceding the so-called civil war, especially as compared to the performance of other countries at similar levels of development or with similar natural endowments.

After the economic disaster of the war, Lebanon witnessed a new economic take-off in 1977, then in 1979, and again in the last quarter of 1981. It is not our purpose, however, once again to praise the virtues of Lebanon's economic system or to dwell upon the remarkable flexibility which enables this country rapidly to adjust to a continuously changing economic or political environment.

Rather, the focus here will be on the many problems Lebanon's economy is still facing, with the main purpose of generating a set of policy implications, and an agenda for economic research. In the first part of this analysis (I), post-war economic performance will be briefly assessed, with occasional reference to the pre-war experience. The major problems faced by the Lebanese economy till then be identified and analyzed (II) Suggestions for economic research will be made in section (III).

### I. Economic Performance after the War

In spite of heavy losses due to the war, economic activity in Lebanon managed to take a new start in 1977. Between 1977 and 1980 real growth was achieved in almost all sectors, even though, in general, levels of productions are still lower than in 1974. Some indicators of economic performance between 1974 and 1981 are presented in table 1.





Of all sectors, banking, which, in a sense, is Lebanon's "leading" economic sector, was apparently the least hurt. Although banks are still facing a host of problems, as a result of four to five years of economic slowdown, they succeeded during that period in expanding their overseas operations, while the number of commercial banks operating in Lebanon increased (eleven banks were established in 1979 - 1980 and 3 in 1981). Between the end of 1974 and the end of 1981, their overall balance sheet rose from around L.P. 12 billion to over 21 billion while their total credit to the private sector rose from less than L.P. 6 billion to over 21 billion.

After a period of wide fluctuation, the national currency was successfully stabilized by the end of 1979, though at a substantially higher rate per US dollar than in early 1975. In general, confidence in the Lebanese pound was maintained, even though rising interest rates on major foreign currencies led to an increase in the demand for these currencies, especially since 1979. On the other hand, the sharp increase of gold prices raised the value of Central Bank reserves and, consequently, the ratio of total reserves to the money supply, to around 90% in early 1980, thus strengthening the confidence in the pound.

These decent financial developments were paralleled by growth in the real sector of the economy, though at more modest rates than during the golden period of the 1960's and the early 1970s. The construction sector was active in many areas throughout the country. But speculation in real estate also flourished raising prices in this sector and adding to the already high rate of inflation (around 25% in 1981). Appropriate Central Bank measure to restrict credit led, in the second half of 1979 then in 1980, to a relative slowdown of both construction and real estate speculation.



Real growth was also achieved in industry, where nevertheless by early 1980, many existing firms had no resumed production yet. Besides, hosts of problems remain unsolved. Labor is today more expensive, and due to the emigration of skilled workers, the remaining labor force is clearly less productive than before the war. The provision of public services is deficient, and international competition is rising.

In spite of all problems, many new firms were licenced after the war, while many existing firms maintained decent rates of capacity utilization.

TABLE 1


Lebanon: Indicators of economic performance, 1974-79, by selected years

	1974	1977	1978	1979
Foreign assetw of the Bank of Lebanon, in millions of LP (end of the year) <sup>1</sup>	3804	5865	6675	6242
Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks, in millions of LP (end of the year)	12314	17298	20461	27021
Commercial bank credit to private Sector, in millions of LP (end of the year)	5728	8031	10009	13029
Total exports, in millions of LP	1740	2365	1930	2594
Manufactured exports, in millions of LP	1504	1892	1544	2074
Cement sales, in thousands of tons <sup>2</sup>	1837	1594	1356	2077
Energy consumed, in millions of Kwt/h	1540	1513	1644	1869
Balance of payments surplus in millions of LP				

Source: Central Bank and Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

1. Gold, included in these figures is valued at 542 per ounce, clearly underestimating the actual value of these assets.

2. This figure includes total sales of national cement industries



A significant share of total industrial production is still exported, but exports are geographically more concentrated than before the war, with Saudi Arabia buying, close to 50% of total exports. The traditionally large trade deficit is growing but, as in previous years, it is more than offset by capital inflows, mainly remittances from Lebanese working abroad. It should be clear, however, that, in view of the substantial amount of smuggling, which developed since the war, the existing data definitely underestimate actual trade.

It seems that growth was also achieved in agriculture, mainly in response to higher prices in export markets. This has led to higher prices of agricultural land throughout Lebanon, and even in the politically unstable south.

Of all sectors, tourism was obviously the most hurt. In spite of a slightly higher rate of used capacity in Lebanese hotels early in 1980 than in 1979 or 1978, this sector is almost stagnant and relies predominantly on domestic customers. The leisure industry, on the other hand, realized significant progress during the past few years, as the number of movie theaters, of restaurants and of summer and winter resort projects rose in various parts of the country.

In brief, it appears that the war did not destroy the foundations of the economic system in Lebanon, even though it has most probably changed the prospects for future growth and development. As before the war, private initiative remains powerful and, in the absence of public investment, economic growth in Lebanon today can only be attributed to the private sector.



This, however, by no means implies that Lebanon's economic structure did not change, and that optimism about Lebanon's economic future is unambiguously called for. With the war, a host of economic problems have developed, which could in the long run lead to the total failure of the system, unless solutions are rapidly designed. Optimism about the future of Lebanon's economy thus has to be qualified, and will be really justified only when the many problems that threaten and hamper economic efficiency and progress here are taken seriously by policy-makers. This, of course, requires that these problems be carefully investigated, which is unlikely in the absence of data and of appropriate economic research institutions. But, as a first step toward a solution, problems ought at least to be identified and classified. Such an attempt is made in the next (and main) section of this paper.

## II. Post-War Economic Problems

In general, a well-functioning market economy should be able to guarantee an optimal allocation of resources, i.e. economical efficiency. This, however, is true only if a number of conditions are satisfied, including the absence of externalities and of market imperfections.

Lebanon's economy has long provided an example of a decent approximation of a "perfect" market system. The absence of government intervention in this country, at a time the governments of most developing countries were heavily involved in economic affairs, apparently had the advantage of avoiding the many policy mistakes, the burden of which the developing world has been carrying for decades.

### Bank Interior Trade

But markets cannot survive without appropriate efforts of maintenance. In Lebanon, the war has definitely led to the erosion of economic efficiency with, as a result, a large number of problems which are today awaiting a solution.

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These include many market distortions, problems related to the human capital stock, many deficiencies in economic policy-making, and problems resulting from the fragility of the economic structure.


### Market Distortions

The theory of perfect competition traditionally assumes perfect information about goods and factor markets. The availability of such information in Lebanon has undoubtedly become less adequate since 1975, as the war distorted communication channels and led to a fragmentation of the domestic economy.

The resulting immobility of consumer goods, and production factors is clearly a source of inefficiency, since it is now possible for the price of a good or of a factor of production to vary according to its geographical location. The de facto partition of the country is tantamount to a sudden interruption of trade between two (or more) closely related countries. In many different ways, it leads to the misallocation of resources. In particular, it can cause (and in Lebanon has caused) overpricing of many goods, regional unemployment; cost inflation due to the duplication of the facilities of individual firms, losses due to reduced regional specialization of production, and urbanization amidst congestion, pollution, pollution, and anarchy.

Independently of the political structure or of the form of government the Lebanese will decide to choose in the future, the costs of market fragmentation (i.e. of immobility) will have to be remembered, and the free movement of goods, of factors, of consumers will have to be guaranteed.

The war was also a cause of market distortions in that it has changed the time horizon over which business people plan the future of their firms. By making the future more uncertain, the war




has made medium term and long term investments look more risky. Here again the problem is due to the absence of information: in a situation of political instability, the future is unknown and, hence, feared.

The resulting risk-aversion is a possible source of economic inefficiency, since it can introduce a bias in economic decision-making against long-run (usually industrial) projects and in favor of projects with high and rapid yield. Of course, to the extent that future risk is properly assessed, no inefficiency need result from risk-aversion. It is likely, however, that the present situation of political uncertainty in Lebanon has led to the over-estimation of future risk and, hence, to underinvestment in productive projects. Thus, that movie theaters, retail stores and restaurants are expanding today much faster than manufacturing should not be surprising; it is the logical outcome of the partial failure of an economic system subject to important market distortions.

The war also caused a rapid depreciation of the infrastructure with a negative effect on the cost functions of industrial firms. The increased costs of production cannot but lead to a relative contraction of industrial output, to a rise of industrial prices (and hence to a loss of comparative advantage in trade) and finally, to a slower rate of industrial investment. Sectors other than industry are also likely to be affected by the overall situation of deficient public service provision, though to a lower degree than industry. In any case, it remains true that the structure of economic production will change, as a result of the negative externalities related to the depreciating infrastructure, and hence be different from the structure that would have prevailed under normal market conditions .

Finally, the war has been a source of inefficiencies in that it probably reduced the degree of competition in individual markets.



Because smaller firms were, in general less well equipped than larger firms to adjust to the new environment, it is likely that the degree of concentration in individual markets has risen. Unfortunately, there are no data on market structure in Lebanon. It is nevertheless believed that a careful investigation of market organization would shed lights on the process of price determination in Lebanon today and, possibly, on the determinants of inflation.

But these distortions - lack of information, goods and factor immobility, risk-aversion, negative externalities in production, and rising market imperfections - are not alone responsible for the deficient functioning of domestic markets. For the human capital factor, the "entrepreneur" who was the "engine" of economic development in Lebanon was also hurt by war. This should be a source of concern in this natural-resource-poor country, where the erosion of human capital would essentially mean the depletion of the only factor of production in which it is relatively rich, with obvious negative effects on development and growth prospects.

#### Problems related to human Capital

These are no reliable estimates of the brain drain due to the war. It is nevertheless believed that at least 200.000 skilled workers left Lebanon since 1975. Most of these went to the oil-rich Arab countries, but a non-trivial proportion emigrated to developed countries in Europe, America or Australia.

A tentative distribution of these by country of emigration is presented in table 2. To the extent that these workers do not share their revenues with their families in Lebanon, or that they do not invest in Lebanon part of their incomes, this exit of capital is a dead-weight loss to Lebanon. It basically means that the effective yield of investment in this part of Lebanon's human capital can be as low as zero.



TABLE 2

Lebanese migrant labor force in 1975

Country of Emigration	Total	%Share
Saudi Arabia	20,000	20,1
Libya	5,700	5,6
Unated Arab Emirates	5,500	4,5
Kuwait	7,300	1,4
Qatar	1,500	1,5
Bahrain	500	1,5
Jordan	7,500	8,4
Oman	1,100	1,1
Iraq	3,000	3,1
West Africa	9,500	9,5
Europe (including Cyprus)	18,000	14,4
North America	5,000	5,1
South America	8,000	8,7
Australia	6,000	6,1
Total	98,000	100
TOTAL ARAB	51,000	52,2

Fortunately, links with the mother-country remain strong in most cases, at least in the short-run, but in many instances of permanent emigration, remittances will certainly decrease (if not vanish) in the long run, and Lebanon's human capital will then unambiguously decrease.

This massive brain-drain, even if partially offset by remittances of emigrants, has definitely created a shortage of skilled labor in Lebanon and is consequently responsible for at least a part of rising costs in manufacturing and other sectors.





This, in turn, had an obvious negative impact on the competitiveness of Lebanese product in export markets.

One should also be aware of the problems related to the eventual return of many of these workers to Lebanon, when the economic recession here is over or if regional or national political conditions are such as to force them to come back. These include a variety of cultural problems, as well as serious disturbances in the labor market. Moreover, it is likely that the returning labor force will have developed abroad skills that are not directly relevant for the Lebanese economy: re-training and adjustment costs could consequently be quite high.

Along with an important brain-drain, the war should be held responsible for a substantial amount of unemployment and underemployment in the domestic market. No estimates of unemployment in Lebanon exist. It is, however, believed that over 100,000 persons are today absorbed by the "informal" labor market. This figure could thus be taken as a proxy - in fact as a lower limit - for the unemployed labor force in Lebanon.

Estimates of production losses due to unemployment can generally be obtained by the difference between potential output at full-employment and actual output. No such production data exist for Lebanon. But the losses are probably huge, as indicated by the mere comparison of the labor force employed in Lebanon in 1973 (around 500,000) to domestic employment in 1980 (probably around 300,000).

A casual observation of Lebanon's labor markets shows, however, that most unemployment here is disguised. Many Lebanese are today engaged in an incredible variety of non productive and often "new jobs" "intermediaries", "brokers", agents; retail traders and speculators of all kinds are well known examples of such "new" occupations.

They all have in common that they deal with transfer (as opposed to production) operations. Revenue in all these cases is basically a rent, a return to mere power or to a specific social status. In many cases, activities in the informal sector are speculative in nature. Such speculative activities, mainly in real estate, caused sharp increases of both land and housing prices, and were a major determinant of inflation since 1975.

Another example of disguised unemployment is given today by the public service, where, in many cases civil servants do not have effective job assignments. Yet, employment in this sector is growing, financed by the creation of money, i.e., by inflation. The situation prevailing today in Lebanon's public administration is unfortunate, not only because of the waste of resources and the inefficiencies involved, but also it often causes a rapid depreciation of well trained-technicians - a non trivial proportion of the national human capital - who could have been usefully employed elsewhere.

But it is often the case in Lebanon today that employees in various sectors of the economy (and not only in the public service) are overqualified. This misuse of resources is clearly another cause of inefficiency, which can ultimately lead to the erosion of the misused capital.

The brain-drain, unemployment, underemployment, and low productivity in production, along with the many market distortions described earlier, make it clear that the mere reliance on the price system will not guarantee an optimal allocation of resources in Lebanon today. Hence, the need for "distorsion-correcting" economic policies, that only the government can undertake. But, designing and applying economic policy in itself is a problem in a country like Lebanon, where the economic role of the State was never really taken seriously or even properly understood. To such problems of economic policy-making we now turn.

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### THE DEFICIENCIES OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

There is no fiscal policy in Lebanon, where (exactly as under the Ottoman rule), the budget has always been a mere tool needed for the financing of basic public services. In principle, this in itself should not be a cause of concern. The theory of public finance makes it clear that, under perfect market conditions, there is an optimal amount of resources that should be allocated to public goods. Now if the demand for such goods is low, if markets are functioning properly and at high levels of employment, the optimum quantity of public goods is probably very small.

But if markets are distorted, and if negative externalities exist, then there is a good case for higher supply of public good and services. In particular, if the private sector is underinvesting in productive projects, there is a case for government investment in such project or at least in basic infrastructure projects, which are indispensable for further healthy expansion of the private sector. But the focus in Lebanon's public finance is still on current i.e.. typically unproductive areas of spending, as shown in table 3 . In the 1982 budget, 40% of equipment and development expenditures were allocated to national defense, which left only around 18% of the total for civil development and infrastructure projects.

On the other hand, the tax structure is deficient. Most government revenues are generated from customs duties, while direct taxation is only a minor component of the fiscal system. This obviously makes it extremely difficult to use the tax structure as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization policy since that would necessarily imply an unplanned change in the tariff structure i.e. in trade policy.



TABLE 3

Public spending in the Lebanese budget, 1974-1980, by selected years

	1974	1977	1978	1979	1980
Expenditures (in millions of L.P.)					
Current	836	1270	1420	1835	2458
Equipment	176	329	592	725	856
Development	213	62	248	246	271
Total	1225	1661	2260	2806	3585
Percentage Share of:					
Current	68	76	63	65	69
Equipment	15	20	26	26	24
Development	17	4	11	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The absence of tax handles in this country is a clear indicator of the backwardness of the fiscal system here, not only since the 1960s and the early 1970s. In view of the acute problems of unemployment and inflation prevailing today, the poverty of our arsenal of fiscal policy instruments seriously hampers the chances of an economic recovery.


It is true, of course, that monetary policy can, partially at least, offset this deficiency. In fact, use of monetary instruments was made since 1979, in an attempt to stabilize the pound and curb inflation. Measures included the establishment of a reserve requirement and credit controls. But financial markets

in Lebanon remain narrow, which limits the range of monetary instruments the Central Bank can rely upon .

In any case (at least if one believes in Keynesian "finetuning"), monetary policy has to be supplemented by appropriate fiscal measures, or - as a minimum requirement- fiscal "policy" ought not to be in contradiction with monetary policy. Hardly any such coordination between fiscal and monetary policies exists in Lebanon. In fact, recent experience shows that, at a time the Central Bank was engaged in monetary restraint, the budget deficit (and unproductive spending) were growing and clearly tending to offset the expected restrictive effect of monetary policy on inflation.

In fact, what is lacking in Lebanon is the very consciousness of the economic functions and role of the government. As for the use of the basic principles of microeconomics or of the theory of public finance in the Lebanese administration, it is practically nil. Hence, there is substantial room in Lebanon for the rationalization of government decision at both the macro and the microeconomic levels.

This would imply heavier reliance on economists in all the branches of the government, not only in the ministries of finance and of national economy, but also in education, health, defense, communications, and elsewhere. It also means that the economic content of government decisions should be carefully isolated and analyzed. Economic research is hence called for. It could be undertaken by the individual government agencies, of course, but it could also be centralized in a National Center for Economic Research, which would serve as the economic adviser of the government.



In the absence of such an institution, the status quo will go on i.e., little will be known about the Lebanese economy and the appropriate future development path it should follow. Furthermore, it will not be easy to say whether the present ( and often criticized) structure of the national economy is optimal or a potential source of future social losses. In fact, concentration in the Lebanese economy has been viewed as one of its major structural weaknesses. In particular, it is often believed that, in the long run, increasing concentration can be a source of new problems.



## THE FRAGILITY OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

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This apparent fragility partly stems from the structure of production. For the reliance on the production of services in Lebanon has always been relatively high. In principle, this in itself is not necessarily a distortion. But if the expansion of services at the expense of other sectors is due to unjustified risk-aversion, to lack of information about opportunities in other sectors, or to the inadequacy of public services or basic utilities, then the expansion of services is overexpansion indeed, and there is a need for "correction" i.e., for a more balanced structure and for a reduction in the share of services in total output.

Another problem stems from the geographical concentration of the Lebanese working abroad in a relatively small number of countries. If political or economic development conditions are such as to lower or eliminate the demand for these workers, the burden of finding jobs to these (temporary) emigrants, will be shifted on to Lebanon again. The solution to this problem clearly cannot rest in a proper "emigration policy" but rather in a proper domestic employment policy, which would involve both the control of aggregate demand and, at the microeconomic level finding appropriate solutions to structural problems within individual labor markets.

Concentration is also a major characteristic of Lebanon's export destination. In 1973, it seemed that, for many goods, markets were tending to become more diversified. This has apparently reversed this tendency. It is well known that Lebanon's exports heavily rely on oil-rich Arab markets. Here again, displacement of Lebanon's exports from these markets (due, say, to the higher domestic production of manufactures in these countries as they develop) could

mean economic disaster for many of Lebanon's exporters and industrialists. Hence the need for export market diversification, especially if exporters fail to see the risk of possible export displacement in the future.

A final source of concern—a cause of structural fragility—has to do with income distribution in Lebanon. Although hardly anything is known about this problem, it is likely that the war has exacerbated the maldistribution of income in Lebanon through inflation, inadequate supply of social services, an increasingly regressive tax system, and massive population displacements.

It is certain, nevertheless, that the distribution of income in this country (and its effects on resource allocation) have become uncontrollable, with unknown and unpredictable effects on the structure of production and on economic development. Moreover, the rising poverty problems could in the long-run lead to more political and social instability. Hence, there is a need for a careful investigation of distributional issues.

The simultaneous existence of all these problem-market distortions, human capital depreciation, inadequate economic policy, and potential economic instability —makes it almost impossible to predict any future development path for this economy. It is clear, however, that if these problems were seriously investigated, and if appropriate economic research were undertaken, prospects would significantly improve.





### III- AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH

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It should be clear at the outset that no serious economic research in Lebanon can be done in the absence of reliable statistics. The reorganization of the Central Statistics Agency ought to be one of Lebanese policy makers' top priorities, and may be even ranked higher than the mere establishment of a "development and reconstruction" plan. Only when the data are available and if appropriate research institutions are established, will it be possibly better to understand the national economy, and set priorities for the future. Research could be organized around the following major themes:

- 1/ Macroeconomic policy. This would focus on the issues of economic stabilization and inflation control. The construction of a mathematical model of the economy for prediction purposes seems highly desirable.
- 2/ Industrial organization. This would basically involve the investigation of market structure and the assessment of growth prospects for individual sectors of the economy. Pricing techniques, in particular, deserve special attention.
- 3/ Human capital. The brain-drain, labor requirements for development, returns from education, all deserve special investigation.
- 4/ Public finance. Techniques for the rationalization of government spending and taxation should be discussed. These should include heavier reliance on benefit-cost analysis of public projects. Efficient income maintenance programs, and a more equitable and efficient tax structure ought to be designed.
- 5/ Economic diversification. The need for a different economic structure will have to be assessed. Strategies for export market diversification will also have to be planned.

In brief, what is needed is the reliance on criteria of economic efficiency in policy-making. The notion of economic scarcity and its implications for policy have long been unknown in Lebanon. In this period of economic recession, of rising budget constraints, of macroeconomic disequilibrium, and of distorted markets, the case for a rationalization of economic decision is very strong indeed. There remains in Lebanon a huge potential for fast economic development but, unless the obstacles to such developement, and their implication in terms of short-run and long-run policy are taken seriously, gloom is probably all that can be predicted for this economy in the future years.

If however, by some sort of a miracle, all problems and obstacles were magically removed, and if markets all of a sudden started smoothly to function again, there should be no reason to worry. But who, in Lebanon, still believes in miracles ?





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RESOLUTION 436 (1978)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2089TH MEETING

ON OCTOBER 1978

The Security Council,

Noting with grave concern the deteriorating situation in Beirut and its surroundings,

Deeply grieved at the consequent loss of life, human suffering and physical destruction,

Noting the appeal made on 4 October 1978 by the President of the Security Council and the Secretary - General,

1. Calls upon all those involved in hostilities in Lebanon to put an end to acts of violence and observe scrupulously an immediate and effective cease-fire and cessation of hostilities so that internal peace and national reconciliation could be restored based on the preservation of Lebanese unity, territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty;
2. Calls upon all involved to permit units of the International Committee of the Red Cross into the area of conflict to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance;
3. Supports the Secretary -General in his efforts and requests him to continue these efforts to bring about a durable cease-fire, and to keep the Council informed on the implementation of the cease-fire.



THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION APRIL 10, 1981


The European Parliament concerned about the persistence of hostilities in Lebanon inflicting numerous victims among the civil population, particularly in the town of Zahle, thus aggravating the dangers of starting war in that region.

Recalling Resolution No 436 taken by the United Nations on October 6, 1978 calling for a cease fire and the domination of peace, and that the national reconciliation be established on the bases of preservation of the unity of Lebanon, its territorial integrity and its sovereignty.

Recalling the terms of the communiqué adopted by the European Council in Maestricht,

1. Invites all parties concerned to allow the representative of the International Red Cross to enter the areas of conflict in order to evacuate the injured and provide humanitarian assistance.
2. Demands an immediate cease fire and the termination of Syrian bombardment.
3. Demands the withdrawal of all foreign forces except the UNIFIL and the re-establishment of the authority of the legitimate Lebanese Government over all the territory through the proper national military and security forces.
4. Authorizes the President to transmit this Resolution to the Ministers meeting in the Council of European Parliament, to the UN General Secretary, to the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Israel and to the General Secretary of the Arab League.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND WAS PROPOSED BY THE GROUP AS A WHOLE.



THE FULL TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE  
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON APRIL 22ND 1982

Moved by the assassination of a French national employed at the French Embassy in Beirut, together with his wife as well as by the precedent murder of French Ambassador Louis Delamare, the European Parliament:

1. Expresses its indignation and condemnation of these crimes, and calls on Lebanese Authorities for protection of diplomats based in Beirut.
2. Asserts that the wave of terror can only lead Embassies to leave the country.
3. Asserts that Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty were indispensable factors for peace in the Middle East.
4. Emphasizes the necessity that Lebanon recovers its sovereignty throughout its entire territory and foreign troops' eviction.
5. Condemns the aggressions launched by Syrian Forces against the Lebanese people, notably in Zahle.
6. Appeals to the PLO to recognize the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Lebanese State. Appeals to the PLO to disarm its elements.
7. It calls-with the Lebanese people - for free, democratic sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Supports the Lebanese Government and all religious communities in their efforts to apply the democratic process which should allow Lebanon recover its sovereignty and to restore peace.
9. Entrusted its President to forward the resolution to the Committee, Council and Ministries of Foreign Affairs which are grouped in the framework of political cooperation.

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7. The Conference deplores the failure of the efforts of the Quadripartite Arab Committee, due both to the Syro-Palestinian occupation and to the proven ineffectiveness of UNIFIL. The Conference points out that Lebanon's sovereignty can only be one and indivisible and that, without waiting for a solution to the overall Middle East conflict, the Lebanese crisis must be settled without delay.

The democracies which respect human rights must work alongside the Lebanese Resistance, thus providing it with the means to pursue its policies.

To this end, the members of the Conference commit themselves to developing a policy of informing the public in their home countries of the nature and objectives of the struggle being waged by the Lebanese Resistance Forces and pledge to work for the creation of solidarity groups for Lebanon in each of the countries represented.

8. The Conference hereby decides to hold its next session in April 1984, in Lebanon. To this end, it shall create a permanent Committee whose task it will be:
- a. to prepare for the Second International Conference for Solidarity with Lebanon.
  - b. to maintain contact with the members who took part in the first conference and to extend its links with other leading personalities from various countries so as to keep solidarity with Lebanon alive and active.

The Conference shall endow the Chairman of the Committee with full authority to supervise the organization and functioning of the Committee in cooperation with the members.



The members who took part in the First International Congress for Solidarity with Lebanon become founding members. In this capacity, they proclaim their determination to help Lebanon, in a spirit of solidarity and freedom.

The Conference designates Mr. Bashir Gemayel to the office of the Chairman of the PERMANENT COMMITTEE of the INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH LEBANON.

Beit-Mery (Lebnaon), April 3rd, 1982



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TEXT OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL  
CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH LEBANON ON APRIL 3RD 1982

The First International Conference for Solidarity with Lebanon, held in Beit-Mery (Lebanon) at the invitation of the Lebanese Resistance Forces on April 2nd and 3rd, 1982 and bringing together one hundred and thirty participants from 15 different countries as well as delegations from several groups within the European Parliament;

Having heard the presentations of several speakers concerning the unprecedented tragedy being lived out in Lebanon since April 13, 1975, which has caused and continues to cause so much human suffering and which threatens the very existence of Lebanon:

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH LEBANON

1. Expresses its total solidarity with Lebanon and with the Lebanese people, in the critical and painful ordeal which they have been facing since 1975, and proclaims its support for the Lebanese Resistance.

It solemnly appeals to the international community, to immediately mobilize all political and human means so that the Lebanese people can once again become the sole master of its fate and recover the attributes of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. Supports the Lebanese people in its efforts to restore its national sovereignty. This sovereignty is totally incompatible with the settlement of the Palestinians whose massive, armed presence in Lebanon is upsetting the historical and political equilibrium of this country, threatening the peace in this part of the world and contributing to international terrorism. The Conference, noting the destabilizing effect of the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon, demands that the PLO undertake immediately and unconditionally to completely disarm its elements and submit to full compliance with Lebanese laws and regulations.

3. Declares the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the Syrian army and its replacement by the Lebanese army to be indispensable. Such a withdrawal will bring an end to the occupation and to attempts at annexation and genocide. In this regard, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria is highly desirable in order to signal Syria's respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Finally, the Conference urges the Syrian leaders to release the Lebanese citizens who are illegally detained in Syria, in violation of all international conventions and humanitarian principles.
4. Demands that the 1982 presidential elections be organized in an atmosphere of complete freedom so that the new President of the Republic may give concrete and immediate expression to the Lebanese people's determination to recover their independence, liberty and full sovereignty. There can be no guarantee of a free election as long as the Syrian army is in Lebanon.
5. Denounces the depiction of events in Lebanon as a "civil war" , when what is involved is a national struggle against a two fold-occupation; it applauds all actions aimed at liberating Lebanon and testifies to its support and admiration for the Lebanese Resistance Forces, whose determination to build a free and pluralistic society reflects the peculiar characteristics of Lebanon's historical structures. The Conference can only support this profound determination to transform the socio-economic structures of Lebanon, in pursuit of progress and development in a context of freedom.
6. Calls upon the international community to take heed of the dangers which threaten the diplomatic missions in Lebanon, as well as the exercise of press freedoms; these perils are , moreover , only one reflection of a policy of annexation and state terrorism not only foreign to Lebanon but liable to deprive it of its diplomatic relations and of its privileged position as a country with a free press.

